Iñigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe, S. Sánchez-Pagés, Ángel Solano-García
{"title":"The Redistributive Effects of Enfranchising Non-Citizens: Evidence From Sweden","authors":"Iñigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe, S. Sánchez-Pagés, Ángel Solano-García","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3944655","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3944655","url":null,"abstract":"We study theoretically and empirically the redistributive effects of extending voting rights to non-citizens. Our model predicts a tax increase when newly enfranchised voters represent a sufficiently large fraction of voters. We study the 1975 Swedish electoral reform that extended voting rights to non-citizens in municipal elections. In the first term after the reform, there was a tax increase that was not repeated in subsequent terms. This increase was stronger the greater the foreign population in the municipality. This effect was concentrated in municipalities where the size of the non-citizen population was large enough to upturn the previous electoral outcome.","PeriodicalId":150934,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Elections eJournal","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130907352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fairness in Apportionment","authors":"Michael G. Neubauer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3882872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3882872","url":null,"abstract":"We show that under suitable assumption on the number of states and the distribution of the population numbers of the states, bias of various methods of apportionment can be quantified. We also discuss the frequency of quota violations and occurrences of the Alabama Paradox. The results provide support for a proposal for apportioning the U.S. House of Representatives.","PeriodicalId":150934,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Elections eJournal","volume":"152 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123313399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Implementing Direct Democracy Via Representation","authors":"Guadalupe Correa-Lopera","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3907824","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3907824","url":null,"abstract":"Nowadays, several social movements asking for direct participation of citizens in the decision-making process are emerging in western democracies. These groups argue that traditional representative systems fail to adequately represent the will of the majority (often defined as “people” by populist movements) and support direct democracy as the only political system to restore the will of the majority. In this paper we consider a setting where several decisions about independent issues have to be made, and analyze under what conditions the two systems coincide; that is, the policy implemented by the winner of an electoral competition coincides with the one that citizens would choose by means of direct democracy. We find necessary and sufficient conditions for this equivalence to hold, implying that, as long as at least one of them is not fulfilled, the equivalence between direct democracy and representative democracy ceases to exist and disaffection in representative democracy would arise. The theoretical predictions of the model state, that the more divided the electorate over the proposals to be carried out for the bundle of issues and the less polarized are the politicians, the more likely it is that the conditions fail to be satisfied. We illustrate how the failure of our conditions leads to reasons for the emergence of mistrust in systems of representative democracy. Deeply divided societies, the activity of lobbies and special-interest groups, and the failure of electoral competition stand as responsible.","PeriodicalId":150934,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Elections eJournal","volume":"311 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121170345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Proposed Electoral College Amendment","authors":"Bryan H. Wildenthal","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3777733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3777733","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a proposed constitutional amendment reforming the Electoral College. This draft proposal was originally included in an earlier form in my proposed \"Bipartisan Constitutional Reform Amendments\" previously posted on SSRN. \u0000 \u0000My sincere hope is that all these proposals may garner broad, consensus, bipartisan support, and help provide a partial path forward in the nation's deeply polarized current political climate. \u0000 \u0000This proposed amendment would reform and modify the Electoral College system of electing the President and Vice President, while preserving its basic constitutional structure. It balances the need to more closely reflect the popular vote (guaranteeing that this would be the basis for selection of electors), while also preserving the slight advantage given to small states in the longstanding constitutional structure. \u0000 \u0000The paper includes an introduction (pp. 1-14), explaining the text of the proposal (pp. 15-19).","PeriodicalId":150934,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Elections eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132382433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Benford’s Law Application: Case of Elections in Sri Lanka","authors":"Agim Kukeli, Hettiyadura Shehan Karunaratne","doi":"10.31014/aior.1991.03.04.241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31014/aior.1991.03.04.241","url":null,"abstract":"Sri Lanka, like many developing countries has been involved in a circle of allegations of election fraud. Usually these claims are pronounced more by losing parties. This study uses Benford’s law, a law of probability distribution of digits, to investigate whether the election fraud claims might have merit. A sample in this study is made of 808 election data. This data comes from the 2010 Presidential election for representatives from three major political parties and from 2010 General Election data. All of the data points were obtained through reliable government sources, two of which are, the Department of Elections website of Sri Lanka, and the National News Paper statistics (2010). The study contrasts the distribution of the first digit of election results against the Benford’s Law benchmark. After obtaining the results, we organize the data and find median, mean, mode and standard deviation. The preliminary results showe that the data does not align with Benford’s law predictions. In other words, it shows that the data does not follow the law where the mean is larger than the median and there is a positive skewness then it likely follows a Benford’s distribution. The distribution of the first digit of actual data for three parties disagrees with Benford's law. This misalignment is more pronounced for the winning party than for the second and third place parties, respectively. We, therefore, look forward to run the data through several critical analyses and observing if there shall be any fraud or manipulation in numbers.","PeriodicalId":150934,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Elections eJournal","volume":"214 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125091525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cheryl Boudreau, Jonathan Colner, Scott A. Mackenzie
