{"title":"Justice as Luck Egalitarian Fairness?","authors":"Louis-Philippe Hodgson","doi":"10.1017/S0012217319000052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217319000052","url":null,"abstract":"In A Conceptual Investigation of Justice, Kyle Johannsen maintains that the strongest version of John Rawls’s theory of justice is one that incorporates the luck egalitarian conception of fairness developed by G.A. Cohen. He also contends that, once the theory is modified in this way, it becomes clear that the original position doesn’t yield principles of justice but rather what Cohen calls ‘rules of regulation.’ I argue that the minimal conception of fairness that Rawls favours is the right one for his purposes, and that bringing in luck egalitarian fairness would render the outcome of the original position indeterminate. Kyle Johannsen soutient que, pour être pleinement convaincante, la théorie de la justice de John Rawls doit incorporer la conception de l’équité associée avec l’égalitarisme des chances de G.A. Cohen. Il maintient également que, lorsqu’on modifie ainsi la théorie de Rawls, on voit que les principes choisis dans la position originelle doivent être ce que Cohen appelle des «règles de régulation». Je rétorque que la conception de l’équité qu’adopte Rawls est idéalement adaptée aux besoins de sa théorie, et que l’incorporation de la conception de l’équité que défend Cohen rendrait indéterminé le résultat de la position originelle.","PeriodicalId":145102,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128095099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Values for Foxes? A Comment on Kyle Johannsen’s A Conceptual Investigation of Justice","authors":"Colin M. Macleod","doi":"10.1017/S0012217319000088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217319000088","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a critical rejoinder to some themes in Kyle Johannsen’s A Conceptual Investigation of Justice. The discussion focuses on Johannsen’s analysis of fundamental value pluralism and identifies a number of challenges to the form of value pluralism defended by Johannsen. I suggest that Johannsen’s analysis fails to explain how conflicts between fundamental values can be resolved, and that there is greater harmony between fundamental values than Johannsen recognizes. Cet article propose une réponse critique à quelques thèmes du livre de Kyle Johannsen, A Conceptual Investigation of Justice. La discussion se penche sur l’analyse du pluralisme fondamental de la valeur proposée par Johannsen et met en cause cette même analyse. Je soutiens que l’analyse proposée par Johannsen ne parvient pas à expliquer comment des conflits entre des valeurs fondamentales peuvent être résolus et qu’il y a davantage de convergence entre des valeurs fondamentales que ne le reconnaît Johannsen.","PeriodicalId":145102,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125800865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Le monisme matériel de Franz Brentano","authors":"G. Bucchioni, L. Iglesias","doi":"10.1017/s0012217319000416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217319000416","url":null,"abstract":"Le but de cet article est de proposer un examen de l’ontologie matérielle de Franz Brentano. Nous soutenons ici la thèse selon laquelle Brentano défend un type original de monisme. Ce monisme peut être vu comme la conjonction de trois théories : le réisme (la thèse selon laquelle il n’existe que des choses individuelles concrètes), le monisme de priorité (la thèse selon laquelle il n’y a qu’une seule substance) et le super-substantialisme (la thèse selon laquelle cette substance est l’espace). This article is a review of Franz Brenatno’s material ontology. We support the thesis that Brentano defends an original type of monism. This monism can be seen as the conjunction of three theories: reism (the thesis that there are only concrete individual things), priority monism (the thesis that there is only one substance), and supersubstantivalism (the thesis that this substance is space).","PeriodicalId":145102,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116594018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice COLLEEN MUPRHY Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017; 221 pp.; $114.95 (hardback)","authors":"S. Hawkins","doi":"10.1017/S0012217318000690","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217318000690","url":null,"abstract":"qui assiste aux débats incessants entre les versions anglophone et francophone de son histoire nationale — ou, dans le cas canadien, à une opposition entre l’histoire coloniale et l’histoire envisagée selon le point de vue des opprimés —, ce livre d’Alex Rosenberg — qui ne traite aucunement du Canada — apparaît comme une invitation à prolonger la réflexion sur les usages, les limites et les récupérations possibles de l’histoire. Ouvrage peu recensé dans le monde francophone, on espère que How History Gets Things Wrong sera traduit en français.","PeriodicalId":145102,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie","volume":"215 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132766837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does God Know the Occurrence of a Change Among Particulars? Avicenna and the Problem of God’s Knowledge of Change","authors":"Amirhossein Zadyousefi","doi":"10.1017/S0012217318000550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217318000550","url":null,"abstract":"(i) God is omniscient; therefore, for any change, C, among particulars, God knows the occurrence of C. (ii) If God knows the occurrence of C, then X. (iii) not-X. It is clear that the set of propositions (i)—(iii) is inconsistent. This is the general form of two problems—which I call the ‘problem of change in knowledge’ (PCK) and the ‘problem of change in essence’ (PCE)—for Avicenna concerning God’s knowledge of particulars. No work in the secondary literature has discussed exactly what PCK and PCE are. In this paper, I will clarify exactly what they are. (i) Dieu est omniscient. Donc, pour tout changement C parmi les particuliers, Dieu connaît la survenance de C. (ii) Si Dieu connaît la survenance de C, alors X. (iii) Non-X. Or la série de propositions (i) – (iii) est clairement incohérente. Ceci est la forme générale de deux problèmes relevés par Avicenne concernant la connaissance par Dieu des particuliers, que j’appelle «le problème du changement dans la connaissance» (PCC) et «le problème du changement dans l’essence» (PCE). Aucune œuvre dans la littérature secondaire ne discute de la nature des PCC et PCE. Je la clarifierai dans cette étude.","PeriodicalId":145102,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129213700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On How (Not) to Argue for Preferring God’s Non-Existence","authors":"Kirk Lougheed","doi":"10.1017/S0012217318000574","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217318000574","url":null,"abstract":"Consider two epistemically possible worlds that are as similar as can be, except that atheism is true in one world and theism is true in the other world. Which world is it rational to prefer? I explore the strongest defence of the somewhat counterintuitive claim that it is rational to prefer the atheistic world. I also discuss the opposite conclusion, namely, that it’s rational to prefer the theistic world. Surprisingly, my conclusion is that it’s difficult to tell whether to prefer theism or atheism overall. Considérons deux mondes épistémiquement possibles qui sont aussi similaires que possible, sauf que l’athéisme est vrai dans un monde et que le théisme est vrai dans l’autre monde. Quel monde est-il rationnel de préférer? J’examine la défense la plus forte de l’affirmation quelque peu contre-intuitive selon laquelle il est rationnel de préférer le monde athée. Je discute également de la conclusion opposée, à savoir qu’il est rationnel de préférer le monde théiste. Étonnamment, ma conclusion est qu’il est difficile de dire s’il faut préférer le théisme ou l’athéisme en général.","PeriodicalId":145102,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie","volume":"116 9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128064061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Bloomsbury Anthology of Transcendental Thought: From Antiquity to the Anthropocene DAVID LAROCCA (Ed.) New York: Bloomsbury Publishing Inc., 2017; 848 pp., $44.95 (paper)","authors":"J. Rome","doi":"10.1017/S0012217318000537","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217318000537","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":145102,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124879079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}