Staff ReportPub Date : 2006-12-03DOI: 10.21034/sr.389
Benjamin Bridgman, Shi Qi, James A. Schmitz
{"title":"Does Regulation Reduce Productivity? Evidence From Regulation of the U.S. Beet-Sugar Manufacturing Industry During the Sugar Acts, 1934-74 ∗","authors":"Benjamin Bridgman, Shi Qi, James A. Schmitz","doi":"10.21034/sr.389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21034/sr.389","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the pervasiveness of industry regulation, there are few studies of its impact on industry productivity. Assessing regulation's impact on productivity has been difficult for a number of reasons, including the complexity of regulations and the difficulty measuring productivity. We study an industry, the U.S. beet-sugar industry, where these problems and others are much less severe than is usual. While the U.S. beet-sugar industry has been protected from foreign competition since its inception over 100 years ago, it has been heavily regulated only during the 40 year period of the Sugar Acts, 1934-74. Regulations in this period were of two major forms. First, the government set up a mechanism to control both the amount of acres planted to sugar beets and beet-sugar produced by factories. Second, the government attempted to redistribute some of the \"rents\" earned in the industry. It sent checks to farmers based on the amount of sugar they \"produced.\" Farmers produced sugar-in-the-crop, which we denote S, which equals the tons of beets harvested (T) multiplied by the fraction of sugar in the beet (q), or S=qâ‹…T. It also taxed factories on the amount of white sugar, or sugar-in-the-bag, they produced, which we denote Y. (Y is produced from S and, obviously, Y","PeriodicalId":164493,"journal":{"name":"Staff Report","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133492537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Staff ReportPub Date : 2006-11-01DOI: 10.21034/sr.383
Christopher Phelan, Andrzej Skrzypacz
{"title":"Private monitoring with infinite histories","authors":"Christopher Phelan, Andrzej Skrzypacz","doi":"10.21034/sr.383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21034/sr.383","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops new recursive methods for studying stationary sequential equilibria in games with private monitoring. We first consider games where play has occurred forever into the past and develop methods for analyzing a large class of stationary strategies, where the main restriction is that the strategy can be represented as a finite automaton. For a subset of this class, strategies which depend only on the players’ signals in the last k periods, these methods allow the construction of all pure strategy equilibria. We then show that each sequential equilibrium in a game with infinite histories defines a correlated equilibrium for a game with a start date and derive simple necessary and sucient conditions for determining if an","PeriodicalId":164493,"journal":{"name":"Staff Report","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122809296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Staff ReportPub Date : 2005-05-12DOI: 10.1086/429279
James A. Schmitz
{"title":"What determines productivity? lessons from the dramatic recovery of the U.S. and Canadian iron-ore industries following their early 1980s crisis","authors":"James A. Schmitz","doi":"10.1086/429279","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/429279","url":null,"abstract":"Great Lakes iron ore producers had faced no competition from foreign iron ore in the Great Lakes steel market for nearly a century as the 1970s closed. In the early 1980s, as a result of unprecedented developments in the world steel market, Brazilian producers were offering to deliver iron ore to Chicago (the heart of the Great Lakes market) at prices substantially below local iron ore prices. The U.S. and Canadian iron ore industries faced a major crisis that cast doubt on their future. In response to the crisis, these industries dramatically increased productivity. Labor productivity doubled in a few years (whereas it had changed little in the preceding decade). Materials productivity increased by more than half. Capital productivity increased as well. I show that most of the productivity gains were due to changes in work practices. Work practice changes reduced overstaffing and hence increased labor productivity. Changes in work practices, by increasing the fraction of time equipment was in operating mode, also significantly increased materials and capital productivity.","PeriodicalId":164493,"journal":{"name":"Staff Report","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131377487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Staff ReportPub Date : 2005-05-01DOI: 10.20955/r.87.537-550
Ellen R. McGrattan, E. Prescott
{"title":"Productivity and the Post-1990 U.S. Economy","authors":"Ellen R. McGrattan, E. Prescott","doi":"10.20955/r.87.537-550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/r.87.537-550","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we show that ignoring corporate intangible investments gives a distorted picture of the post-1990 U.S. economy. In particular, ignoring intangible investments in the late 1990s leads one to conclude that productivity growth was modest, corporate profits were low, and corporate investment was at moderate levels. In fact, the late 1990s was a boom period for productivity growth, corporate profits, and corporate investment.","PeriodicalId":164493,"journal":{"name":"Staff Report","volume":"167 8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125980769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Staff ReportPub Date : 2005-03-01DOI: 10.21034/sr.360
M. Boldrin, D. Levine
