{"title":"动态最优税收研究进展","authors":"N. Kocherlakota","doi":"10.1017/CBO9781139052269.009","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"1 This paper surveys the recent literature concerning the structure of optimal taxes in dynamic economies in which agents are privately informed about skills and effort.","PeriodicalId":162026,"journal":{"name":"Levine's Bibliography","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2005-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"60","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Advances in Dynamic Optimal Taxation\",\"authors\":\"N. Kocherlakota\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/CBO9781139052269.009\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"1 This paper surveys the recent literature concerning the structure of optimal taxes in dynamic economies in which agents are privately informed about skills and effort.\",\"PeriodicalId\":162026,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Levine's Bibliography\",\"volume\":\"52 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2005-10-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"60\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Levine's Bibliography\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139052269.009\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Levine's Bibliography","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139052269.009","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
1 This paper surveys the recent literature concerning the structure of optimal taxes in dynamic economies in which agents are privately informed about skills and effort.
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