The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck最新文献_第4页

Epistemic Luck and the Extended Mind 认知运气和扩展思维

The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck Pub Date : 2019-02-11 DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-29

J. Carter

引用次数: 1

The Probability Account of Luck 运气的概率说明

The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck Pub Date : 2019-02-11 DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-13

N. Rescher

引用次数: 1

Luck And Risk 运气与风险

The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck Pub Date : 2019-02-11 DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-31

K. Teigen

引用次数: 0

Luck and Norms 运气与规范

The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck Pub Date : 2019-02-11 DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-17

Rachel McKinnon

引用次数: 0

Luck In Science 1 科学中的运气1

The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck Pub Date : 2019-02-11 DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-35

J. Trout

引用次数: 2

Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams on Moral Luck 托马斯·内格尔和伯纳德·威廉姆斯论道德运气

The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck Pub Date : 2019-02-11 DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-10

Andrew Latus

引用次数: 0

The Mixed Account of Luck 运气好坏参半

The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck Pub Date : 2019-02-01 DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-14

R. Peels

引用次数: 3

The Gettier Problem Gettier问题

The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck Pub Date : 2018-11-05 DOI: 10.1017/9781316827413

Ian M. Church

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引用次数: 2

Feminist Approaches To Moral Luck 道德运气的女权主义方法

The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4324/9781351258760-38

C. McLeod, Jody Tomchishen

引用次数: 0