Implementing Direct Democracy Via Representation

Guadalupe Correa-Lopera
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Abstract

Nowadays, several social movements asking for direct participation of citizens in the decision-making process are emerging in western democracies. These groups argue that traditional representative systems fail to adequately represent the will of the majority (often defined as “people” by populist movements) and support direct democracy as the only political system to restore the will of the majority. In this paper we consider a setting where several decisions about independent issues have to be made, and analyze under what conditions the two systems coincide; that is, the policy implemented by the winner of an electoral competition coincides with the one that citizens would choose by means of direct democracy. We find necessary and sufficient conditions for this equivalence to hold, implying that, as long as at least one of them is not fulfilled, the equivalence between direct democracy and representative democracy ceases to exist and disaffection in representative democracy would arise. The theoretical predictions of the model state, that the more divided the electorate over the proposals to be carried out for the bundle of issues and the less polarized are the politicians, the more likely it is that the conditions fail to be satisfied. We illustrate how the failure of our conditions leads to reasons for the emergence of mistrust in systems of representative democracy. Deeply divided societies, the activity of lobbies and special-interest groups, and the failure of electoral competition stand as responsible.
实行代表制直接民主
如今,西方民主国家出现了一些要求公民直接参与决策过程的社会运动。这些团体认为,传统的代议制制度未能充分代表多数人的意愿(通常被民粹主义运动定义为“人民”),并支持直接民主作为恢复多数人意愿的唯一政治制度。在本文中,我们考虑了一种必须对几个独立问题做出决策的设置,并分析了在什么条件下这两个系统重合;也就是说,在选举竞争中胜出者所执行的政策与公民通过直接民主所选择的政策是一致的。我们找到了这种等价的必要和充分条件,这意味着,只要其中至少有一个不满足,直接民主和代议制民主之间的等价就不复存在,代议制民主的不满情绪就会出现。该模型的理论预测表明,选民对一系列问题的建议分歧越大,政客的两极化程度越低,就越有可能无法满足这些条件。我们说明了我们条件的失败如何导致代议制民主制度中出现不信任的原因。严重分裂的社会,游说团体和特殊利益集团的活动,以及选举竞争的失败是罪魁祸首。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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