Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal最新文献_第7页

Managing the Treasury Yield Curve in the 1940s 在20世纪40年代管理国债收益率曲线

Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal Pub Date : 2020-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3537189

K. Garbade

引用次数: 11

The Politics of Central Banking in Kenya: Balancing Political and Developmental Interests 肯尼亚中央银行的政治:平衡政治和发展利益

Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal Pub Date : 2020-01-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3523035

M. Tyce

{"title":"The Politics of Central Banking in Kenya: Balancing Political and Developmental Interests","authors":"M. Tyce","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3523035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3523035","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses the performance of the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) in delivering on its mandate since the organisation gained formal independence in the early-1990s. It utilises a political settlements approach, tracking how the distribution of power has shaped CBK’s effectiveness over time. The paper finds that Kenya’s political settlement has constrained CBK’s performance in certain respects, particularly with regards to financial sector supervision, where the organisation must operate within a tight set of political constraints because of the sector’s importance in enabling vital patronage networks and generating political financing for elections. This has often incentivised CBK governors to undertake incremental reforms that balance developmental and political interests; governors who have not been willing to compromise in this way have undermined the organisation’s independence and autonomy by provoking a backlash. The paper also finds that Kenya’s competitive clientelist political settlement has caused difficulties for CBK in undertaking its price stability mandate. This is particularly the case during election periods, when the organisation faces pressure to adopt a looser stance. Nonetheless, despite these pressures, the paper finds that CBK has, overall, been effective in delivering on its core mandate throughout the period under analysis, to the extent that it can be labelled a long-standing ‘pocket of effectiveness’. This is because three other sets of factors have played a kind of countervailing role, by keeping CBK relatively insulated from the most corrosive aspects of Kenya’s competitive clientelism. These are: transnational factors; ideas and ideology; and organisational-level factors, including CBK’s leadership and its formal and informal sources of autonomy.","PeriodicalId":145273,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129307215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

Dominant Money 占主导地位的钱

Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal Pub Date : 2020-01-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3513411

J. Huber

引用次数: 0

Hi J. Powell: From Where the “NORM” of 2 Percent Inflation Target Come From? 嗨，J.鲍威尔:2%通胀目标的“常态”从何而来?

Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal Pub Date : 2019-12-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3506327

Yosef Bonaparte

引用次数: 0

Sovereign Debt Crisis in Portugal and in Spain 葡萄牙和西班牙的主权债务危机

Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal Pub Date : 2019-12-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3504337

António Afonso, Nuno Verdial

引用次数: 2

Banking Supervision, Monetary Policy and Risk-Taking: Big Data Evidence from 15 Credit Registers 银行监管、货币政策与风险承担:来自15家信用登记机构的大数据证据

Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3512892

Carlo Altavilla, Miguel Boucinha, J. Peydró, F. Smets

{"title":"Banking Supervision, Monetary Policy and Risk-Taking: Big Data Evidence from 15 Credit Registers","authors":"Carlo Altavilla, Miguel Boucinha, J. Peydró, F. Smets","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3512892","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3512892","url":null,"abstract":"We analyse the effects of supranational versus national banking supervision on credit supply, and its interactions with monetary policy. For identification, we exploit: (i) a new, proprietary dataset based on 15 European credit registers; (ii) the institutional change leading to the centralisation of European banking supervision; (iii) high-frequency monetary policy surprises; (iv) differences across euro area countries, also vis-a-vis non-euro area countries. We show that supranational supervision reduces credit supply to firms with very high ex-ante and ex-post credit risk, while stimulating credit supply to firms without loan delinquencies. Moreover, the increased risk-sensitivity of credit supply driven by centralised supervision is stronger for banks operating in stressed countries. Exploiting heterogeneity across banks, we find that the mechanism driving the results is higher quantity and quality of human resources available to the supranational supervisor rather than changes in incentives due to the reallocation of supervisory responsibility to the new institution. Finally, there are crucial complementarities between supervision and monetary policy: centralised supervision offsets excessive bank risk-taking induced by a more accommodative monetary policy stance, but does not offset more productive risk-taking. Overall, we show that using multiple credit registers – first time in the literature – is crucial for external validity.","PeriodicalId":145273,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117148817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 32

An Operating Framework for the 21st Century 面向21世纪的运营框架

Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal Pub Date : 2019-11-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3494567

David Beckworth

引用次数: 0

Capital, Liquidity and Prudential Regulation (Presentation Slides) 资本、流动性及审慎监管(投影片)

Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3518858

Christa H. S. Bouwman

引用次数: 0

Keynote Address: Quantitative Easing and Global Economic Problems (Presentation Slides) 主题演讲:量化宽松与全球经济问题(幻灯片)

Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3518866

A. Blundell-Wignall

引用次数: 0

Russia’s Monetary Policy in 2018 2018年俄罗斯的货币政策

Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3448484

P. Trunin, A. Bozhechkova, A. Kiyutsevskaya, A. Knobel

{"title":"Russia’s Monetary Policy in 2018","authors":"P. Trunin, A. Bozhechkova, A. Kiyutsevskaya, A. Knobel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3448484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3448484","url":null,"abstract":"Russia’s central bank adopted a new monetary policy regime in 2018 by raising the key interest rate for the first time since December 2014. After slashing the key interest rate on February 9th and on March 23rd by 0.25 percentage points to 7.5 and 7.25 percent per annum, respectively, the central bank lifted the rate on September 14th by 0.25 percentage points to 7.5 percent per annum, with another hike on December 14th of 0.25 percentage points to 7.75 percent per annum. The transition to a neutral monetary policy regime2 slowed as far back as in 2017. There were more constraints to interest rate cuts in 2018 that came from new April and August anti-Russia sanctions that spurred capital outflows from the country and depreciation of the Russian ruble, a VAT hike decision scheduled for 2019, a late-year fall in energy prices, and concerns about possible heightening of inflation expectations. The key interest rate hike suggested that the Bank of Russia is committed to bring inflation back down to target in the medium term. For instance, according to a forecast of the central bank, end-of-year inflation for 2019 may reach 5–5.5 percent, and it is not until 2020 that inflation is back to its target.","PeriodicalId":145273,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal","volume":"20 18","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120847026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0