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Justice, Pluralism, and the Egalitarian Ethos 正义、多元主义和平等主义精神
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0012217319000143
K. Voigt
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引用次数: 1
DIA volume 58 issue 4 Cover and Front matter DIA第58卷第4期封面和封面问题
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0012217320000013
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引用次数: 0
How History Gets Things Wrong: The Neuroscience of Our Addiction to Stories ALEX ROSENBERG Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, 2018, 289 p. 历史是如何出错的:我们对故事上瘾的神经科学亚历克斯罗森伯格剑桥(MA)，麻省理工学院出版社，2018年，289页。
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0012217319000349
Y. Laberge
{"title":"How History Gets Things Wrong: The Neuroscience of Our Addiction to Stories ALEX ROSENBERG Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, 2018, 289 p.","authors":"Y. Laberge","doi":"10.1017/s0012217319000349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217319000349","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":145102,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie","volume":"11 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114020724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
DIA volume 58 issue 4 Cover and Back matter DIA第58卷第4期封面和封底
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0012217320000025
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引用次数: 0
Defending A Conceptual Investigation of Justice 捍卫正义的概念调查
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0012217319000179
Kyle Johannsen
{"title":"Defending A Conceptual Investigation of Justice","authors":"Kyle Johannsen","doi":"10.1017/S0012217319000179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217319000179","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I explain the arguments my critics target and I respond to their criticisms. Some of my replies further expand upon the ideas covered in my book—A Conceptual Investigation of Justice—and some cover matters that weren’t discussed there. This paper thus substantially contributes to the arguments made in my book. Cet article détaille et défend les arguments avancés dans l’ouvrage A Conceptual Investigation of Justice en réponse aux critiques. Cette mise au point développe certaines des idées contenues dans le livre, mais elle présente également des perspectives inédites, étayant l’argumentaire de sa thèse principale.","PeriodicalId":145102,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie","volume":"78 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116770039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Conceptual Disagreement about Justice: Verbal, but Not Merely Verbal 关于正义的概念分歧:口头的，但不仅仅是口头的
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0012217319000167
Kyle Johannsen
{"title":"Conceptual Disagreement about Justice: Verbal, but Not Merely Verbal","authors":"Kyle Johannsen","doi":"10.1017/S0012217319000167","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217319000167","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I introduce the articles contained in this special issue, and I briefly explain some of the main arguments presented in my book A Conceptual Investigation of Justice. A central claim in my book is that a verbal and yet also philosophically substantial disagreement over the word ‘justice’ lies at the heart of a number of issues in contemporary political philosophy. Over the course of introducing my book’s arguments and the commentaries in this issue, I also offer an account of what it means for a dispute to be verbal, but not merely verbal. Ce texte offre un aperçu des articles composant ce numéro spécial et présente brièvement les principaux arguments avancés dans A Conceptual Investigation of Justice, dont une des thèses centrales veut qu’un important désaccord à la fois sémantique et philosophique sur la définition du terme «justice» soit au cœur de plusieurs questions en philosophie politique contemporaine. Cette présentation nous amène par ailleurs à décrire les caractéristiques d’un débat sémantique dont la portée dépasse la stricte sphère linguistique.","PeriodicalId":145102,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130144935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Doute et scepticisme. Examen d’une distinction hégélienne à Iéna 怀疑和怀疑。回顾黑格尔在耶拿的区别
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0012217319000404
Lucas Petuaud-letang
