{"title":"Allan Meltzer: How He Underestimated His Own Contribution to the Modern Concept of a Central Bank","authors":"R. Hetzel","doi":"10.21144/WP18-02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21144/WP18-02","url":null,"abstract":"In his great work A History of the Federal Reserve System, vol. 1, Allan Meltzer contended that monetary policymakers in the Depression simply ignored the quantity theoretic prescriptions that would have prevented contractionary monetary policy. Practically, he was arguing that the Fed should have accepted the responsibilities for economic stabilization now taken for granted with the modern concept of a central bank. In reality, decades of monetarist criticism had to pass before the Fed accepted both responsibility for the behavior of the price level and economic stabilization. In effect, Meltzer?s contention about the self-evident truth of quantity theory ideas ignored the monumental task that lay ahead for the monetarists.","PeriodicalId":138376,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Policies (Topic)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124853215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Central Bank Forward Guidance and the Signal Value of Market Prices","authors":"S. Morris, H. Shin","doi":"10.1257/PANDP.20181081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/PANDP.20181081","url":null,"abstract":"The analysis suggests that relying less on market signals increases the effectiveness of central bank communication. In their eagerness to correctly anticipate policy moves, market participants risk giving too much weight to central bankers' utterances and not enough to assessing economic data. If central bankers, in turn, trust markets to guide their actions, they may end up creating a feedback loop that cancels out the value of the very market signals they rely on. In this circular relationship, market outcomes reflect central bank actions, which in turn reflect market outcomes.","PeriodicalId":138376,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Policies (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130007140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Our Textbooks are Wrong: How an Increase in the Currency-Deposit Ratio Can Increase the Money Multiplier","authors":"J. Zinn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3061224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3061224","url":null,"abstract":"I show that when deposits are less than bank reserves the money multiplier is increasing in the currency-deposit ratio. This result contradicts textbooks in intermediate macroeconomic theory and money & banking, which claim that the money multiplier is always decreasing in the currency-deposit ratio. I also propose an alternative framework in which the money multiplier and circulating currency always have a negative relationship. This approach explicitly assumes that the monetary base is constant, which is consistent with an analysis focused exclusively on the behavior of private banks and the public.","PeriodicalId":138376,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Policies (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121845480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Monetary Misperceptions: Optimal Monetary Policy Under Incomplete Information","authors":"Basil Halperin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3022052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3022052","url":null,"abstract":"Inflation targeting is strictly suboptimal when economic actors have incomplete information about the state of the economy. Nominal income targeting is approximately optimal, and exactly optimal under certain parameterizations. We derive this result in a “Lucas islands” monetary misperceptions model built from explicit microfoundations. Agents have knowledge of local productivity and money supply conditions, but must perform a signal extraction problem each period to estimate the aggregate productivity shock and the aggregate money supply shock. Without full information, agents cannot perfectly distinguish between relative price shocks and aggregate shocks, causing monetary policy to affect the real economy. Since the model is built from agents optimizing from first principles, we are able to take a second-order welfare approximation and ask what monetary policy rule is optimal. In contrast to sticky price or sticky information models, inflation and price level targeting are always suboptimal, as price level variation provides useful information to agents. Under log utility, nominal income targeting is optimal.","PeriodicalId":138376,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Policies (Topic)","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121796370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rethinking the Power of Forward Guidance: Lessons from Japan","authors":"M. Gertler","doi":"10.3386/W23707","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W23707","url":null,"abstract":"In the spring of 2013 the Bank of Japan introduced a state-of-the-art monetary policy which included among other things inflation targeting and aggressive use of forward guidance. In contrast to the predictions of conventional macroeconomic theory, these policies have had only very limited success in reflating the economy. I argue that the disconnect between the Japanese experience and existing theory can be traced to the forward guidance puzzle (FGP). As recent literature suggests, the essence of the FGP is that existing models predict implausibly strong effects of expected future interest rate changes on the