Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security最新文献_第4页

POSTER: OS Independent Fuzz Testing of I/O Boundary 海报:I/O边界的操作系统独立模糊测试

Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2021-11-12 DOI: 10.1145/3460120.3485359

Masanori Misono, Takahiro Shinagawa

引用次数: 2

On-device IoT Certificate Revocation Checking with Small Memory and Low Latency 设备上的物联网证书撤销检查与小内存和低延迟

Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2021-11-12 DOI: 10.1145/3460120.3484580

Xiaofeng Shi, Shouqian Shi, Minmei Wang, Jonne Kaunisto, Chen Qian

{"title":"On-device IoT Certificate Revocation Checking with Small Memory and Low Latency","authors":"Xiaofeng Shi, Shouqian Shi, Minmei Wang, Jonne Kaunisto, Chen Qian","doi":"10.1145/3460120.3484580","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3484580","url":null,"abstract":"Allowing a device to verify the digital certificate of another device is an essential requirement and key building block of many security protocols for emerging and future IoT systems that involve device-to-device communication. However, on-device certificate verification is challenging for current devices, mainly because the certificate revocation (CR) checking step costs too much resource on IoT devices and the synchronization of CR status to devices yields a long latency. This paper presents an on-device CR checking system called TinyCR, which achieves 100% accuracy, memory and computation efficiency, low synchronization latency, and low network bandwidth, while being compatible with the current certificate standard. We design a new compact and dynamic data structure called DASS to store and query global CR status on a device in TinyCR. Our implementation shows that TinyCR only costs each device 1.7 MB of memory to track 100 million IoT certificates with 1% revocation rate. Checking the CR status of one certificate spends less than 1 microsecond on a Raspberry Pi 3. TinyCR can also be updated instantly when there are new certificates added or revoked.","PeriodicalId":135883,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125583995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

Labeled PSI from Homomorphic Encryption with Reduced Computation and Communication 减少计算和通信的同态加密中的标记PSI

Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2021-11-12 DOI: 10.1145/3460120.3484760

Kelong Cong, R. C. Moreno, M. Gama, Wei Dai, Ilia Iliashenko, Kim Laine, Michael Rosenberg

{"title":"Labeled PSI from Homomorphic Encryption with Reduced Computation and Communication","authors":"Kelong Cong, R. C. Moreno, M. Gama, Wei Dai, Ilia Iliashenko, Kim Laine, Michael Rosenberg","doi":"10.1145/3460120.3484760","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3484760","url":null,"abstract":"It is known that fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) can be used to build efficient (labeled) Private Set Intersection protocols in the unbalanced setting, where one of the sets is much larger than the other~(Chen et al. (CCS'17, CCS'18)). In this paper we demonstrate multiple algorithmic improvements upon these works. In particular, our protocol has an asymptotically better computation cost, requiring only O(√|X| ) homomorphic multiplications, and communication complexity sublinear in the larger set size|X|. We demonstrate that our protocol is significantly better than that of Chen et al. (CCS'18) for many practical parameters, especially in terms of online communication cost. For example, when intersecting $228 and 2048 item sets, our protocol reduces the online computation time by more than 71% and communication by more than 63%. When intersecting 224 and 4096 item sets, our protocol reduces the online computation time by 27% and communication by 63%. Our comparison to other state-of-the-art unbalanced PSI protocols shows that our protocol has the best total communication complexity when |X| ≥ 224. For labeled PSI our protocol also outperforms Chen et al. (CCS'18). When intersecting 220 and 256 item sets, with the larger set having associated 288-byte labels, our protocol reduces the online computation time by more than 67% and communication by 34%. Finally, we demonstrate a modification that results in nearly constant communication cost in the larger set size |X|, but impractically high computation complexity on today's CPUs. For example, to intersect a 210-item set with sets of size 222, 224, or 226, our proof-of-concept implementation requires only 0.76 MB of online communication, which is more than a 24-fold improvement over Chen et al. (CCS'18).","PeriodicalId":135883,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"116 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126693300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 44

