{"title":"Provisioning and Non-Performing Exposures During the Financial Crisis: Are Italian Banks Special?","authors":"A. Carboni, A. Carboni","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2694226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2694226","url":null,"abstract":"Using a sample of 500 Italian banks over the period 2007 - 2014, our paper provides evidence on the hypothesis behind the management of credit risk provisions and non-performing exposures for the entire banking system and for different types of banks, clustered on dimension. We also study on the behavior of riskier banks and offer an interpretation of higher provisions during recent episodes of unconventional monetary measures. We summarize our main results in these points. First, provisions of Italian banks support the earnings management and the capital management hypothesis, reflecting their procyclicality. Second, the evidence shows that banks with different dimensions do not have the same response to selected determinants. In particular, macroeconomic variables affect provisioning only for medium and large banks, the capital management hypothesis holds for cooperative and small banks, while the earnings management is not validated for large banks. Third, non-performing loans are highly persistent for cooperative and small banks, while the hypothesis regarding efficiency, profitability and risk-taking are confirmed in relation to non-performing loans. Fourth, we also observe that banks with weaknesses in credit risk practices have insufficient provisions and therefore need more non-discretionary income to enlarge their coverage capacity. They also violate the capital management hypothesis. Finally, results show increased sensitivity of provisions to earnings in 2011 - 2013, due to unconventional measures.","PeriodicalId":154391,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets Regulation (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131315083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Bond Investors Price Tail Risk Exposures of Financial Institutions?","authors":"S. Chava, Rohan Ganduri, Vijay Yerramilli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2417499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2417499","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze whether bond investors price tail risk exposures of financial institutions using a comprehensive sample of bond issuances by U.S. financial institutions. Although primary bond yield spreads increase with an institution’s own tail risk (expected shortfall), systematic tail risk (marginal expected shortfall) of the institution doesn’t affect its yields. The relationship between yield spreads and tail risk is significantly weaker for depository institutions, large institutions, government-sponsored entities, politically-connected institutions, and in periods following large-scale bailouts of financial institutions. Overall, our results suggest that implicit bailout guarantees of financial institutions can exacerbate moral hazard in bond markets and weaken market discipline.","PeriodicalId":154391,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets Regulation (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132746850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pichaphop Chalermchatvichien, Seksak Jumreonwong, P. Jiraporn
{"title":"Basel III, Ownership Concentration, Risk-Taking, and Capital Stability: Evidence from Asia","authors":"Pichaphop Chalermchatvichien, Seksak Jumreonwong, P. Jiraporn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2495842","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2495842","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the associations among bank risk-taking, ownership concentration, and the recently-proposed standard for capital stability (Basel III). Consistent with theory, the evidence shows that a rise in ownership concentration by one standard deviation increases the extent of risk-taking by as much as 6-8%. Although Basel III does not start taking effect until 2013, we hypothetically apply the capital stability standard on a sample of East Asian banks in the period 2005-2009. Our results suggest that an improvement in capital stability by one standard deviation diminishes the extent of risk-taking by 5.37% (as measured by the bank’s Z-score). We also find that the standard for capital stability would have been more effective in countries with better economic development. Our results provide insights into the likely effects of Basel III and should be useful to a wide range of audiences, including policymakers, regulators, bankers, as well as practitioners and researchers.","PeriodicalId":154391,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets Regulation (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124174892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Preferential Regulatory Treatment and Banks’ Demand for Government Bonds","authors":"C. Bonner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2474058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2474058","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of preferential regulatory treatment on banks’ demand for government bonds. Using unique transaction-level data, our analysis suggests that preferential treatment in microprudential liquidity and capital regulation significantly increases banks’ demand for government bonds. Liquidity and capital regulation also seem to incentivize banks to substitute other bonds with government bonds. We also find evidence that this \"regulatory effect\" leads banks to reduce lending to the real economy.","PeriodicalId":154391,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets Regulation (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128503776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Competitor Firms’ Stock-Price Reaction to Private Equity Placement Announcements: Evidence from China","authors":"M. Fonseka, Sisira R. N. Colombage, G. Tian","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2396029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2396029","url":null,"abstract":"Private equity funds have taken a strong position in Chinese equity market particularly after the Chinese Security Regulatory Commission started regulating private equity placements (PEP) in 2006. We investigate impact of market reaction to the announcements of the PEP application, withdrawal, rejection, approval, and completion, while examining the cross-sectional differences of the market performance of competitor firms in the industry both in the short and long run. We find that competitors experience a decrease in stock prices in response to the announcements of application, approval, and completion of PEPs and increase in stock prices around the announcements of withdrawal or rejection of applications, suggesting the existence of competitive effects in the short-run. Competitors experience an increase in the long-term stock performance following private placements while also being consistent with competitive effects in the long-run.","PeriodicalId":154391,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets Regulation (Topic)","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131743626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Collateral-Motivated Financial Innovation","authors":"Ji Shen, Hongjun Yan, Jinfan Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2014928","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2014928","url":null,"abstract":"Collateral