economy,.with the strength of the effect increasing with the expected horizon of the interest rate change. Accordingly, in this lecture I sketch a model meant to capture the challenge of reflation in Japan. As in recent literature I attempt to mute the power of forward guidance by stepping outside of rational expectations. In particular I introduce a hybrid adaptive/rational expectations belief mechanism. Most relevant to the Japanese experience is that individuals have adaptive expectations about trend inflation, which is consistent with the evidence. As Kuroda (2016) emphasizes, for an economy without a history of inflation being anchored by a target, individuals need direct evidence that the central bank is capable of moving inflation to target.","PeriodicalId":138376,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Policies (Topic)","volume":"4 41","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132747761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Did QE Lead to Lax Bank Lending Standards? Evidence from the Federal Reserve's LSAPs","authors":"Robert J. Kurtzman, Stephan Luck, Tom Zimmermann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2966362","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2966362","url":null,"abstract":"Using confidential loan officer survey data on lending standards and internal risk ratings on loans, we document an effect of large-scale asset purchase programs (LSAPs) on lending standards and risk-taking. We exploit cross-sectional variation in banks’ holdings of mortgage-backed securities to show that the first and third round of quantitative easing (QE1 and QE3) significantly lowered lending standards and increased loan risk characteristics. The magnitude of the effects is about the same in QE1 and QE3, and is comparable to the effect of a one percentage point decrease in the Fed funds target rate.","PeriodicalId":138376,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Policies (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116712224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Big is the Toolbox of a Central Banker? Managing Expectations with Policy-Rate Forecasts: Evidence from Sweden","authors":"M. Åhl","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2996994","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2996994","url":null,"abstract":"Some central banks have decided to publish forecasts of their policy rates. Can such forecasts manage market expectations of future policy rates? I use regression analysis on Swedish data to conclude that the answer is yes. The published Riksbank forecasts affect expectations of the future repo rate up to a horizon of approximately a year and a half. However, the response of market expectations to a surprise in the announced repo-rate path is not one-to-one, but is estimated to be less than half of the surprise and decreasing with the forecast horizon.","PeriodicalId":138376,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Policies (Topic)","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124892200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pegging the Interest Rate on Bank Reserves","authors":"B. Diba, Olivier Loisel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2917961","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2917961","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a model of monetary policy with a small departure from the basic New Keynesian (NK) model. In this model, the central bank can set the interest rate on bank reserves and the nominal stock of bank reserves independently, because these reserves reduce the costs of banking (i.e., have a convenience yield). The model delivers local-equilibrium determinacy under a permanent interest-rate peg. Consequently, it does not share the puzzling and paradoxical implications of the basic NK model under a temporary peg (e.g., in the context of a liquidity trap). More specifically, it offers a resolution of the forward guidance puzzle,\" a related puzzle about scal multipliers, and the paradox of exibility,\" even for an arbitrarily small departure from the basic NK model (i.e., arbitrarily small banking costs and convenience yield of reserves).","PeriodicalId":138376,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Policies (Topic)","volume":"36 1-3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121003059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"US Strategic and Economic Cooperation in an Early Stage of a Hypothetical Korean Reunification: Opportunities and Constraints (통일 한국 초기단계에서 미국의 대한반도 경제협력: 기회와 제약)","authors":"N. Eberstadt","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2961680","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2961680","url":null,"abstract":"English Abstract: Our assignment in this paper is to consider the question of “management under temporary separation and international cooperation after Korean unification”: more specifically, to examine “U.S. strategy for economic cooperation with unified Korea, particularly with a focus on investment in North Korea” (and, to the extent feasible, the) “prospects of changes in East Asian value chain after Korean unification: from the U.S.’s perspective”. \u0000The basic assumptions about the nature of the hypothetical future re-unification for this exercise are laid out as follows: \u0000Of the many scenarios of Korea’s unification, this research project will focus on the “compromising scenario” which is a scenario that has achieved political unification through governmental negotiations but have not yet begun full-fledged economic integration. Economic integration