收紧内幕交易监管的经济后果:来自香港的证据

Zhihong Chen, Yuyan Guan, B. Ke
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引用次数: 1

摘要

通过一个游说事件导致香港更严格的内幕交易管制意外逆转,我们研究了收紧内幕交易监管是否会增加股东价值。我们发现,废除这一规定增加了整个香港股市的股东价值。对于受监管影响更大的游说公司来说,增幅更大。我们没有发现任何证据支持监管支持者的指控,即游说公司的内部人士在拟议的新禁止期对未来收益新闻进行更积极的交易或推迟收益公告。为了支持监管批评者的观点,我们发现,游说公司的内部人员在拟议的新禁售期更积极地交易,以在股价动荡时期稳定其公司的股价。我们的研究结果表明,在实施更严格的内幕交易监管方面要谨慎。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Economic Consequences of Tightening Insider Trading Regulation: Evidence from Hong Kong
Using a lobbying event that led to the unexpected reversal of a tougher insider trading blackout regulation in Hong Kong, we examine whether tightening insider trading regulation increases shareholder value. We find that repealing the regulation increases shareholder value for the entire Hong Kong stock market. The increase is greater for the lobbying firms, which are more affected by the regulation. We find no evidence to support the allegations made by the proponents of the regulation that insiders of lobbying firms trade more aggressively on future earnings news in the proposed new blackout period or delay earnings announcements. Supporting the argument made by the critics of the regulation, we find that lobbying firms’ insiders trade more aggressively in the proposed new blackout period to stabilize their firms’ stock prices in times of stock price turmoil. Our results suggest caution in imposing tougher insider trading regulation.
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