Defining Section 5 of the FTC Act: The Failure of the Common Law Method and the Case for Formal Agency Guidelines

J. Rybnicek, Joshua D. Wright
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

As the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or the "Commission") celebrates its 100th anniversary, it does so amid a renewed interest in finally defining what constitutes a standalone "unfair method of competition" under Section 5 of the FTC Act. For a century, the business community and agency staff have been without any meaningful guidance about what conduct violates the Commission's signature competition statute. As consensus begins to build about the appropriate parameters of Section 5, some commentators have opposed articulating a principled standard for the application of the FTC's authority to prosecute standalone unfair methods of competition for fear that doing so would too severely restrict the agency's enforcement agenda. These commentators prefer for Section 5 to develop through the common law method, and point to the successful development of the traditional antitrust laws as evidence that the common law approach is the standard and preferred means for developing competition law. This Article discusses why, after a century-long natural experiment, it is clear that the common law method cannot be expected to define the scope of the FTC's unfair methods of competition authority. This Article explains that the failure of the common law process in the Section 5 context is due to fundamental differences between the inputs and outputs associated with traditional litigation and those associated with Section 5 enforcement actions. In particular, this Article explains that Section 5 disputes have almost always been resolved through settlements and, unlike reasoned judicial decisions, that such settlements do not help the public distinguish between what conduct is lawful and unlawful and generally are not treated as binding precedent by the FTC. As a result, this Article argues that the Commission should issue formal agency guidelines to serve as a superior analytical starting point and finally give meaning and purpose to Section 5.
界定《联邦贸易委员会法》第5条:普通法方法的失败和正式机构指南的案例
在美国联邦贸易委员会(以下简称“FTC”或“委员会”)庆祝成立100周年之际,人们重新燃起了对《联邦贸易委员会法》第5条规定的“不正当竞争方法”的定义的兴趣。一个世纪以来,对于哪些行为违反了委员会标志性的竞争法规,商界和机构工作人员一直没有任何有意义的指导。随着人们开始就第5条的适当参数达成共识,一些评论员反对为联邦贸易委员会起诉独立的不公平竞争方法的权力制定原则性标准,因为他们担心这样做会过于严重地限制该机构的执法议程。这些评论家更倾向于通过普通法方法来发展第5节,并指出传统反垄断法的成功发展作为证据,证明普通法方法是发展竞争法的标准和首选手段。本文讨论了为什么经过长达一个世纪的自然实验,普通法方法显然不能界定联邦贸易委员会的不正当竞争管理方法的范围。本文解释了普通法程序在第5条背景下的失败是由于与传统诉讼相关的输入和输出与第5条执法行动相关的输入和输出之间的根本差异。特别是,本条解释了第5条纠纷几乎总是通过和解来解决,并且与理性的司法决定不同,此类和解不能帮助公众区分哪些行为是合法的,哪些行为是非法的,并且通常不被联邦贸易委员会视为具有约束力的先例。因此,本文认为,委员会应发布正式的机构准则,作为一个优越的分析起点,并最终赋予第5节意义和目的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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