Ontology III: From the World to Consciousness

Abstract

Summary I so far focused mainly on the brain and how it is related to consciousness. This let me suppose that the brain, through its relation to the world, i.e., the world-brain relation, is necessary connected to consciousness (chapter 10). While this highlighted the central importance of the brain for the existence and reality of consciousness, the world itself and its ontological role were rather neglected so far – that shall be the focus in this chapter. My main argument is that the world is indispensable for consciousness and mental features in general: without world, there could no world-brain relation, which, in turn, renders impossible consciousness. I will discuss the role of the world for consciousness in terms of three arguments, the “argument of calibration”, the “argument of structure”, and the “argument of location”. First, as discussed in the “argument of calibration”, the world serves as “spatiotemporal frame”; this makes it possible for world-brain relation to serve as “spatiotemporal baseline” and “space of possible experience” for calibrating the possible objects or events for consciousness. That, as I argue, is central for yielding specifically the phenomenal features of consciousness. Secondly, as discussed in the “argument of structure”, the world itself can ontologically be characterized by “spatiotemporal nestedness”: the brain and its smaller spatiotemporal scale are contained and nested within the larger spatiotemporal scale of the world. Such “spatiotemporal nestedness” is an ontological feature of the world which is necessary for and makes possible, i.e., predisposes, consciousness. Finally, as discussed in the “argument of location”, the world allows for “complex location” of both brain and consciousness as part of and within the world as distinguished from both “simple location” and “non-location”. In sum, inclusion of the world in our ontology is indispensable if one wants to understand the existence and reality of mental features which, if reduced or limited to either brain or mind, remain unclear. I conclude that we need to include both world and brain including their relation, i.e., world-brain relation, in our ontology of consciousness – this amounts to what I describe as world-brain problem. Otherwise, when considering either brain or world alone as in “brain problem” and “world-problem” as I say, one leaves a gap between world and brain which makes it impossible to account for the existence and reality of mental features like consciousness.