{"title":"Ranked-Choice Voting and Political Expression: How Voting Aids Narrow the Gap between Informed and Uninformed Citizens","authors":"Cheryl Boudreau, Jonathan Colner, Scott A. Mackenzie","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3786972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3786972","url":null,"abstract":"The implementation of ranked-choice voting (RCV) systems across the United States anticipates several benefits. For citizens, the ability to rank multiple candidates yields increased opportunities for political expression. Taking advantage of these opportunities, however, requires both more effort by citizens and more information about candidates. What types of citizens will benefit from the greater opportunity for political expression afforded by RCV systems? We address this question by conducting an experiment in the context of the 2020 general election in San Francisco. In the experiment, we randomly assign the electoral rules (single-choice versus ranked-choice) that govern citizen decision-making and the provision of political information (a voter guide summarizing candidates’ policy positions versus no information). We assess whether respondents use the choices available to them and the extent to which they choose / rank candidates whose policy views are similar to their own.<br><br>Our results indicate that a majority of respondents in the ranked-choice setting take advantage of the increased opportunities for political expression. Nonetheless, uninformed respondents (i.e., those who know relatively little about local politics) are significantly less likely than informed respondents to rank multiple candidates and use all of their allotted rankings. The rankings of uninformed respondents are also more weakly related to their own policy views. Providing an issue-oriented voter guide increases the share of uninformed respondents who use their allotted rankings, and strengthens the relationship between respondents’ candidate rankings and their policy views. Together, these results indicate that the benefits of RCV elections may not be fully realized by all types of citizens. Providing citizens with accessible forms of political information, such as an issue-oriented voter guide, can reduce these disparities and help citizens make more and potentially better informed choices.","PeriodicalId":150934,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Elections eJournal","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117316807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Making Rallies Great Again: The Effects of Presidential Campaign Rallies on Voter Behavior, 2008-2016","authors":"J. Snyder, Hasin Yousaf","doi":"10.3386/w28043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w28043","url":null,"abstract":"Populism has surged around the world in recent decades. One campaign activity that may be especially important for populist leaders is holding large rallies to gain unmediated support from \"the people.\" In this paper, we explore whether populist leaders are particularly effective in gaining support via their rallies. We do this by studying the effect of campaign rallies held by Donald Trump and other U.S. Presidential candidates since 2008. To measure the short-run causal impact of rallies, we exploit the fact that some respondents in the CCES were surveyed a few days before a rally, while others were surveyed a few days afterwards. We find that Trump's rallies produced a short-lived increase in his support over Clinton (especially among leaning Republicans), intention to vote (especially among strong Republicans), and individual campaign contributions for him. We do not find consistent, robust effects for other candidates. In terms of channels, we find that local media coverage of all candidates increased around their rallies, suggesting that the quantity of media coverage alone does not explain the findings.","PeriodicalId":150934,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Elections eJournal","volume":"74 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133036789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anne E. Baker, R. Boatright, A. Corrado, D. Dwyre, John C. Green, Steven Weissman, C. Wilcox
{"title":"How Super PACs Have Transformed the Federal Campaign Finance System: A Political Scientists' Amicus Brief to the Supreme Court.","authors":"Anne E. Baker, R. Boatright, A. Corrado, D. Dwyre, John C. Green, Steven Weissman, C. Wilcox","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3659999","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3659999","url":null,"abstract":"This paper served as an amicus brief to the Supreme Court concerning Representative Ted Lieu et. al vs. Federal Election Commission, a petition for review of the 2010 D.C. Circuit Court decision that legalized Super PACs. The brief finds that Super PACs accepting unlimited contributions spend nearly one in every four federal election campaign dollars, concentrated on the most competitive races. They enable million-dollar donors to support organizations marketing and conducting themselves as extensions of candidates’ and parties’ campaigns — regardless of federal contribution limits applying to those campaigns. Thus Super PACs undermine the contribution limits that are the very basis of the federal campaign finance system.","PeriodicalId":150934,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Elections eJournal","volume":"22 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115565108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Time to Prepare for Voting by Mail","authors":"D. Shoag, Stan Veuger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3570653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3570653","url":null,"abstract":"The general election’s timing is set by statute Nonetheless, it would be irresponsible to require people to vote in person in the midst of a pandemic Dramatic","PeriodicalId":150934,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Elections eJournal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133440104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Polarization and the US Electoral College","authors":"James Siderius","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3564820","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3564820","url":null,"abstract":"In light of the 2000 and 2016 presidential elections, there has been doubt about whether the electoral college is a \"fair'' way of selecting a presidential candidate. Rather than taking a position on the issue, this paper attempts to quantify the importance of such a discussion. Toward this end, we consider a voting model based on regional and personal biases, which provides a unifying framework for other probabilistic models in the literature along with offering new ones. Our main contribution is the derivation of simple expressions for the asymptotic likelihood of a \"referendum paradox,'' whereby one candidate wins the election according to the electoral college, but loses the popular vote. We then consider how this likelihood varies depending on the heterogeneity of opinions within and across regions of a country, which may also differ in population. We conclude that rising polarization of political beliefs leading up to the 2020 election has made these two election formats increasingly more incompatible.","PeriodicalId":150934,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Elections eJournal","volume":"129 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130676723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}