frictions have a profound effect on our economic landscape, ranging from the design of financial securities, laws, and institutions, to various rules and regulations. We analyze a model with disagreement, where securities and collateral requirements are endogenous. It shows that the security that isolates the variable with disagreement is \"optimal\" in the sense that alternative securities cannot generate any trading. In an economy with N states, investors may introduce more than N securities, and markets are still incomplete. The model has several novel predictions on the behavior of basis—the spread between the prices of an asset and its replicating portfolio.","PeriodicalId":154391,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets Regulation (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114341743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is Financial Regulation Appropriately Dealing with Systemic Risk? Are We Really Fixing Existing Problems or Creating New Ones?","authors":"Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2381180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2381180","url":null,"abstract":"What is the purpose of financial sector regulation? What problem are we trying to solve? We are not (or should not be) trying to eliminate risk from the market. There is an \"optimal level of risk,\" and surely it is not zero. That means that there could exist inefficiently high levels of risk, but also inefficiently low levels.Instead, we are trying to eliminate what might be called \"excessive risk.\" But what makes risk \"excessive?\" To an economist, that can only mean risk which is priced too low, perhaps even not priced at all. But that is another way of saying risk which has not been fully internalized in the market, which is another way of describing an externality. In this article I summarize important shortfalls of current regulatory requirements, namely stress testing, to deal with the actual problem.I argue that the risk to fix the problem of \"excessive risk\" by the banks is to directly look into the banks’ liabilities that are prone to a bank run and regulate these instead. It is simpler, straight to the core of the problem, significantly less costly to implement and less costly in terms of negative effects that excessive and mis-targeted regulation can have in terms of economic growth, than the approach actually adopted.There were many components to the 2007-2009, which did create a perfect financial storm. But at the end of the day, it was fundamentally a problem of too much leverage on very short term debt. This fact was the trigger of the run and I believe also a key driver of contagion throughout the financial sector. Therefore, avoiding excessive risk will require that financial institutions taking deposits, borrowing overnight and issuing fixed-value money-market shares or any other type of asset that can cause a bank run then it will have to back up 100% of its liabilities with short term treasuries or reserves at the Fed.","PeriodicalId":154391,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets Regulation (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128873670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Charoula Daskalaki, Alexandros Kostakis, G. Skiadopoulos
{"title":"Are There Common Factors in Individual Commodity Futures Returns?","authors":"Charoula Daskalaki, Alexandros Kostakis, G. Skiadopoulos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2056186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2056186","url":null,"abstract":"We explore whether there are common factors in the cross-section of individual commodity futures returns. We test various asset pricing models which have been employed for the equities market as well as models motivated by commodity pricing theories. The use of these families of models allows us also to test whether the commodities and equities market are integrated. In addition, we employ Principal Components factor models which do not require à priori specification of factors. We find that none of the models is successful. Our results imply that commodity markets are segmented from the equities market and they are considerably heterogeneous per se.","PeriodicalId":154391,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets Regulation (Topic)","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126694346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Bank Business Models Drive Interest Margins: Evidence from U.S. Bank-Level Data","authors":"Saskia E. van Ewijk, I. Arnold","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2311117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2311117","url":null,"abstract":"The two decades prior to the credit crisis witnessed a strategic shift from a traditional, relationships-oriented model (ROM) to a transactions-oriented model (TOM) of financial intermediation in developed countries. A concurrent trend has been a persistent decline in average bank interest margins. In the literature, these phenomena are often explained using a causality that runs from increased competition in traditional segments to lower margins to new activities. Using a comprehensive dataset with bank-level data on over 16,000 FDIC-insured U.S. commercial banks for a period ranging from 1992 to 2010, this paper qualifies this chain of causality. We find that a bank's business model, measured using a multi-dimensional proxy of relationship banking activity, exerts a robust, positive effect on interest margins. Relationship banks still enjoy considerable interest margins. Our results provide evidence that banks' quest for growth, not the level of competition in traditional retail segments, has transformed banks' balance sheets and has reduced interest rate margins as a by-product.","PeriodicalId":154391,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets Regulation (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131278124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Treasury Liquidity, Funding Liquidity and Asset Returns","authors":"Ruslan Goyenko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2023187","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2023187","url":null,"abstract":"This paper links the illiquidity of US Treasuries to funding liquidity and shows that dealers’ financial constraints tighten after a positive shock to Treasury illiquidity. Consistent with the empirical properties of funding liquidity, illiquidity of Treasuries predicts changes in the TED spread and VIX index. Further, bond illiquidity is the only variable which consistently predicts the equity premium across sub-periods when controlling for all other common predictors. Moreover it is the only variable which survives the Goyal and Welch (2008, Review of Financial Studies) out-of-sample tests. Using it as a priced risk factor helps to explain cross-sectional returns of mutual funds. Controlling for stock market liquidity risk, funds with higher funding liquidity risk outperform funds with lower funding liquidity risk by 4.9% per annum. Fund inflows associated with lower funds’ liquidity constraints and higher funding liquidity risk predict superior performance.","PeriodicalId":154391,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets Regulation (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125205848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}