Levine's BibliographyPub Date : 2006-12-08DOI: 10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780195328318.003.0005
A. Rubinstein, Yuval Slalant
{"title":"Some Thoughts on the Principle of Revealed Preference","authors":"A. Rubinstein, Yuval Slalant","doi":"10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780195328318.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780195328318.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"(2) Mental preferences: These describe the mental attitude of an individual toward the objects. They can be defined in contexts which do not involve actual choice. In particular, preferences can describe tastes (such as a preference for one season over another) or can refer to situations which are only hypothetical (such as the possible courses of action available to an individual were he to become Emperor of Rome) or which the individual does not fully control (such as a game situation in which a player has preferences over the entire set of outcomes).","PeriodicalId":162026,"journal":{"name":"Levine's Bibliography","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117075482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Levine's BibliographyPub Date : 2006-10-07DOI: 10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780195328318.003.0010
Vicnent P. Crawford
{"title":"Look-ups as the Windows of the Strategic Soul: Studying Cognition via Information Search in Game Experiments","authors":"Vicnent P. Crawford","doi":"10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780195328318.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780195328318.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"VIA INFORMATION SEARCH IN GAME EXPERIMENTS Vincent P. Crawford, University of California, San Diego 5 October 2006; revised 16 January 2007","PeriodicalId":162026,"journal":{"name":"Levine's Bibliography","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121104294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Incentives and Self Control","authors":"Ted O’Donoghue, M. Rabin","doi":"10.1017/CBO9781139052276.010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139052276.010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":162026,"journal":{"name":"Levine's Bibliography","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127413631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Advances in Dynamic Optimal Taxation","authors":"N. Kocherlakota","doi":"10.1017/CBO9781139052269.009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139052269.009","url":null,"abstract":"1 This paper surveys the recent literature concerning the structure of optimal taxes in dynamic economies in which agents are privately informed about skills and effort.","PeriodicalId":162026,"journal":{"name":"Levine's Bibliography","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116935103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Noise sensitivity and chaos in social choice theory","authors":"G. Kalai","doi":"10.1007/978-3-642-13580-4_8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13580-4_8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":162026,"journal":{"name":"Levine's Bibliography","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114194625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Levine's BibliographyPub Date : 2005-01-04DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0004
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Paul R. Milgrom
{"title":"Ascending Proxy Auctions","authors":"Lawrence M. Ausubel, Paul R. Milgrom","doi":"10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction Theoretical treatments of auctions usually analyze situations in which there is some particular item to be bought or sold and the question is what auction format to use. In real auctions, however, the important planning starts much earlier and is much more encompassing. For example, in a bankruptcy auction, the auctioneer may need to decide whether to sell a whole company as a single unit or its various assets individually, what guarantees to offer concerning the conditions of its physical assets, what kinds of financing terms to require, how much time to allow buyers to obtain needed regulatory or other approvals for the acquisition, and so on.","PeriodicalId":162026,"journal":{"name":"Levine's Bibliography","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126453540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Limits of Ex Post Implementation Revisited","authors":"S. Bikhchandani","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.605862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.605862","url":null,"abstract":"Existence of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms in models with multi-dimensional signals and interdependent values is possible when there are no consumption externalities. An ex post incentive compatible mechanism is constructed in a model where a single indivisible object is allocated among several buyers with multi-dimensional information and interdependent values. It is the combination of informational externalities (i.e., interdependent values) and consumption externalities, rather than informational externalities alone, that leads to non-existence of ex post equilibrium when agents have multi-dimensional signals. As ex post equilibrium has been employed mostly in models with private goods, this is not a significant limitation.","PeriodicalId":162026,"journal":{"name":"Levine's Bibliography","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116514366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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