Packet Scheduling with Optional Client Privacy 具有可选客户端隐私的数据包调度

Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2021-11-12 DOI: 10.1145/3460120.3485371

and H W Beams, Sampath Kannan, Sebastian Angel

引用次数: 5

A Security Framework for Distributed Ledgers 分布式账本的安全框架

Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2021-11-12 DOI: 10.1145/3460120.3485362

Christoph Egger, M. Graf, Ralf Küsters, Daniel Rausch, Viktoria Ronge, Dominique Schröder

{"title":"A Security Framework for Distributed Ledgers","authors":"Christoph Egger, M. Graf, Ralf Küsters, Daniel Rausch, Viktoria Ronge, Dominique Schröder","doi":"10.1145/3460120.3485362","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3485362","url":null,"abstract":"In the past few years blockchains have been a major focus for security research, resulting in significant progress in the design, formalization, and analysis of blockchain protocols. However, the more general class of distributed ledgers, which includes not just blockchains but also prominent non-blockchain protocols, such as Corda and OmniLedger, cannot be covered by the state-of-the-art in the security literature yet. These distributed ledgers often break with traditional blockchain paradigms, such as block structures to store data, system-wide consensus, or global consistency. In this paper, we close this gap by proposing the first framework for defining and analyzing the security of general distributed ledgers, with an ideal distributed ledger functionality, called Fledger, at the core of our contribution. This functionality covers not only classical blockchains but also non-blockchain distributed ledgers in a unified way. To illustrate Fledger, we first show that the prominent ideal block-chain functionalities Gledger and GPL realize (suitable instantiations of) Fledger, which captures their security properties. This implies that their respective implementations, including Bitcoin, Ouroboros Genesis, and Ouroboros Crypsinous, realize Fledger as well. Secondly, we demonstrate that Fledger is capable of precisely modeling also non-blockchain distributed ledgers by performing the first formal security analysis of such a distributed ledger, namely the prominent Corda protocol. Due to the wide spread use of Corda in industry, in particular the financial sector, this analysis is of independent interest. These results also illustrate that Fledger not just generalizes the modular treatment of blockchains to distributed ledgers, but moreover helps to unify existing results.","PeriodicalId":135883,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"23 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125705624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 8

Supply-Chain Vulnerability Elimination via Active Learning and Regeneration 基于主动学习和再生的供应链脆弱性消除

Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2021-11-12 DOI: 10.1145/3460120.3484736

N. Vasilakis, Achilles Benetopoulos, Shivam Handa, Alizee Schoen, Jiasi Shen, M. Rinard

{"title":"Supply-Chain Vulnerability Elimination via Active Learning and Regeneration","authors":"N. Vasilakis, Achilles Benetopoulos, Shivam Handa, Alizee Schoen, Jiasi Shen, M. Rinard","doi":"10.1145/3460120.3484736","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3484736","url":null,"abstract":"Software supply-chain attacks target components that are integrated into client applications. Such attacks often target widely-used components, with the attack taking place via operations (for example, file system or network accesses) that do not affect those aspects of component behavior that the client observes. We propose new active library learning and regeneration (ALR) techniques for inferring and regenerating the client-observable behavior of software components. Using increasingly sophisticated rounds of exploration, ALR generates inputs, provides these inputs to the component, and observes the resulting outputs to infer a model of the component's behavior as a program in a domain-specific language. We present Harp, an ALR system for string processing components. We apply Harp to successfully infer and regenerate string-processing components written in JavaScript and C/C++. Our results indicate that, in the majority of cases, Harp completes the regeneration in less than a minute, remains fully compatible with the original library, and delivers performance indistinguishable from the original library. We also demonstrate that Harp can eliminate vulnerabilities associated with libraries targeted in several highly visible security incidents, specifically event-stream, left-pad, and string-compare.","PeriodicalId":135883,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123824707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 12

