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Intertheoretic Reduction Intertheoretic减少
Bayesian Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-08-23 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199672110.003.0008
J. Sprenger, S. Hartmann
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引用次数: 0
Models, Idealizations and Objective Chance 模型、理想化和客观机遇
Bayesian Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-08-23 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199672110.003.0012
J. Sprenger, S. Hartmann
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引用次数: 0
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