J. Goeree, T. Palfrey, Brian W. Rogers, R. McKelvey
{"title":"Self-Correcting Information Cascades","authors":"J. Goeree, T. Palfrey, Brian W. Rogers, R. McKelvey","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00438.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00438.x","url":null,"abstract":"In laboratory experiments, information cascades are ephemeral phenomena, collapsing soon after they form, and them reforming again. The formation/collapse/reformation cycles occur frequently and repeatedly. Cascades may be reversed (collapse followed by a cascade on a different state) and more often than not, such a reversal is self-correcting: The cascade switches from the incorrect to the correct state. Past experimental work focused on relatively short horizons, where these interesting dynamics are rarely observed. We present experiments with a longer horizon, and also investigate the effect of signal informativeness. We propose a theoretical model, based on quantal response equilibrium, where temporary and self-correcting cascades arise as equilibrium phenomena. The model also predicts the systematic differences we observe experimentally in the dynamics, as a function of signal informativeness. We extend the basic model to include a parameter measuring base rate neglect and find it to be a statistically significant factor in the dynamics, resulting in somewhat faster rates of social learning. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)","PeriodicalId":162026,"journal":{"name":"Levine's Bibliography","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127359181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Calculating and Using Second Order Accurate Solutions of Discrete Time","authors":"Jinill Kim, Sunghyun Kim, E. Schaumburg, C. Sims","doi":"10.17016/FEDS.2003.61","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2003.61","url":null,"abstract":"We describe an algorithm for calculating second order approximations to the solutions to nonlinear stochastic rational expectation models. The paper also explains methods for using such an approximate solution to generate forecasts, simulated time paths for the model, and evaluations of expected welfare differences across different versions of a model. The paper gives conditions for local validity of the approximation that allow for disturbance distributions with unbounded support and allow for non-stationarity of the solution process.","PeriodicalId":162026,"journal":{"name":"Levine's Bibliography","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130870893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Complexity and Competition, Part I: Sequential Matching","authors":"Douglas Gale, H. Sabourian","doi":"10.17863/CAM.5203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.5203","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses the complexity of non-competitive behaviour to provide a new justification for competitive equilibrium in the context of extensive-form market games with a finite number of agents. This paper demonstrates that if rational agents have (at least at the margin) an aversion for complex behaviours then their maximizing behaviour will result in simple behavioural rules and thereby in a perfectly competitive outcome. In particular, we consider sequential market games with heterogeneous sets of buyers and sellers and show that if the complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players’ preferences, together with the standard payoff in the game, then every equilibrium strategy profile induces a competitive outcome. This is done for sequential deterministic matching/bargaining models in which at any date either the identities of the matched players are determined exogenously or one player is exogenously selected to choose his partner and make a price proposal.","PeriodicalId":162026,"journal":{"name":"Levine's Bibliography","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115449200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bargaining, Interdependence and the Rationality of Fair Division","authors":"Giuseppe Lopomo, Efe A. Ok","doi":"10.2307/2696409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/2696409","url":null,"abstract":"We consider two person bargaining games with independent preferences, with and without bilateral incomplete information. We show that, both in the ultimatum game and in the two-stage alternating-offers game, our equilibrium predictions are fully consistent with all robust experimental regularities which falsify the standard game theoretic model: occurrence of disagreements, disadvantageous counteroffers, and outcomes that come close to the equal split of the pie.","PeriodicalId":162026,"journal":{"name":"Levine's Bibliography","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128707926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Classification of Games by Player Type","authors":"G. Bornstein","doi":"10.1007/978-0-387-72596-3_3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-72596-3_3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":162026,"journal":{"name":"Levine's Bibliography","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115370161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Learning to Network","authors":"B. Skyrms, Robin Pemantle","doi":"10.1007/978-90-481-3615-5_12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3615-5_12","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":162026,"journal":{"name":"Levine's Bibliography","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130281372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dynamics in Stochastic Evolutionary Models","authors":"D. Levine, S. Modica","doi":"10.3982/TE1978","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1978","url":null,"abstract":"We characterize transitions between stochastically stable states and relative ergodic probabilities in the theory of the evolution of conventions. We give an application to the fall of hegemonies in the evolutionary theory of institutions and conflict and illustrate the theory with the fall of the Qing Dynasty and rise of Communism in China. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)","PeriodicalId":162026,"journal":{"name":"Levine's Bibliography","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124021979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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