{"title":"Doute et scepticisme. Examen d’une distinction hégélienne à Iéna","authors":"Lucas Petuaud-letang","doi":"10.1017/S0012217319000404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217319000404","url":null,"abstract":"Dans cet article, nous nous demandons quelles sont les raisons de la distinction et de l’opposition établies par Hegel entre le doute et le scepticisme antique dans son essai de 1802 et dans quelle mesure ce point de vue est original. L’article montre que cette séparation se fonde sur l’attribution au sceptique d’une certitude de sa négation et que cette attribution se révèle à travers l’interprétation hégélienne du rapport entre Pyrrhonisme et Nouvelle Académie, d’une part, et d’autre part du Parménide de Platon. This article investigates why Hegel contrasts doubt and ancient scepticism in his 1802 essay, and shows how original this view is. The article shows that this separation rests on ascribing a certainty in the act of negating to the sceptic; this can be seen, first, in Hegel’s interpretation of the relationship between Pyrrhonism and the New Academy and, second, in his reading of Plato’s Parmenides.","PeriodicalId":145102,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie","volume":"116 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133476042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Advances JACQUES DERRIDA Translated by Philippe Lynes. Introduction by Philippe Lynes Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2017; 102 pp.; $19.95 (paper) 雅克·德里达进行篇，菲利普·莱恩斯译。Philippe Lynes引言明尼阿波利斯和伦敦:明尼苏达大学出版社，2017;102页;19.95美元(纸)
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0012217318000641
Dylan Shaul
{"title":"Advances JACQUES DERRIDA Translated by Philippe Lynes. Introduction by Philippe Lynes Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2017; 102 pp.; $19.95 (paper)","authors":"Dylan Shaul","doi":"10.1017/S0012217318000641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217318000641","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":145102,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122382083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Complex Justice for Complex Problems: Comments on Johannsen’s A Conceptual Investigation of Justice 复杂问题的复杂正义——评约翰森《正义的概念研究》
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/s001221731900012x
Phil Smolenski
{"title":"Complex Justice for Complex Problems: Comments on Johannsen’s A Conceptual Investigation of Justice","authors":"Phil Smolenski","doi":"10.1017/s001221731900012x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s001221731900012x","url":null,"abstract":"Kyle Johannsen’s conceptual investigation of justice urges us to think of justice as a simple value, which is independent of the exigencies of practice. In what follows, I highlight two methodological issues as a way to raise concerns over whether Johannsen is operating with the ‘correct’ understanding of justice, and to persuade Johannsen that complex problems, such as those of social justice require understanding justice as a complex value. So, while contextualists about justice should embrace the distinction between justice and rules of regulation, justice must be more than an input in our deliberation, and instead constitutes an output. L’enquête conceptuelle sur la justice de Kyle Johannsen nous incite à considérer la justice comme une simple valeur, indépendante des exigences de la pratique. Dans ce qui suit, je soulève deux questions méthodologiques afin de déterminer si Johannsen fonctionne avec la compréhension ‘correcte’ de la justice et de le convaincre que des problèmes complexes, tels que ceux concernant la justice sociale, nécessitent que la justice soit comprise comme une valeur complexe. Ainsi, les contextualistes de la justice devraient embrasser la distinction entre la justice et les règles de régulation. En outre, la justice, davantage qu’une valeur parmi d’autres à considérer dans nos délibérations, doit plutôt être conçue comme leur résultat.","PeriodicalId":145102,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125162049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Disability, Disadvantage, and Luck Egalitarianism 残疾、劣势和运气平均主义
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/S0012217319000155
Matthew Palynchuk
{"title":"Disability, Disadvantage, and Luck Egalitarianism","authors":"Matthew Palynchuk","doi":"10.1017/S0012217319000155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217319000155","url":null,"abstract":"In his A Conceptual Investigation of Justice, Kyle Johannsen suggests a theory of disability that holds that to have a disability just is to be worse off, sometimes referred to as the ‘medical’ or ‘individual’ model of disability. I argue that Johannsen’s understanding of disability might force some of his key claims into an uncomfortable position. In particular, for his theory to avoid the thrust of Elizabeth Anderson’s criticisms of luck egalitarianism, the assumption of the medical model of disability must be dropped, but this comes at the cost of his criticism of John Rawls’ difference principle. Dans son livre, A Conceptual Investigation of Justice, Kyle Johannsen semble invoquer une théorie du handicap selon laquelle le fait d’avoir un handicap, c’est être pire qu’une autre personne, un modèle parfois appelé le modèle de handicap «médical» ou «individuel». Je soutiens que la compréhension de Johannsen en matière d’invalidité peut mettre sa theorie dans une position difficile. En particulier, pour que sa théorie évite les critiques d’Elizabeth Anderson sur l’égalitarisme de la chance, l’hypothèse du modèle médical du handicap doit être abandonnée. Cependant, cela se fait au détriment de la critique du principe de différence de John Rawls formulée par Johannsen.","PeriodicalId":145102,"journal":{"name":"Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114098908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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