Journal of Environmental Economics and Management最新文献_第8页

Importing air pollution? Evidence from China’s plastic waste imports 进口空气污染？中国进口塑料垃圾的证据

IF 4.6 3区经济学

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Pub Date : 2024-05-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102996

Kerstin Unfried , Feicheng Wang

{"title":"Importing air pollution? Evidence from China’s plastic waste imports","authors":"Kerstin Unfried , Feicheng Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102996","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102996","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Plastic waste trade has grown considerably in the last decades and has led to severe environmental problems in recipient countries. Being the largest recipient, China has permanently banned the imports of plastic waste since 2018. This paper examines the causal effect of plastic waste imports on air pollution by exploiting China’s experience of importing plastic waste and the recent import ban. By combining data on plastic waste imports with PM<sub>2.5</sub> data at the city level for the years 2000–2011, we find that plastic waste imports increased PM<sub>2.5</sub> density significantly in recipient cities. To evaluate the impact of the import ban on air quality, we employ daily data on air pollution between 2015 and 2020. Our difference-in-differences results show that affected cities, relative to other cities, experienced considerable improvement in air quality following the ban. Further analysis reveals that increased incineration of non-recycled waste is the main channel. These findings provide insights into the costs of importing plastic waste and the potential environmental gains from banning such imports in other countries.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15763,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Environmental Economics and Management","volume":"125 ","pages":"Article 102996"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069624000706/pdfft?md5=c142a2cb61cd07bc1a51cb38b5007517&pid=1-s2.0-S0095069624000706-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140948423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Pricing carbon in a multi-sector economy with social discounting 多部门经济中的碳定价与社会折扣

IF 4.6 3区经济学

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Pub Date : 2024-05-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102991

Oliver Kalsbach , Sebastian Rausch

{"title":"Pricing carbon in a multi-sector economy with social discounting","authors":"Oliver Kalsbach , Sebastian Rausch","doi":"10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102991","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102991","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Economists tend to view a uniform emissions price as the most cost-effective approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. This paper scrutinizes the assumptions in general equilibrium which underlie the established view that uniform emissions pricing is optimal, focusing on economies where society values the well-being of future generations more than private actors. When social and private discount rates differ, we show that a uniform carbon price is optimal only under restrictive assumptions about technology homogeneity and intertemporal decision-making. Non-uniform pricing spurs capital accumulation and benefits future generations. Depending on sectoral heterogeneity in the substitutability between capital and energy inputs, we find that optimal carbon prices differ widely across sectors and yield substantial welfare gains relative to uniform pricing. Realizing these welfare gains, however, requires that the regulator has information on the technology heterogeneity across sectors. Differentiated carbon pricing based on imperfect estimates of technology heterogeneity can yield significant welfare losses.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15763,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Environmental Economics and Management","volume":"125 ","pages":"Article 102991"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069624000652/pdfft?md5=a4f9535430c4ba96b3d9d8e4b36b5bf5&pid=1-s2.0-S0095069624000652-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140879379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Adjusted net savings needs further adjusting: Reassessing human and resource factors in sustainability measurement 调整后的净节余需要进一步调整：重新评估可持续性衡量中的人力和资源因素

IF 4.6 3区经济学

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Pub Date : 2024-04-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102984

John C.V. Pezzey

{"title":"Adjusted net savings needs further adjusting: Reassessing human and resource factors in sustainability measurement","authors":"John C.V. Pezzey","doi":"10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102984","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102984","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We build a theoretical model of optimal, closed-economy growth of production and consumption, including inputs of human and knowledge capital and growing natural resources, and give two calibrations of it to the global economy's approximately exponential growth during 1995–2014. We thereby show that the World Bank's Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) measure of an economy's sustainability, which has some practical and theoretical advantages over change in wealth, the Bank's preferred measure, ideally needs further adjusting. Our model includes omitted or undervalued estimates of the benefits of human and knowledge capital investment, net resource growth, and productivity growth, and the cost of capitals dilution by population growth. Together these raise estimated, global ANS about 10 percentage points above the Bank's estimate, to equal their growth rate times total wealth, but our adjustments could be negative overall for some countries. By reclassifying about 18% of output from consumption to human and knowledge capital investments, our second calibration needs only 0.3 %/yr of exogenous productivity growth to explain global consumption growth observed during 1995–2014. Though our model omits environmental costs and thus ignores long-run sustainability issues, our adjustments suggest desirable though difficult changes that could improve World Bank ANS as a comparative sustainability indicator.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15763,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Environmental Economics and Management","volume":"127 ","pages":"Article 102984"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069624000585/pdfft?md5=1e18dd7ebe3a15e9d3ba9de58207c581&pid=1-s2.0-S0095069624000585-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141308443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Cross-ownership and green managerial delegation contracts in a mixed oligopoly 混合寡头垄断中的交叉所有权和绿色管理委托合同

IF 4.6 3区经济学

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Pub Date : 2024-04-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102993

Mingqing Xing , Sang-Ho Lee

引用次数: 0

Payments and penalties in ecosystem services programs 生态系统服务计划中的付款和处罚

IF 4.6 3区经济学

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Pub Date : 2024-04-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102988

