The Spontaneous Brain最新文献

{"title":"Prediction Model of Brain and Consciousness","authors":"G. Northoff","doi":"10.7551/mitpress/9780262038072.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262038072.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"Is the prediction model of brain relevant for consciousness? The prediction model of brain is based on predictive coding that focuses on contents as associated with stimulus-induced activity. Stimulus-induced activity itself is conceived in a cognitive (rather than sensory) sense in that it is supposed to result from the interaction between predicted and actual inputs, i.e., the prediction error. The central question in this chapter is whether contents and the cognitive model of stimulus-induced activity can sufficiently account for the contents in consciousness. Based on empirical evidence, I argue that predictive coding can only account for the selection of contents in consciousness including the distinction between accurate and inaccurate contents. In contrast, predictive coding remains insufficient when it comes to the association of any given content with consciousness. Hence, the prediction model of brain and its cognitive model of stimulus-induced activity cannot be extended to a cognitive model of consciousness. Put simply, consciousness is different from and extends beyond its contents and our cognition of them.","PeriodicalId":156542,"journal":{"name":"The Spontaneous Brain","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117018885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ontology III: From the World to Consciousness","authors":"G. Northoff","doi":"10.7551/mitpress/9780262038072.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262038072.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"Summary I so far focused mainly on the brain and how it is related to consciousness. This let me suppose that the brain, through its relation to the world, i.e., the world-brain relation, is necessary connected to consciousness (chapter 10). While this highlighted the central importance of the brain for the existence and reality of consciousness, the world itself and its ontological role were rather neglected so far – that shall be the focus in this chapter. My main argument is that the world is indispensable for consciousness and mental features in general: without world, there could no world-brain relation, which, in turn, renders impossible consciousness. I will discuss the role of the world for consciousness in terms of three arguments, the “argument of calibration”, the “argument of structure”, and the “argument of location”. First, as discussed in the “argument of calibration”, the world serves as “spatiotemporal frame”; this makes it possible for world-brain relation to serve as “spatiotemporal baseline” and “space of possible experience” for calibrating the possible objects or events for consciousness. That, as I argue, is central for yielding specifically the phenomenal features of consciousness. Secondly, as discussed in the “argument of structure”, the world itself can ontologically be characterized by “spatiotemporal nestedness”: the brain and its smaller spatiotemporal scale are contained and nested within the larger spatiotemporal scale of the world. Such “spatiotemporal nestedness” is an ontological feature of the world which is necessary for and makes possible, i.e., predisposes, consciousness. Finally, as discussed in the “argument of location”, the world allows for “complex location” of both brain and consciousness as part of and within the world as distinguished from both “simple location” and “non-location”. In sum, inclusion of the world in our ontology is indispensable if one wants to understand the existence and reality of mental features which, if reduced or limited to either brain or mind, remain unclear. I conclude that we need to include both world and brain including their relation, i.e., world-brain relation, in our ontology of consciousness – this amounts to what I describe as world-brain problem. Otherwise, when considering either brain or world alone as in “brain problem” and “world-problem” as I say, one leaves a gap between world and brain which makes it impossible to account for the existence and reality of mental features like consciousness.","PeriodicalId":156542,"journal":{"name":"The Spontaneous Brain","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130877297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Relation between Spontaneous and Stimulus-Induced Activity: Interaction Model of Brain","authors":"G. Northoff","doi":"10.7551/mitpress/9780262038072.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262038072.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"The brain and especially its spontaneous activity have been the subject of intense study in both neuroscience and philosophy (as for instance by Klein 2014). However, what exactly counts as spontaneous activity as well as its relationship with stimulus-induced or task-evoked activity remain matters of debate. I here focus on the second aspect, the relationship between spontaneous and stimulus-induced activity. I suggest two different models of their relationship, parallelism and interactionism. I weigh the empirical evidence for and against both models and tentatively suggest that it speaks in favour of interactionism wherein spontaneous and stimulus-induced activity are taken to be mutually dependent on each other and interact in a non-additive way. In addition to empirical evidence, I also discuss the non-additive interaction within the context of philosophy of science by referring to Giere’s distinction between model and fundamental principle. I suggest a particular coding strategy by the brain, e.g., difference-based coding, to underlie and make possible the interaction model – difference-based coding may therefore be regarded a fundamental principle. This complements the empirical findings I present by extrapolating some of the theoretical implications of the interactionist view.","PeriodicalId":156542,"journal":{"name":"The Spontaneous Brain","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116303524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Copernican Revolution in Neuroscience and Philosophy: Vantage Point from beyond Brain","authors":"G. Northoff","doi":"10.7551/mitpress/9780262038072.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262038072.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"How can we eliminate the “intuition of mind”? I demonstrated that the “intuition of mind” can be traced to our pre-Copernican vantage point from within mind or brain (chapter 20). Analogous to Copernicus, we need to radically shift our vantage point to eliminate the intuition of mind and take into view the necessary ontological connection between brain and mental features. For that, we need shift our vantage point from within either mind or brain to a “vantage point from beyond brain”. \u0000My main argument in the present chapter is that, analogous to Copernicus with regard to earth, we need to replace the pre-Copernican “vantage point from within mind” (or from within brain) by a post-Copernican “vantage point from beyond brain”. Unlike the “vantage point from within mind” (or brain), the “vantage point from beyond brain” includes relation, i.e., world-brain relation, as possible epistemic option within its “logical space of knowledge”. This allows us to take into view the necessary ontological connection between brain and mental features through world-brain relation as ontological predisposition of consciousness (chapter 10). Most importantly, this renders superfluous if not impossible both “intuition of mind” and mind-body problem which then can be replaced by world-brain relation and world-brain problem. I conclude that such “vantage point from beyond brain” with the world-brain problem amounts to nothing less than a Copernican revolution in neuroscience and philosophy.","PeriodicalId":156542,"journal":{"name":"The Spontaneous Brain","volume":"306 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114590018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}