Interpreting Kuhn最新文献

Mop-Up Work 扫荡工作

Interpreting Kuhn Pub Date : 2021-06-30 DOI: 10.1017/9781108653206.006

W. Goodwin

引用次数: 1

Kuhn, the Duck, and the Rabbit – Perception, Theory-Ladenness, and Creativity in Science 库恩，鸭子和兔子——科学中的感知、理论、内涵和创造力

Interpreting Kuhn Pub Date : 2021-06-30 DOI: 10.1017/9781108653206.010

V. Kindi

引用次数: 1

Index 指数

Interpreting Kuhn Pub Date : 2021-06-30 DOI: 10.1017/9781108653206.015

引用次数: 0

Kuhn and Logical Positivism 库恩与逻辑实证主义

Interpreting Kuhn Pub Date : 2021-06-30 DOI: 10.1017/9781108653206.005

J. Oliveira

引用次数: 0

Truth, Incoherence, and the Evolution of Science 真理、不连贯和科学的演变

Interpreting Kuhn Pub Date : 2021-06-30 DOI: 10.1017/9781108653206.012

Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen

{"title":"Truth, Incoherence, and the Evolution of Science","authors":"Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen","doi":"10.1017/9781108653206.012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108653206.012","url":null,"abstract":"property. Now the key question is: What is the linguistic role of “truth” that could be used to substitute the abstract concept of truth? Sellars’s view is that for a proposition to be true, it means that it is assertible: “True is the same as semantically assertible” (Sellars 1967, 101). Brandom’s interpretation of Sellars’s position is that talk about truth is “misleading talk about what one is doing in saying something in the sense of making a statement: the use of ‘truth’ is to be understood in terms of the platitude that asserting is taking true” (Brandom 2015, 258). The Sellarsian view of truth is a form of deflationarism in something like the following way. The proper use of “true” enables one to make the following inference: from “Bob is five feet tall is true” to “Bob is five feet tall.” In order for this to work, it is necessary to understand the kinds of inferences that are warranted. Sellars’s idea is that the use of language always takes place in a frame and in the space of reasons stipulated by a specific language game and its world view. The idea of frame-dependent inferences well serves Kuhn’s request that “truth” must be able to discriminate between epistemic candidates. “Truth” thus plays a special social-discursive role and its correct application in sentences means that the inferences taken are appropriate. The focus in judging whether an inference is warranted must be determined on the basis of the inferential specifics of a framework. It may be difficult to outline a general theory of correct inferences because we are dealing with material inferences whose validity depends on non-logical vocabularies. I finish this section on truth and coherence with an illustration of legitimate or warranted and illegitimate or unwarranted semantically assertible inferences in a frame of pre-Copernican and Copernican astronomy (cf. SSR-4, 115). A pre-Copernican could say that “the yellow object in the sky is a planet is true” (pointing to the Moon), dropping “true”, and inferring therefore that “the yellow object in the sky is a planet”. In the preCopernican framework this inference is legitimate and semantically assertible. In a Copernican framework, this exemplifies faulty reasoning. A Copernican would say something like “the yellow object in the sky is a satellite is true” inferring that “the yellow object in the sky is a satellite”. Although the notion of “truth” hardly adds anything substantial, this is one way in which it can be kept as a (more or less redundant) linguistic device, quite as Kuhn required: it indicates an approval of the stated, and by extension, correct inferences maintaining truth-values constant. In conclusion, this pragmatist notion of truth allows one to discriminate between acceptable and unacceptable inferences. It also sheds light on the frameworks and on how their legitimate rules of reasoning vary in the 220 jouni-matti kuukkanen C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/26474462/WORKINGFOLDER/WRAY-OPM/9781108498296C11.3D 221 [2","PeriodicalId":148089,"journal":{"name":"Interpreting Kuhn","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131417279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Kuhn’s Kantian Dimensions 库恩的康德维度

Interpreting Kuhn Pub Date : 2021-06-30 DOI: 10.1017/9781108653206.003

Lydia Patton

{"title":"Kuhn’s Kantian Dimensions","authors":"Lydia Patton","doi":"10.1017/9781108653206.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108653206.003","url":null,"abstract":"Two questions need to be considered when assessing the Kantian dimensions of Kuhn’s thought. First, was Kuhn himself a Kantian of some sort? There are Neo-Kantian traditions, French and German, from which Kuhn could have drawn, and there are more complicated possible influences. In order to assess Kuhn’s “Kantian” influences, then, we need to figure out whether Kant, Kantians, or Neo-Kantians have had an influence on his work, directly or indirectly. A second question is whether Kuhn had an influence on the Kantian and Neo-Kantian thought that came after him. Here, rather than looking at sources and influences, we consider a reception tradition. While both questions are significant to the current project, it is crucial to distinguish them from each other. In particular, as I will argue, making clear distinctions here will allow us to see how recent assessments of Kuhn can be correct, within their own domain, but incorrect when applied outside it (Kant scholars will recognize this move from the Antinomies!). More and more scholars are working on Kuhn’s influences, scholarly development, and reception. For instance, we might look at the competing assessments of Pihlström and Siitonen (2005) and Mayoral de Lucas (2009). Pihlström and Siitonen argue that","PeriodicalId":148089,"journal":{"name":"Interpreting Kuhn","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121321013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Reassessing Kuhn’s Theoretical Monism 重新评价库恩的理论一元论

Interpreting Kuhn Pub Date : 2021-06-30 DOI: 10.1017/9781108653206.013

K. Wray

引用次数: 0

The Genealogy of Thomas Kuhn’s Metaphysics 托马斯·库恩的形而上学谱系

Interpreting Kuhn Pub Date : 2021-06-30 DOI: 10.1017/9781108653206.002

P. Hoyningen-Huene

引用次数: 1

Reassessing the Notion of a Kuhnian Revolution 重新评估库恩革命的概念

Interpreting Kuhn Pub Date : 2021-06-30 DOI: 10.1017/9781108653206.008

Eric R. Scerri