Political Institutions: Elections eJournal最新文献_第10页

The Impact of Super PACs on the 2010 and 2012 Congressional Elections 超级政治行动委员会对2010年和2012年国会选举的影响

Political Institutions: Elections eJournal Pub Date : 2013-08-29 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2312917

Victoria A. Farrar-Myers, J. Gulati, Richard M. Skinner

引用次数: 3

Perceived Election (Un)fairness and Support for Electoral Protest: Reactions to the Russian State Duma Election in 2011 选举公正性认知与对选举抗议的支持:对2011年俄罗斯国家杜马选举的反应

Political Institutions: Elections eJournal Pub Date : 2013-08-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2309708

A. Sedziaka

{"title":"Perceived Election (Un)fairness and Support for Electoral Protest: Reactions to the Russian State Duma Election in 2011","authors":"A. Sedziaka","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2309708","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2309708","url":null,"abstract":"Recent research focuses on electoral authoritarian regimes, which use limited political competition and manipulated elections to enhance legitimacy and maintain incumbent rule. But to what extent and under what conditions do unfair elections enhance or erode support for regime? More specifically, when do unfair elections increase support for electoral protest? To address these questions, I use evidence from the New Russia Barometer nationwide survey, conducted shortly after the 2011 State Duma election that triggered electoral protests. This evidence is complemented by surveys of Muscovites and Moscow protesters. I test the effects of several conditions on support for electoral protest: direct experience of procedural unfairness, perceived decisiveness of procedural violations for election outcomes (substantive unfairness), knowledge of the election observers’ critical assessments, and voting for winners or losers. I conclude with a discussion of implications of perceived election unfairness for protest attitudes. NOTE: Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Midwest Political Science Association annual convention, April 11th-14th, 2013, Chicago, IL and at the pre-APSA Workshop on Electoral Integrity, August 28th, 2013, Chicago, IL.","PeriodicalId":150934,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Elections eJournal","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114666333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Disentangling the Turnout Effect: The Case of Taiwan's 2012 Concurrent Elections 解读投票率效应:以台湾2012年同期选举为例

Political Institutions: Elections eJournal Pub Date : 2013-08-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2315745

Chí Huang, Ying-lung Chou

{"title":"Disentangling the Turnout Effect: The Case of Taiwan's 2012 Concurrent Elections","authors":"Chí Huang, Ying-lung Chou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2315745","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2315745","url":null,"abstract":"It is generally agreed that when a relatively low-profile election is held simultaneously with a high-profile election, voter turnout rate of the former tends to be higher than it would be if it were held separately. The central concern of this study is twofold. The first one is to estimate the size of this effect, and the second one is to explore whether partisan effects of voter turnout exist. The case of Taiwan’s 2012 concurrent elections is employed in our study. For the first question, we estimate that the overall effect of concurrent presidential election on legislative election turnout rate is roughly 16.7%. As to the second research question, we find that partisan effects differ depends on voter types. For those who usually turnout to vote in high-profile elections, the pull effect of concurrent election is nearly universal regardless of demographical characteristics and partisanship. For those who rarely turnout to vote in stand-alone elections but are mobilized in a highly competitive concurrent election, the pull effect does show partisan difference. Surprisingly, such effect is somewhat beneficial to the pan-Green camp in Taiwan’s 2012 legislative election. Despite the exploratory nature of this study, our findings have important theoretical implications. Future studies of partisan-turnout effects should specify the mechanism behind higher (or lower) turnout before inferring its effects. Furthermore, there may be different “layers” of voters drawn to the voting booths in a high turnout election and their voter compositions, including partisanship, may be also quite different.","PeriodicalId":150934,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Elections eJournal","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122571365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A District at a Time: Electoral Implications of Widespread Adoption of the Congressional District Method (or Congressional District) for Allocating Electors 一次一个选区:广泛采用国会选区方法(或国会选区)分配选民的选举影响

Political Institutions: Elections eJournal Pub Date : 2013-08-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2314321

A. Cizmar, Irwin L. Morris

{"title":"A District at a Time: Electoral Implications of Widespread Adoption of the Congressional District Method (or Congressional District) for Allocating Electors","authors":"A. Cizmar, Irwin L. Morris","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2314321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2314321","url":null,"abstract":"Currently, forty-eight states allocate Electors on a winner-take-all basis. Only Maine and Nebraska have a distinctive allocation mechanism, and in both of these cases, the winner of the state’s popular vote receives two Electors (those representing the senators) and the remaining Electors are distributed according to the popular vote in each of the congressional districts. This paper focuses on the political implications — historical, current, and future — of the adoption of the Congressional district allocation procedure by all of the states. We begin by assessing the historical impact of an ex ante universal adoption of the Maine-Nebraska allocation rule by all fifty states during the post-World War II era. After estimating the effect of this institutional change on the outcome of each election, we identify those districts and states which would have been the “battleground” constituencies for each election. We then assess the number and location of each of the battleground areas. We are particularly interested in the geographic dispersion of battleground districts relative to battleground states. We present data on this dispersion for recent elections and discuss the electoral implications of this dispersion in the context of widespread use of the Congressional district allocation procedure.","PeriodicalId":150934,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Elections eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128219827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Elections and Deceptions: An Experimental Study on the Behavioral Effects of Democracy 选举与欺骗:民主行为效应的实验研究

