ERN: Central Banks - Policies (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Prudential Policies and Their Impact on Credit in the United States","authors":"P. Calem, Ricardo Correa, S. J. Lee","doi":"10.17016/IFDP.2016.1186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17016/IFDP.2016.1186","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze how two types of recently used prudential policies affected the supply of credit in the United States. First, we test whether the U.S. bank stress tests had any impact on the supply of mortgage credit. We find that the first Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) stress test in 2011 had a negative effect on the share of jumbo mortgage originations and approval rates at stress-tested banks?banks with worse capital positions were impacted more negatively. Second, we analyze the impact of the 2013 Supervisory Guidance on Leveraged Lending and subsequent 2014 FAQ notice, which clarified expectations on the Guidance. We find that the share of speculative-grade term-loan originations decreased notably at regulated banks after the FAQ notice.","PeriodicalId":138376,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Policies (Topic)","volume":"214 1-2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114011250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"US-Euro Area Term Structure Spillovers, Implications for Central Banks","authors":"K. Nyholm","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2910919","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2910919","url":null,"abstract":"Spillovers between the US and euro area term structures of interest rates are examined. Implications for monetary policy are investigated using term-structure metrics that proxy conventional and unconventional instruments, i.e. the short rate, the 10 year term premium, and the 10 year risk-free rate. A new discrete-time arbitrage-free term structure model is used to extract these variables, at a daily frequency during the period covering 2005 to 2016. Relying on forecast error variance decompositions, following Diebold and Yilmaz (2009), it is found that transatlantic spillovers have increased by approximately 11%-points during the examined period, making it more dicult for central banks to directly assess the impact of their policies. JEL Classification: C32, E43, E58","PeriodicalId":138376,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Policies (Topic)","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117236962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Should Central Banks Care About Fiscal Rules?","authors":"E. Leeper","doi":"10.3386/W22800","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W22800","url":null,"abstract":"This essay aims to explain the nature of monetary and fiscal policy interactions and how those interactions could inform the fiscal rules that countries choose to follow. It makes two points: (1) monetary policy control of inflation requires appropriate fiscal backing; (2) European fiscal frameworks appear unlikely to provide the necessary fiscal backing.","PeriodicalId":138376,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Policies (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116912487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Pegxit Pressure: Evidence from the Classical Gold Standard","authors":"K. Mitchener, Gonçalo Pina","doi":"10.3386/W22844","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W22844","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a simple model that highlights the costs and benefits of fixed exchange rates as they relate to trade, and show that negative export-price shocks reduce fiscal revenue and increase the likelihood of an expected currency devaluation. Using a new high-frequency data set on commodity-price movements from the classical gold standard era, we then show that the model’s main prediction holds even for the canonical example of hard pegs. We identify a negative causal relationship between export-price shocks and currency-risk premia in emerging market economies, indicating that negative export-price shocks increased the probability that countries abandoned their pegs.","PeriodicalId":138376,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Policies (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132259842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Lower Bound on Real Interest Rates","authors":"J. Zinn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2850210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2850210","url":null,"abstract":"I show that real interest rates can be no lower than -100%. This contrasts with recent commentary suggesting that there is no lower bound on the natural rate of interest. I discuss how using the textbook approximation to the Fisher equation can lead to the erroneous belief that there is no lower bound on real interest rates, so this analysis serves as a reminder to avoid using this approximation when considering the effects of extreme levels of inflation.","PeriodicalId":138376,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Policies (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131344699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Money Creation and Destruction","authors":"Salomon Faure, H. Gersbach","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2866473","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2866473","url":null,"abstract":"We study money creation and destruction in today's monetary architecture and examine the impact of monetary policy and capital regulation in a general equilibrium setting. There are two types of money created and destructed: bank deposits, when banks grant loans to firms or to other banks and central bank money, when the central bank grants loans to private banks. We show that equilibria yield the first-best level of money creation and lending when prices are flexible, regardless of the monetary policy or capital regulation. When prices are rigid, we identify the circumstances in which money creation is excessive or breaks down and the ones in which an adequate combination of monetary policy and capital regulation can restore effciency.","PeriodicalId":138376,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Policies (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125323866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Macroprudential