Youngho Kim, Erik Lichtenberg, David A. Newburn

{"title":"Payments and penalties in ecosystem services programs","authors":"Youngho Kim, Erik Lichtenberg, David A. Newburn","doi":"10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102988","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102988","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Payment for ecosystem services (PES) program contracts include penalties for non-performance to ensure that these programs receive the environmental benefits they have been paying for. The standard penalty structure in PES programs requires participants to pay back all program payments received if the contract is terminated before the end of the contract lifetime. We derive the optimal non-completion penalty structure, which decouples the penalty from payments received. In contrast to the backward-looking standard penalty, the optimal penalty is forward-looking and equals the principal's net future environmental benefits lost due to contract non-completion. The optimal penalty thus falls over the life of the contract, in contrast to the standard penalty, which rises over the life of the contract. A numerical policy simulation with heterogeneous agents based on features in federal agricultural conservation programs in the United States suggests that the optimal penalty structure can increase realized net environmental benefits significantly. Our results suggest that performance of most kinds of PES programs can be enhanced by decoupling non-completion penalties from payments and by adjusting how penalties vary over contract lifetimes.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15763,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Environmental Economics and Management","volume":"126 ","pages":"Article 102988"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140756396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Can leaders motivate employees’ energy-efficient behavior with thoughtful communication? 领导者能否通过深思熟虑的沟通激发员工的节能行为？

IF 4.6 3区经济学

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Pub Date : 2024-04-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102990

Christin Hoffmann , Kirsten Thommes

{"title":"Can leaders motivate employees’ energy-efficient behavior with thoughtful communication?","authors":"Christin Hoffmann , Kirsten Thommes","doi":"10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102990","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the effect of an employer’s communication concerning energy-efficient behavior on a firm’s employees’ behavioral responses. The management aims to enhance energy-efficient behavior performance by irregularly sending online messages to remote employees. We break down each message, analyzing the positive or negative emotions conveyed, collective or individual orientation, and ease of language. Comparing employees’ daily energy efficiency after receiving a message to their daily performance without a previous message, we find that messages generally result in an immediate increase in efficiency. Messages conveying negative emotions and those making a distinction between the manager and the employees have a smaller effect than messages conveying positive emotions and emphasizing a collective orientation that includes both the management and employees. Additionally, shorter messages are more likely to induce improved efficiency. Sending messages significantly impacts driver performance for up to six days after the message, resulting in economically relevant cost reductions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15763,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Environmental Economics and Management","volume":"125 ","pages":"Article 102990"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069624000640/pdfft?md5=91cc0894f38be592cc1925d0e23ab6dc&pid=1-s2.0-S0095069624000640-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140647061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

How constant is constant elasticity of substitution? Endogenous substitution between clean and dirty energy 恒定替代弹性有多恒定？清洁能源与肮脏能源之间的内生替代

IF 4.6 3区经济学

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Pub Date : 2024-04-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102982

Ara Jo , Alena Miftakhova

引用次数: 0

Discretion rather than rules in multiple-species fisheries 多鱼种渔业中的自由裁量权而非规则

IF 4.6 3区经济学

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Pub Date : 2024-04-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102983

Rajesh Singh, Quinn Weninger

引用次数: 0

Carbon capture: Storage vs. Utilization 碳捕获：储存与利用

IF 4.6 3区经济学

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Pub Date : 2024-04-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102976

Michel Moreaux , Jean-Pierre Amigues , Gerard van der Meijden , Cees Withagen

{"title":"Carbon capture: Storage vs. Utilization","authors":"Michel Moreaux , Jean-Pierre Amigues , Gerard van der Meijden , Cees Withagen","doi":"10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102976","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102976","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Carbon capture and storage in salt domes or in inactive fields is seen as an appealing option to meet the ambitious objectives of the Paris Agreement. Captured CO<span><math><msub><mrow></mrow><mrow><mn>2</mn></mrow></msub></math></span> emissions can also be injected in active fields to enhance gas or oil recovery. We examine the optimal scale and timing of these different capturing and storage options in a dynamic model of an economy subject to a carbon budget. We consider the socially optimal outcome as well as the outcome under <em>laissez-faire</em>. The social optimum can have different forms depending on the initial carbon budget, the fossil fuel resource stock and the stock of already injected CO<span><math><msub><mrow></mrow><mrow><mn>2</mn></mrow></msub></math></span> in active fields. The level and convexity of the costs of capturing, storing and producing renewable energy plays a role as well. We specify the conditions under which each possible sequence of regimes – no capturing, only enhanced recovery, only storage without enhanced recovery, a combination of both or only renewables – occurs. We quantify our analytical results by calibrating the model and running simulations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15763,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Environmental Economics and Management","volume":"125 ","pages":"Article 102976"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069624000500/pdfft?md5=9c7b28db25f57931448332d680db5e88&pid=1-s2.0-S0095069624000500-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140633001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Coordinating to avoid the catastrophe 协调避免灾难

IF 4.6 3区经济学

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Pub Date : 2024-04-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102977

Vitus Bühl, Robert C. Schmidt

{"title":"Coordinating to avoid the catastrophe","authors":"Vitus Bühl, Robert C. Schmidt","doi":"10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102977","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102977","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>“Tipping points” for dangerous climate damages can transform climate protection into a coordination problem. If the location of the threshold is known, Nash equilibria exist in which the catastrophe is averted even without a climate agreement. However, there usually exists also an equilibrium in which no country exerts effort to prevent it, and the catastrophe occurs. We model equilibrium selection among non-cooperative countries with the help of an external randomization device, and analyze how it affects coalition formation. We find that results are much more nuanced than in the case where non-cooperative countries always coordinate on preventing the catastrophe. In some cases, a “coalition of free-riders” forms that is detrimental to welfare. In other cases, a “threshold equilibrium” emerges in which coalition members commit to do more than the outsiders, and the coalition is just large enough to become active. The grand coalition is also an equilibrium outcome, but is often unstable towards deviations by groups of countries.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15763,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Environmental Economics and Management","volume":"125 ","pages":"Article 102977"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069624000512/pdfft?md5=7c64fef9c88c473acf3204310a5f2dae&pid=1-s2.0-S0095069624000512-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140540675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0