LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)最新文献_第5页

Systemic Risk and Financial Contagion 系统性风险和金融传染

LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-06-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3407969

Eduard Buzila

{"title":"Systemic Risk and Financial Contagion","authors":"Eduard Buzila","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3407969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3407969","url":null,"abstract":"It is widely acknowledged now, by many financial and macroeconomists, that in the past, only little attention has been paid to “systemic risk” and “financial contagion”. Rochet and Tirole point out that the ”anxiety about systemic risk is perhaps strongest among bank executives and regulators“. Galati and Moessner state that ”there has been a fundamental lack of understanding of system-wide risk“. Battiston et al. confirm the latter statement by saying that the ”recent financial crisis has shown that systemic risk has been dramatically underestimated“. Fouque and Langsam emphasis this fact when they say that the ”[r]ecent history has shown us not only the enormous cost of a systemic crisis but also how woefully unprepared and ill-equipped governments and private markets have been to prevent systemic crisis or minimize its impact“. According to Geanakoplos et al. Macroeconomists were completely surprised by the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Up until then they had concentrated on macroeconomics with a capital M: global imbalances, interest rates, monetary policy“. Therefore, as Martınez-Jaramillo et al. put it, the ”understanding of systemic risk is of central importance for maintaining financial stability“.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"27 24","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113976597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Effect of Patent Length on Social Welfare: The Economics of Modifying Patent Life as a Policy Instrument 专利期限对社会福利的影响:调整专利期限作为政策工具的经济学

LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2601594

Kai Xie

{"title":"The Effect of Patent Length on Social Welfare: The Economics of Modifying Patent Life as a Policy Instrument","authors":"Kai Xie","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2601594","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2601594","url":null,"abstract":"This paper will explore the contemporary applicability of an economic model of patents. It will proceed to then analyze the implications of the model’s findings on scholarly understanding of the contemporary patent system. The model views a patent as conferring a period of exclusivity during which the patentee can reap the producer surplus due to monopoly pricing. Upon expiration of the patent and thus the elimination of the deadweight loss characteristic of the patentee’s monopoly pricing during the term, the surplus becomes entirely the consumer’s. The model treats the problem as one of optimization, balancing the force of the patentee’s profit motive and desire to seek adequate recompense for its initial cash outlay to come up with the invention (i.e. a desire for a longer patent term), with the push of the government’s desire to reduce the deadweight loss and allow other market entrants (i.e. a shorter patent term). My updates to the model demonstrates that contemporary discount rates will not affect the basic findings that welfare is not too dependent on patent length. In addition, the findings still have policy-setting applicability in light of the existence of patent thickets. If the government were to aim to decrease thickets, then shortening patent life would be an effective tool, as overall societal welfare would be minimally impacted. The paper also demonstrates that shortening or tweaking patent life also has the ability to stem the effects of the activity of non-practicing entities (NPEs), commonly known as “patent trolls.”","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116871931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Economics of Civil Procedure 民事诉讼经济学

LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-04-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2568705

Daniel Klerman

引用次数: 13

The Institutions of Roman Markets 罗马市场制度

LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-03-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2588582

Benito Arruñada

引用次数: 5

Return on Political Investment in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 2004年美国就业创造法案的政治投资回报

LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-12-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2537079

H. Chen, Katherine Gunny, K. Ramanna

引用次数: 8

Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics 象征性公司治理政治

LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2404530

{"title":"Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics","authors":"","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2404530","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2404530","url":null,"abstract":"How are we to understand the persistent gap between rhetoric and reality that characterizes so much of corporate governance politics? In this Article, we show that the rhetoric around a variety of high profile corporate governance controversies (including shareholder proposals asking boards to redeem poison pills, proxy access, majority voting in director elections, and shareholder proposals to remove supermajority voting requirements) cannot be justified by the material interests at stake. At the same time, shareholder activists are oddly reluctant to pursue issues that may have a more material impact, such as anti-pill charter provisions or mandatory bylaw amendments. We consider a variety of explanations for this phenomenon including “public interest” analyses, “public choice” analyses, and the possibility that corporate governance politics has a substantial “symbolic” or “folkloristic” element. Elaborating on arguments made in Thurman Arnold’s The Folklore of Capitalism, we suggest that there is an analogous “Folklore of Corporate Governance” that serves to reconcile the gap between our idealized view of corporations as controlled by real-life shareholders and the inevitable reality that effective control largely resides in managements and in disembodied institutions. We consider some implications of the explanations we put forward.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130398167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

