{"title":"The Economic Consequences of Tightening Insider Trading Regulation: Evidence from Hong Kong","authors":"Zhihong Chen, Yuyan Guan, B. Ke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3237234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3237234","url":null,"abstract":"Using a lobbying event that led to the unexpected reversal of a tougher insider trading blackout regulation in Hong Kong, we examine whether tightening insider trading regulation increases shareholder value. We find that repealing the regulation increases shareholder value for the entire Hong Kong stock market. The increase is greater for the lobbying firms, which are more affected by the regulation. We find no evidence to support the allegations made by the proponents of the regulation that insiders of lobbying firms trade more aggressively on future earnings news in the proposed new blackout period or delay earnings announcements. Supporting the argument made by the critics of the regulation, we find that lobbying firms’ insiders trade more aggressively in the proposed new blackout period to stabilize their firms’ stock prices in times of stock price turmoil. Our results suggest caution in imposing tougher insider trading regulation.","PeriodicalId":154391,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets Regulation (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131839669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Banking Transformation","authors":"P. Vanini, Shadie Broumandi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2221266","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2221266","url":null,"abstract":"The material is structured as follows: 1. Asset Pricing beforer and after the Financial Crisis 2008. 2. Financial Crisis 2008. 3. Digital Disruption in Banking. 4. Innovation in Banking.","PeriodicalId":154391,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets Regulation (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114328883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Trade Matching Forms in the Credit Default Swap Market","authors":"Jun Sung Kim, Gerardo Ferrara, B. Koo, Zijun Liu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2665511","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2665511","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the pairing of dealers and customers in credit default swap (CDS) transactions. Specifically, we analyse how a participant in a CDS transaction determines its trading partner in a matching game framework. Using comprehensive transaction reports from the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC), we show that the size of organisations and the degree of participation in CDS transactions are important factors for trade matching in the UK CDS market. This finding lends credence to the notion that `too big to fail' may prevail. Next, we find that dealers with more intermediation are more likely to be selected as trading partners, leading to greater concentration in the CDS market. We also find that counterparty risk plays an important role in trade pairing, but its effect differs by the type of market participants. For example, unlike other institutions, hedge funds prefer trading with risky counterparties during some periods. This finding is significant for policymakers because such incentives can potentially lead to contagion risk.","PeriodicalId":154391,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets Regulation (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133231596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Impact of Anti-Money Laundering Regulation on Payment Flows: Evidence from SWIFT Data","authors":"M. Collin, Samantha Cook, Kimmo Soramaki","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2893790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2893790","url":null,"abstract":"Regulatory pressure on international banks to fight money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) increased substantially in the past decade. At the same time there has been a rise in the number of complaints of banks denying transactions or closing the accounts of customers either based in high risk countries or attempting to send money there, a process known as de-risking. In this paper, we investigate the impact of an increase in regulatory risk, driven by the inclusion of countries on an internationally-recognized list of high risk jurisdictions, on subsequent cross-border payments. We find countries that have been added to a high risk greylist face up to a 10 percent decline in the number of cross border payments received from other jurisdictions, but no change in the number sent. We also find that a greylisted country is more likely to see a decline in payments from other countries with weak AML/CFT institutions. We find limited evidence that these effects manifest in cross border trade or other flows. Given that countries that are placed on these lists tend to be poorer on average, these impacts are likely to be more strongly felt in developing countries.","PeriodicalId":154391,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets Regulation (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117337026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Real Effects of NASDAQ Delistings","authors":"Karen Liu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2893493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2893493","url":null,"abstract":"It is claimed that exchange listing of its stock benefits a firm by improving its stock liquidity and access to capital, thereby affecting real decisions and consequent outcome variables. Testing this claim empirically encounters obvious and formidable endogeneity problems. This paper empirically examines the causal effect of involuntary delisting from a stock exchange on stock liquidity, access to capital, corporate investment and profitability. Focusing on firms in violation of NASDAQ continued listing rules between 2000 and 2009, I compare firms that eventually delisted and moved trading of their stock to OTC markets with those that regained compliance and remained on NASDAQ. Market volatility during the delisting grace period is used as an instrumental variable (IV) for the delisting outcome. My findings suggest the following: First, delisting causes stocks to experience reduced daily trading volume, but only if the stock was actively traded prior to delisting; for thinly-traded stocks, there is no effect. Second, surprisingly, the number of investors, institutional ownership or analyst coverage are not affected by delisting. Third, delisting leads to less future equity issuance only if a stock was actively traded prior to delisting. Fourth, delisting has no statistically significant effect on a firm's long-term investments. Fifth, delisting improves long-term gross margin for firms which were thinly-traded prior to delisting. Sixth, delisting does not have statistically significant effect on firm value. Overall, my findings indicate that delisting from a stock exchange is not as costly as commonly believed. This