{"title":"Demand Spillovers and Market Outcomes in the Mutual Fund Industry","authors":"A. Gavazza","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1487629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1487629","url":null,"abstract":"When consumers concentrate their purchases at a single firm, a firm that offers more products than its rivals can gain market share for all its other products, as well. These spillovers induce firms to compete by offering a greater variety of products rather than lower prices, and a natural form of industry concentration with few large firms offering many products can arise if spillovers are strong enough. This paper presents a simple model that illustrates this mechanism explicitly. The empirical analysis documents strong demand spillovers in the retail segment of the U.S. mutual fund industry, in which fees are non-trivial, families offer a large number of funds, and the market is quite concentrated. Instead, spillovers are weaker, fees are lower, families offer fewer funds, and the market structure is more fragmented in the institutional segment. The current design of employer-sponsored defined-contribution retirement plans likely accounts for these differential demand patterns between the retail and the institutional segments.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126744784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Upward Price Pressure, Merger Simulation, and Merger Simulation Light","authors":"M. Noel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2653096","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2653096","url":null,"abstract":"The Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have traditionally used market shares as an early preliminary screen in evaluating the potential for anticompetitive effects of a proposed merger. Recently, Farrell and Shapiro proposed a new merger screen known as Upward Price Pressure. This article discusses the advantages and disadvantages of this screen, contrasts it to more complicated full merger simulations, and ultimately suggests a merger simulation light approach that has elements of both and that may be more useful in the very early stages of analysis.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127456859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do We Need Big Banks? Evidence on Performance, Strategy and Market Discipline","authors":"Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, H. Huizinga","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1774869","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1774869","url":null,"abstract":"For an international sample of banks, we construct measures of a bank’s absolute size and its systemic size defined as size relative to the national economy. We then examine how a bank’s risk and return, its activity mix and funding strategy, and the extent to which it faces market discipline depend on both size measures. While absolute size presents banks with a trade-off between risk and return, systemic size is an unmitigated bad, reducing return without a reduction in risk. Despite too-big-to-fail subsidies, we find that systemically large banks are subject to greater market discipline as evidenced by a higher sensitivity of their funding costs to risk proxies, suggesting that they are often too big to save. The finding that a bank’s interest cost tends to rise with its systemic size can also in part explain why a bank’s rate of return on assets tends to decline with systemic size. Overall, our results cast doubt on the need to have systemically large banks. Bank growth has not been in the interest of bank shareholders in small countries, and it is not clear whether those in larger countries have benefited. While market discipline through increasing funding costs should keep systemic size in check, clearly it has not been effective in preventing the emergence of such banks in the first place. Inadequate corporate governance structures at banks seem to have enabled managers to pursue high-growth strategies at the expense of shareholders, providing support for greater government regulation.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126365729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Re-Thinking Commercial Real Estate Market Segmentation","authors":"Franz Fuerst, G. Marcato","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1692953","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1692953","url":null,"abstract":"Identifying groups of comparable individual assets for a relative comparison of investment performance presents a major difficulty for direct real estate investors. The old adage ‘no two properties are exactly the same’ expresses this problem, yet investment managers require reliable this information to assess the performance of individual assets. The most common segmentation currently used in real estate investment analysis combines property sector and geographical region. In this paper, we compare the predictive power of existing industry classifications with a new type of segmentation using cluster analysis on a number of relevant property attributes, including the equivalent yield and size of the property, as well as information on lease terms, number of tenants and tenant concentration. The new segments are shown to be distinct and relatively stable over time. In a second stage of the analysis, we test whether the newly generated segments are also able to better predict the resulting financial performance of the assets than the old two-dimensional segments. Applying both discriminant and neural network analysis we find mixed evidence for this hypothesis. Overall, we conclude that each of the two approaches is valid depending on the specific task at hand. While our new clusters are more suitable for identifying investment opportunities and risks, the old sector-region classification is sufficient for describing the broad characteristics of a real estate portfolio.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131220233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Endogenous Sunk Costs, Quality Competition and Welfare: A Technical Note","authors":"George S. Ford, Michael L. Stern","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1739760","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1739760","url":null,"abstract":"Quality competition, by increasing sunk costs, may produce levels of concentration even higher than expected in its absence. Based on Sutton's model of endogenous sunk costs and quality competition, we show that consumers, under certain conditions, may benefit from higher industry concentration driven by an increase in endogenous sunk costs despite the effects on concentration and likely attenuation of price competition.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121094071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Competition and Market Structure in Local Real Estate Markets","authors":"Jason Beck, F. Scott, Aaron Yelowitz","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1727604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1727604","url":null,"abstract":"The persistence of the standard six percent real estate sales commission across markets and over time calls into question the competitiveness of the residential real estate brokerage industry. While there is anecdotal evidence that some local real estate markets are fairly concentrated, no systematic study of market structures has been conducted. We have collected primary data on the number and market shares of real estate brokers in a variety of small, medium, and large real estate markets across the U.S. for 2007 and 2009. In addition to these cross sectional data, we have also collected longitudinal data on the size distribution of firms for Louisville, KY for a nine-year period. In our cross-sectional analysis of medium and large markets, we find no evidence that market concentration might create problems for competition. We do find that small markets on average have higher HHI’s than medium and large markets. The longitudinal analysis reveals that many small brokers are in and out of the market, selling a house or two one year and selling zero houses the next year.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133787335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Meta-Analysis of Estimates of the Impact of Technical Barriers to Trade","authors":"Yuan Li, J. Beghin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1511827","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1511827","url":null,"abstract":"A meta-analysis explains the variation in estimated trade effects of technical barriers to trade broadly defined, using available estimates from the empirical international trade literature, and accounting for data sampling and methodology differences. Agriculture and food industries tend to be more impeded by these barriers than other sectors. SPS regulations on agricultural and food trade flows from developing exporters to high-income importers tend to impede trade. Not controlling for “multilateral resistance” barriers increase the likelihood to overstate the trade impeding effect of technical measures and not accounting for their potential endogeneity with trade does the opposite. Studies using direct maximum residue limits tend to find more trade impeding effects than other measures and clearer policy implications. Other technical measures proxies tend to muddle results and increase the likelihood of inconclusive results and few policy implications.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127621720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Competition and Product Quality in the Supermarket Industry","authors":"David A. Matsa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1440414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1440414","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the effect of competition on a supermarket firm’s incentive to provide product quality. In the supermarket industry, product availability is an important measure of quality. Using U.S. consumer price index microdata to track inventory shortfalls, I find that stores facing more intense competition have fewer shortfalls. Competition from Wal-Mart – the most significant shock to industry market structure in half a century – decreased shortfalls by up to 24 percent. The risk that customers will switch stores appears to provide competitors with a strong incentive to invest in product quality.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127141862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Merger Simulations with Observed Diversion Ratios","authors":"L. Mathiesen, Øivind A. Nilsen, Lars Sørgard","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1698166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1698166","url":null,"abstract":"A common approach to merger simulations used in antitrust cases is to calibrate demand from market shares and a few additional parameters. When the products involved in the merger case are differentiated along several dimensions, the resulting diversion ratios may be very different from those based upon market shares. This again may affect the predicted post-merger price effects. This article shows how merger simulation can be improved by using observed diversion ratios. To illustrate the effects of this approach we use diversion ratios from a local grocery market in Norway. In this case diversions from the acquired to the acquiring stores were considerably smaller than suggested by market shares, and the predicted average price increase from the acquisition was 40 % lower using this model rather than a model based upon market shares. This analysis also suggests that even a subset of observed diversion ratios may significantly change the prediction from a merger simulation based upon market shares.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129612683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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