{"title":"Intellectual property and market size","authors":"M. Boldrin, D. Levine","doi":"10.21034/sr.360","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21034/sr.360","url":null,"abstract":"Intellectual property protection involves a trade-off between the undesirability of monopoly and the desirable encouragement of creation and innovation. As the scale of the market increases, due either to economic and population growth or to the expansion of trade through treaties such as the World Trade Organization, this trade-off changes. We show that, generally speaking, the socially optimal amount of protection decreases as the scale of the market increases. We also provide simple empirical estimates of how much it should decrease.","PeriodicalId":164493,"journal":{"name":"Staff Report","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133597800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Staff ReportPub Date : 2004-12-01DOI: 10.21034/sr.338
Ellen R. McGrattan
{"title":"Comment on Gali and Rabanal's \"Technology shocks and aggregate fluctuations: how well does the RBC model fit postwar U.S. data?\"","authors":"Ellen R. McGrattan","doi":"10.21034/sr.338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21034/sr.338","url":null,"abstract":"Gali and Rabanal provide statistical evidence that, in their view, puts into question the real business cycle paradigm in favor of the sticky-price paradigm. I demonstrate that their statistical procedure is easily misled in that they would reach the same conclusions even if their data had been simulated from an RBC model. I also demonstrate that sticky-price models do a poor job generating U.S.-like business cycles with only shocks to technology, the federal funds rate, and government consumption. This explains why Gali and Rabanal need large unobserved shocks to preferences and to the degree of monopoly power.","PeriodicalId":164493,"journal":{"name":"Staff Report","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123637769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Staff ReportPub Date : 2004-07-01DOI: 10.1111/J.1467-937X.2004.00302.X
M. Nardi
{"title":"Wealth inequality and intergenerational links","authors":"M. Nardi","doi":"10.1111/J.1467-937X.2004.00302.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1467-937X.2004.00302.X","url":null,"abstract":"Previous work has had difficulty generating household saving behavior that makes the distribution of wealth much more concentrated than that of labor earnings, and that makes the richest households hold onto large amounts of wealth, even during very old age. I construct a quantitative, general equilibrium, overlapping-generations model in which parents and children are linked by accidental and voluntary bequests and by earnings ability. I show that voluntary bequests can explain the emergence of large estates, while accidental bequests alone cannot, and that adding earnings persistence within families increases wealth concentration even more. I also show that the introduction of a bequest motive generates lifetime savings profiles more consistent with the data.","PeriodicalId":164493,"journal":{"name":"Staff Report","volume":"167 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132601819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Staff ReportPub Date : 2004-03-01DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0684(05)01021-X
Stephen L. Parente, E. Prescott
{"title":"A unified theory of the evolution of international income levels","authors":"Stephen L. Parente, E. Prescott","doi":"10.1016/S1574-0684(05)01021-X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0684(05)01021-X","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":164493,"journal":{"name":"Staff Report","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134319939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Staff ReportPub Date : 2004-02-01DOI: 10.3386/W10316
E. Prescott
{"title":"Why Do Americans Work so Much More than Europeans","authors":"E. Prescott","doi":"10.3386/W10316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W10316","url":null,"abstract":"Americans now work 50 percent more than do the Germans, French, and Italians. This was not the case in the early 1970s, when the Western Europeans worked more than Americans. This article examines the role of taxes in accounting for the differences in labor supply across time and across countries; in particular, the effective marginal tax rate on labor income. The population of countries considered is the G-7 countries, which are major advanced industrial countries. The surprising fi nding is that this marginal tax rate accounts for the predominance of differences at points in time and the large change in relative labor supply over time.","PeriodicalId":164493,"journal":{"name":"Staff Report","volume":"34 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123461998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Staff ReportPub Date : 2003-07-01DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00256
M. Golosov, N. Kocherlakota, Aleh Tsyvinski
{"title":"Optimal indirect and capital taxation","authors":"M. Golosov, N. Kocherlakota, Aleh Tsyvinski","doi":"10.1111/1467-937X.00256","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00256","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we consider an environment in which agents? skills are private information, are potentially multi-dimensional, and follow arbitrary stochastic processes. We allow for arbitrary incentive-compatible and physically feasible tax schemes. We prove that it is typically Pareto optimal to have positive capital taxes. As well, we prove that in any given period, it is Pareto optimal to tax consumption goods at a uniform rate.","PeriodicalId":164493,"journal":{"name":"Staff Report","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116888629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}