Tools, Transmission and Modelling","authors":"Oriol Carreras, E. Davis, Rebecca Piggott","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2967270","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2967270","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we review the theoretical and empirical literature on macroprudential policies and tools. Second, we test empirically the effectiveness of several macroprudential policies and tools using three datasets from the IMF and BIS that cover up to 19 OECD countries during 2000-2014, thus giving wide coverage of instruments. In addition, our focus on OECD countries gives us access to a wider range of control variables whose omission may lead to excessively favourable results on the impact of macroprudential policies. We find evidence that macroprudential polices are effective at curbing house price and credit growth, albeit some tools are more effective than others. These include, in particular, taxes on financial institutions and strict loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratio limits.","PeriodicalId":138376,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Policies (Topic)","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128356776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Time to Rethink Monetary Policy in Emerging Economies: Touching the Tip of an Iceberg","authors":"I. Lee, Kyunghun Kim, Eunjung Kang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2771581","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2771581","url":null,"abstract":"Emerging economies are struggling to keep their growth momentum alive in the face of waning global demand. Yet, they are partly handicapped by the loss of monetary policy independence and greater exposure to potential capital reversal. Against this background, a comprehensive review of all their policy options are in order, including both macro policy instruments, micro measures, and global safety net aimed at attaining the best possible solution to escaping global recession.","PeriodicalId":138376,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Policies (Topic)","volume":"9 12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116960067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Looking for Liquidity -- Banking and Emergency Liquidity Facilities","authors":"Jeremy M. Kronick","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2730098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2730098","url":null,"abstract":"As lender of last resort, the Bank of Canada has the responsibility of stepping in to provide liquidity in cases when markets require emergency funding. In crisis situations, a timely and effective response is imperative for avoiding systemic breakdowns. In this Commentary, I argue that in order to achieve this goal, a predefined, permanent, market-wide emergency liquidity mechanism should be established. The benefits of such a mechanism, including on-going design improvement and transparency for market participants, outweigh concerns over the moral hazard it may generate. The financial crisis of 2008-09 led to a new set of reforms through the Basel III regulatory framework. These rules have provided stability, including by limiting risky behaviour by financial institutions. However, they have also created a significantly smaller market for liquidity. Therefore, in future times of stress, financial institutions will face increased difficulty obtaining funding from private markets. Furthermore, as technologies become more sophisticated, idiosyncratic shocks can propagate into systemic shocks faster than ever before. Combined, these concerns suggest the need for pre-established, non-discretionary, market-wide emergency liquidity facilities that are instantly available in times of crisis. The permanence of such facilities would allow the design to be improved as market conditions evolve, while the removal of discretion would increase the level of transparency that is vital for a well-functioning financial sector. While the design of the emergency liquidity features introduced by the Bank of Canada during the 2008- 09 global economic crisis was appropriate, the auction format used likely fell short of generating the competitive prices and quantities that create both optimal liquidity distribution and the highest possible return for the public. In this paper, I recommend the use of the “Product-Mix” auction design, which involves an unlimited bid, single-round process in which bids are made on different forms of collateral simultaneously, and no minimum reference price above the benchmark overnight rate is established in advance. The Bank should continue to use discriminatory pricing for different term repos and uniform pricing for term loan facilities. Overall, these characteristics should improve the outcome of any future auctions from the viewpoint of both financial institutions and central bankers.","PeriodicalId":138376,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Policies (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129336115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Central Bank Governance and the Role of Nonfinancial Risk Management","authors":"Ashraf Khan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2737528","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2737528","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that nonfinancial risk management is an essential element of good governance of central banks. It provides a funnelled analysis, on the basis of selected literature, by (i) presenting an outline of central bank governance in general; (ii) zooming in on internal governance and organization issues of central banks; (iii) highlighting the main issues with nonfinancial risk management; and (iv) ending with recommendations for future work. It shows how attention for nonfinancial risk management has been growing, and how this has amplified the call for better governance of central banks. It stresses that in the area of nonfinancial risk management there are no crucial differences between commercial and central banks: both have people, processes, procedures, and structures. It highlights policy areas to be explored.","PeriodicalId":138376,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Policies (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116276831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}