Towards End-to-End Verified TEEs via Verified Interface Conformance and Certified Compilers

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI:10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00021

Farzaneh Derakhshan, Zichao Zhang, Amit Vasudevan, Limin Jia

{"title":"Towards End-to-End Verified TEEs via Verified Interface Conformance and Certified Compilers","authors":"Farzaneh Derakhshan, Zichao Zhang, Amit Vasudevan, Limin Jia","doi":"10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00021","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) are ubiq-uitous. They form the highest privileged software component of the platform with full access to the system and associated devices. However, vulnerabilities have been found in deployed TEEs allowing an attacker to gain complete control. Despite the progress made in fully-verified software systems, few deployed TEEs are fully-verified, due to the high cost of verification. Instead of aiming for full-functional correctness, this paper proposes a formal framework and approach that leverages com-partmentalization at the source level to bring security-relevant properties verified at the source level down to the binary via existing certified compilers. The benefit of our approach is the relative low cost of verification: developers can use existing automated program verification tools and certified compilers. Our case studies demonstrate how security properties verified on two open-source TEEs at the source level can be pushed down to the compiled code by using an off-the-shelf certified compiler.","PeriodicalId":179870,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00021","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) are ubiq-uitous. They form the highest privileged software component of the platform with full access to the system and associated devices. However, vulnerabilities have been found in deployed TEEs allowing an attacker to gain complete control. Despite the progress made in fully-verified software systems, few deployed TEEs are fully-verified, due to the high cost of verification. Instead of aiming for full-functional correctness, this paper proposes a formal framework and approach that leverages com-partmentalization at the source level to bring security-relevant properties verified at the source level down to the binary via existing certified compilers. The benefit of our approach is the relative low cost of verification: developers can use existing automated program verification tools and certified compilers. Our case studies demonstrate how security properties verified on two open-source TEEs at the source level can be pushed down to the compiled code by using an off-the-shelf certified compiler.

查看原文本刊更多论文

通过验证接口一致性和认证编译器实现端到端验证tee

可信执行环境(TEE)无处不在。它们构成了平台的最高特权软件组件，具有对系统和相关设备的完全访问权限。然而，在部署的tee中发现了漏洞，允许攻击者获得完全控制。尽管在完全验证的软件系统方面取得了进展，但由于验证成本高，部署的tee很少得到完全验证。本文提出了一个正式的框架和方法，该框架和方法利用源级的分隔，通过现有的经过认证的编译器将源级验证的安全相关属性降至二进制文件。我们的方法的好处是相对较低的验证成本:开发人员可以使用现有的自动化程序验证工具和经过认证的编译器。我们的案例研究演示了如何通过使用现成的经过认证的编译器，将在源代码级的两个开源tee上验证的安全属性下推到已编译的代码中。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)

自引率

0.00%

发文量