Global Cartels Redux: The Lysine Antitrust Litigation 全球卡特尔重组:赖氨酸反垄断诉讼

LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-11-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2520151

J. Connor

引用次数: 4

Defining Section 5 of the FTC Act: The Failure of the Common Law Method and the Case for Formal Agency Guidelines 界定《联邦贸易委员会法》第5条:普通法方法的失败和正式机构指南的案例

LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-09-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2496748

J. Rybnicek, Joshua D. Wright

{"title":"Defining Section 5 of the FTC Act: The Failure of the Common Law Method and the Case for Formal Agency Guidelines","authors":"J. Rybnicek, Joshua D. Wright","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2496748","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2496748","url":null,"abstract":"As the Federal Trade Commission (\"FTC\" or the \"Commission\") celebrates its 100th anniversary, it does so amid a renewed interest in finally defining what constitutes a standalone \"unfair method of competition\" under Section 5 of the FTC Act. For a century, the business community and agency staff have been without any meaningful guidance about what conduct violates the Commission's signature competition statute. As consensus begins to build about the appropriate parameters of Section 5, some commentators have opposed articulating a principled standard for the application of the FTC's authority to prosecute standalone unfair methods of competition for fear that doing so would too severely restrict the agency's enforcement agenda. These commentators prefer for Section 5 to develop through the common law method, and point to the successful development of the traditional antitrust laws as evidence that the common law approach is the standard and preferred means for developing competition law. This Article discusses why, after a century-long natural experiment, it is clear that the common law method cannot be expected to define the scope of the FTC's unfair methods of competition authority. This Article explains that the failure of the common law process in the Section 5 context is due to fundamental differences between the inputs and outputs associated with traditional litigation and those associated with Section 5 enforcement actions. In particular, this Article explains that Section 5 disputes have almost always been resolved through settlements and, unlike reasoned judicial decisions, that such settlements do not help the public distinguish between what conduct is lawful and unlawful and generally are not treated as binding precedent by the FTC. As a result, this Article argues that the Commission should issue formal agency guidelines to serve as a superior analytical starting point and finally give meaning and purpose to Section 5.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114632022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

The Behavioural Economics of Competitive Balance: Implications for League Policy and Championship Management 竞争平衡的行为经济学:对联赛政策和冠军管理的启示

LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-09-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2493764

Oliver Budzinski, T. Pawlowski

{"title":"The Behavioural Economics of Competitive Balance: Implications for League Policy and Championship Management","authors":"Oliver Budzinski, T. Pawlowski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2493764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2493764","url":null,"abstract":"The theory of competitive balance represents one of the core concepts of sports economics. Based upon an international research project analyzing the perception of competitive balance by consumers (Pawlowski 2013a, 2013b; Pawlowski & Budzinski 2013, 2014), we argue in this paper that behavioural explanations of competitive balance may offer additional insights for selected sports economics and, in particular, sports policy problems, complementing the standard view on competitive balance. After summarizing the standard analysis of competitive balance in sports economics concerning theory, policy and empirical record in chapter 2, we report the main theoretical and empirical insights from our research project (chapter 3, closely drawing on the respective publications). In addition to providing a more comprehensive picture of the behavioural economics of competitive balance, we add a discussion of sports policy implications (chapter 4). While perceived competitive balance is found to matter, there are rather narrow conditions for sports policy interventions or restrictive regulations of competition by the league management (or sports associations). Furthermore, it is not the balance of the overall league that matters. Instead, it is sufficient or even advantageous if the most relevant subcompetitions, like the race for the championship or the fight against relegation, are 'balanced' among a narrow oligopoly of contenders.","PeriodicalId":162065,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117091773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 50

Economic Analysis of Prescription in Tort Law 侵权行为法中时效的经济学分析

LSN: Law & Economics: Private Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-09-04 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-211-77992-7_5

I. Gilead

引用次数: 2