implies that the OTC markets may provide small firms that have limited trading volume with a low-cost, effective market for their stock. My conclusions support the recent policy initiations to provide the alternative listing and trading venues for small public companies.","PeriodicalId":154391,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets Regulation (Topic)","volume":"119 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116608287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Efficiency Costs Fairness: Resolving Financial Market Rumors through Public Inquiries","authors":"S. Park","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2310932","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2310932","url":null,"abstract":"Should regulators require firms to publicly confirm or deny rumors? In a sequential trading model, such \"rumor regulation\" may enhance pricing efficiency through two mechanisms: (i) an increase in the number of informed traders brought about by the public inquiry (ii) a shortened information advantage period. However, data on rumor-disclosure events in the Korea Exchange shows that such regulations may actually reduce fairness: informed traders earn higher profits than in the absence of the regulation due to an increase in noise trading and false alerts.","PeriodicalId":154391,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets Regulation (Topic)","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114741121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Consumption-Based Asset Pricing with Rare Disaster Risk - A Simulated Method of Moments Approach","authors":"J. Grammig, J. Sönksen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2397065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2397065","url":null,"abstract":"The rare disaster hypothesis suggests that the extraordinarily high postwar U.S. equity premium resulted because investors ex ante demanded compensation for unlikely but calamitous risks that they happened not to incur. Although convincing in theory, empirical tests of the rare disaster explanation are scarce. We estimate a disaster-including consumption-based asset pricing model (CBM) using a combination of the simulated method of moments and bootstrapping. We consider several methodological alternatives that differ in the moment matches and the way to account for disasters in the simulated consumption growth and return series. Whichever specification is used, the estimated preference parameters are of an economically plausible size, and the estimation precision is much higher than in previous studies that use the canonical CBM. Our results thus provide empirical support for the rare disaster hypothesis, and help reconcile the nexus between real economy and financial markets implied by the consumption-based asset pricing paradigm.","PeriodicalId":154391,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets Regulation (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121782506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sarbanes-Oxley, Capital Structure and the Choice of Payment in Mergers and Acquisitions","authors":"Tim Chai, Dimitrios Vortelinos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2797501","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2797501","url":null,"abstract":"The present paper studies the impact of the SOX act to the choice of payment in Mergers & Acquisitions for firms with different capital structures. Use Probit and Tobit models to access the firms’ pre-acquisition leverage levels as well as the leverage changes of firms because of the SOX act. The behavior of cash payment M&As is compared to the Stock M&As.","PeriodicalId":154391,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets Regulation (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133728182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Federica Ciocchetta, Wanda Cornacchia, Roberto Felici, M. Loberto
{"title":"Assessing Financial Stability Risks from the Real Estate Market in Italy","authors":"Federica Ciocchetta, Wanda Cornacchia, Roberto Felici, M. Loberto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2772507","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2772507","url":null,"abstract":"We provide an analytical framework for assessing financial stability risks arising from the real estate sector in Italy. This framework consists of two blocks: three complementary early warning models (EWMs) and a broad set of indicators related to the real estate market, to credit and to households. We focus separately on households and on firms engaged in construction, management and investment services in the real estate sector. Since in Italy there have been no real estate-related systemic banking crises, as vulnerability indicator we consider a continuous indicator represented by the ratio between the annual flow of bad debts related to the real estate sector and banks’ capital and reserves. We contribute to the recent literature on EWMs by implementing a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) based on linear regression models with a continuous dependent variable of vulnerability and an ordered logit model with a discrete dependent variable of vulnerability classes. Both models exhibit good predictive abilities. Based on the BMA projections for the period from the third quarter of 2015 to the second quarter of 2016, banking vulnerability related to the real estate sector is expected to gradually decline.","PeriodicalId":154391,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets Regulation (Topic)","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123523909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Market Timing of Seasoned Equity Offerings with Long Regulative Process","authors":"Yong Huang, Konari Uchida, Daolin Zah","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2726227","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2726227","url":null,"abstract":"A long regulative process exists between the initial announcement and execution of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in China. Although the initial announcement of an SEO is associated with a significant reduction in the stock price, the regulator (China Securities Regulatory Commission) finally approves it after a significant run up in the price of the stock. Chinese managers execute SEOs after additional stock price increases. As a result, the stock price at issuance is not significantly different from the price on announcement, and is significantly higher than the price three months before the announcement. We also find stock prices decline following the execution. These results suggest that regulative screenings for market stabilization are beneficial for SEO market timing, and that Chinese managers successfully time the market, even with a prolonged regulative process.","PeriodicalId":154391,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets Regulation (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115234773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}