Political Institutions: Elections eJournal Pub Date : 2013-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1430904

L. Corazzini, Sebastian Kube, Michel André Maréchal, Antonio Nicoló

引用次数: 80

Negative Campaigning, Fundraising, and Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment 负面竞选、筹款和选民投票率:实地实验

Political Institutions: Elections eJournal Pub Date : 2013-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2280214

Jared L. Barton, M. Castillo, Ragan Petrie

引用次数: 18

To End Gerrymandering: The Canadian Model for Reforming the Congressional Redistricting Process in the United States 结束不公正的选区划分:改革美国国会选区划分程序的加拿大模式

Political Institutions: Elections eJournal Pub Date : 2013-03-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2225509

Anthony J. Gaughan

{"title":"To End Gerrymandering: The Canadian Model for Reforming the Congressional Redistricting Process in the United States","authors":"Anthony J. Gaughan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2225509","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2225509","url":null,"abstract":"In the 2012 Congressional elections, Democratic candidates for the House of Representatives carried 1.3 million more votes nationwide than Republican candidates did. Nevertheless, Republicans captured control of the House by a margin of 234 seats to 201. The undemocratic outcome of the House elections resulted directly from America’s system of redistricting and reapportionment. Partisan politics, not principles of good government, dictate the congressional redistricting process in the vast majority of states.Congressional apportionment law exacerbates the problem. In particular, the statutory limit on the size of the House of Representatives magnifies gerrymandering’s effects more than ever before. As the population gap between large and small states and urban and rural areas continues to increase, redistricting disparities will only worsen in the years ahead. Accordingly, this article proposes that Congress look to Canada as a model for making U.S. House elections more reflective of the electorate’s will. A nation strikingly similar to the United States in many important respects, Canada rejected partisan gerrymandering half a century ago. Adopting the Canadian approach would involve two significant reforms: first, the nationwide establishment of non-partisan independent redistricting commissions, and, second, the restoration of decennial increases in the total number of seats in the House of Representatives to reflect the growing population of the United States. This article explains the current law of Congressional redistricting and reapportionment, assesses the main critiques of the American system, analyzes the Parliamentary redistribution process in Canada, and proposes how the United States can apply the best features of the Canadian system to Congressional redistricting and reapportionment.","PeriodicalId":150934,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Elections eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130374902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Presidentialism and Political Parties in Indonesia: Why are All Parties Not Presidentialized? 印尼的总统制与政党:为何所有政党都不是总统制?

Political Institutions: Elections eJournal Pub Date : 2013-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2280942

Koich Kawamura

引用次数: 13

Universal, Unequal Suffrage: Authoritarian Vote-Seat Malapportionment in the 1907 Austrian Electoral Reform 普遍的、不平等的选举权:1907年奥地利选举改革中的专制选票席位分配不公

Political Institutions: Elections eJournal Pub Date : 2013-02-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2220787

Henry Thomson

{"title":"Universal, Unequal Suffrage: Authoritarian Vote-Seat Malapportionment in the 1907 Austrian Electoral Reform","authors":"Henry Thomson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2220787","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2220787","url":null,"abstract":"Leaders of undemocratic regimes allow elections in order to co-opt powerful groups in society and secure their own grip on power. However, they do not allow fair elections. They manipulate the electoral system in order to over-represent the geographic areas, and the groups within them, to whom they wish to allocate political power. This is done via the mechanism of malapportionment, by which electoral districts in the privileged areas are assigned a greater share of legislative seats than their share of the population. Analyzing the introduction of universal male suffrage in Austria in 1907, I show that this reform did not lead to universal, equal suffrage and that malapportionment under authoritarian regimes does not run exclusively along an urban-rural cleavage. Instead, reform resulted in an electoral system which perpetuated the under-representation of ethnic minorities in the lower house of the Reichsrat and the over-representation of the rural German-speaking population and urban Polish elites. This solved the regime’s problem of controlling urban unrest by satisfying demands for electoral reform, while at the same time maintaining the predominant political position of German and Polish groups in Cislethania via more subtle manipulation of the electoral system.","PeriodicalId":150934,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Elections eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127021286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Mediocracy, Fourth Version 《平庸》第四版

Political Institutions: Elections eJournal Pub Date : 2013-02-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2213973

A. Mattozzi, Antonio Merlo

引用次数: 1