in this case will be a gradual process. \u0000This scenario involves one political and economic system (market capitalism), but will have two separate economic units (North and South) which eventually is expected to reach full integration. Initially there will be integration of the commodities market and capital market (1ststage) then there will be labor market integration (2nd stage), then adaptation of a common currency (3rd stage), which will gradually reach full integration into a single market. \u0000This project will focus on the 1st stage of this process, where we assume an integration of the commodities and capital market, but not yet labor market integration or a unified currency. In this paper we will propose an alternative method for attempting to quantify economic performance for the DPRK - and by extension, for a future northern Korea in a re-unified peninsula. This is based upon an approach of modeling economic performance on the basis of international data-files which do include estimates of North Korean socioeconomic conditions. This approach seems to produce generally robust results, and affords a novel method for estimating possible macroeconomic performance and international trade and financial performance for a northern Korea in a re-unified peninsula. Developing this model and presenting its results is the main contribution of this paper... (The rest is omitted.) \u0000Korean Abstract: 이 연구의 목적은 \"한반도 통일 후 한시적 분리와 국제 협력하의 관리체제\"라는 문제를 고찰하는 것이다. 더 구체적으로는 통일 한반도와의 경제적 협력을 위한 전략, 특히 북한 투자와 (가능하다면) \"통일 이후의 동아시아 가치사슬의 변화 전망:미국의 시각\"에 초점을 맞추고자 한다. 이 연구를 위해 설정한 통일 시나리오의 성격에 대한 기본 가정은 다음과 같다.이 연구에서는 한국의 통일 시나리오 중 하나인 정부 협상을 통해 정치적 통일은 이루었지만 본격적인 경제 통합을 시작하지 않은 시나리오인 '타협 시나리오'에 초점을 맞춘다. 이 경우 경제 통합은 점진적인 과정이 될 것이다. 이 시나리오는 하나의 정치 및 경제 시스템(시장자본주의)을 포함하지만, 궁극적으로 완전한 통합에 도달할 것으로 예상되는 두 개의 별도 경제 단위(남과 북)를 가정한다. 처음에는 상품시장과 자본시장의 통합(1단계)이 있을 것이며, 다음으로 노동시장의 통합(2단계)이 있을 것이고 점차적으로 단일 시장으로 완전히 통합될 공통 통화(3단계)의 단계가 있을 예정이다... (이하 생략)","PeriodicalId":138376,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Policies (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128536852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"고령화시대 주요국 금융시장 구조변화 분석과 정책적 시사점 (The Impact of Population Ageing on Financial Market Structures and Policy Implications)","authors":"D. Yoon, Dong‐Eun Rhee","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2958475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2958475","url":null,"abstract":"Korean Abstract: 본 연구에서는 우리나라의 고령화가 야기하게될 금융시장관련 변화를 실증연구와 해외사례를 바탕으로 분석하였다. 연구결과는 고령화가 금융정책의 유효성을 약화시키고 저성장, 저물가, 저투자를 야기하게될 것임을 확인하고 있다. 사례연구에서는 고령화 대책은 경기적 대응보다 노동시장적 대응이 더 효과적이며 노령층에 주안한 연금상품의 개발과 도입을 지원하는 정책적 노력이 필요한 것으로 나타났다. 특히 한국의 낮은 연금수령비중과 사회조장체제 수준을 고려할 때 조속하고 포괄적인 정책대응이 요구된다. English Abstract: Korea is aging at a rapid pace, causing concern about the resulting socio-economic impacts. This study analyzes the expected changes in the financial markets resulting from aging and seeks possible policy measures to mitigate the negative impacts of aging stemming from these changes. Chapter 2 reviews the current status of Korea's aging process. Even though the country remains yet at the stage of an aging society, it is expected to become an aged society in 2017 and then a super-aged society in 2026, a mere nine years later. The aging of the Korean population is proceeding at an unprecedented pace. The fundamental reason for this fast pace of aging is the rapid drop in birth rate and growing life expectancy. However, Korea's socio-economic systems are not well prepared to absorb the shocks for aged people. More and more aged people are facing poverty and the rate of suicide is highest among the elderly. Rent beneficiaries occupy just a part of the old population. The social security system does not guarantee a stable livelihood for old people. This problem will become more serious in the near future because the baby boom generation has started to retire recently. The aging problem will lead to low growth, low inflation and low investment throughout the whole Korean economy, making structural changes inevitable in the financial market. Chapter 3 undertakes empirical analysis to examine whether monetary policies can maintain their effectiveness even after aging has proceeded further. We performed a panel-VAR analysis using the OECD data for 25 member countries for 20 years, from 1995 to 2014. The empirical analysis showed that monetary policies lose their effectiveness considerably in an aged society. This result implies a possible change in the effectiveness of Korea’s monetary policies, especially if the aging of Korea’s population proceeds further. As of yet aging has not progressed significantly in Korea. However, the Bank of Korea should restructure its monetary policies in the long term, considering the change of policy effectiveness according to the progress of aging. The government may utilize fiscal policies to a more intensive extent to respond to cyclical depression while it sets monetary policies to manage the financial market and inflation pressure. For instance, if the government employs monetary policies to control cyclical changes, they would have to apply greater and faster interest rate changes than before to achieve the same effect. Research on the relation between aging and monetary policy has only begun to be discussed recently. However, it may become one of the main research topics in the near future due to its importance. Fu","PeriodicalId":138376,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Policies (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125789549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}