Revisiting Hybrid Private Information Retrieval 重新审视混合私有信息检索

Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2021-11-12 DOI: 10.1145/3460120.3485346

D. Günther, T. Schneider, Felix Wiegand

{"title":"Revisiting Hybrid Private Information Retrieval","authors":"D. Günther, T. Schneider, Felix Wiegand","doi":"10.1145/3460120.3485346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3485346","url":null,"abstract":"Private Information Retrieval (PIR) allows a client to request entries from a public database held by k servers without revealing any information about the requested data to the servers. PIR is classified into two classes: (i) Multi-server PIR protocols where the request is split among k≥2 non-colluding servers, and Single-server PIR protocols where exactly k=1 server holds the database while the query is protected via certain computational hardness assumptions. Devet & Goldberg (PETS'14) showed that both can be combined into one recursive PIR protocol in order to improve the communication complexity. Their hybrid PIR protocol is instantiated with the multi-server PIR protocol of Goldberg (S&P'07) and the single-server PIR protocol by Melchar & Gaborit (WEWoRC'07), resulting in online request runtime speedups and guaranteeing at least partial privacy if the multi-server PIR servers do in fact collude. In this work we show that the hybrid PIR protocol by Devet & Goldberg still has practical relevance by designing a hybrid approach using the state-of-the-art multi-server protocol CIP-PIR (Günther et al., ePrint'21/823) and the single-server protocol SealPIR (Angel et al., S&P'18). Our novel hybrid PIR protocol massively improves the linear communication complexity of CIP-PIR and obtains the strong property of client-independent preprocessing, which allow batch-preprocessing among multiple clients without the clients being involved. We implement and benchmark our protocol and get speedups of ≈4.36× over the original implementation of Devet & Goldberg (8 GiB DB), speedups of ≈26.08× (8 GiB DB) over CIP-PIR, and speedups of ≈11.16× over SealPIR (1 GiB DB).","PeriodicalId":135883,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121603224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Side-Channel Attacks on Query-Based Data Anonymization 基于查询的数据匿名化侧通道攻击

Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2021-11-12 DOI: 10.1145/3460120.3484751

Franziska Boenisch, Reinhard Munz, Marcel Tiepelt, Simon Hanisch, C. Kuhn, P. Francis

{"title":"Side-Channel Attacks on Query-Based Data Anonymization","authors":"Franziska Boenisch, Reinhard Munz, Marcel Tiepelt, Simon Hanisch, C. Kuhn, P. Francis","doi":"10.1145/3460120.3484751","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3484751","url":null,"abstract":"A longstanding problem in computer privacy is that of data anonymization. One common approach is to present a query interface to analysts, and anonymize on a query-by-query basis. In practice, this approach often uses a standard database back end, and presents the query semantics of the database to the analyst. This paper presents a class of novel side-channel attacks that work against any query-based anonymization system that uses a standard database back end. The attacks exploit the implicit conditional logic of database runtime optimizations. They manipulate this logic to trigger timing and exception-throwing side-channels based on the contents of the data. We demonstrate the attacks on the implementation of the CHORUS Differential Privacy system released by Uber as an open source project. We obtain perfect reconstruction of millions of data values even with a Differential Privacy budget smaller than epsilon = 1.0 and no prior knowledge. The paper also presents the design of a general defense to the runtime-optimization attacks, and a concrete implementation of the defense in the latest version of Diffix. The defense works without modifications to the back end database, and operates by modifying SQL to eliminate the runtime optimization or disable the side-channels. In addition, two other attacks that exploit specific flaws in Diffix and CHORUS are reported. These have been fixed in the respective implementations.","PeriodicalId":135883,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127734171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 8

Rusted Anchors: A National Client-Side View of Hidden Root CAs in the Web PKI Ecosystem 生锈的锚:Web PKI生态系统中隐藏根ca的国家客户端视图

Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2021-11-12 DOI: 10.1145/3460120.3484768

Yiming Zhang, Baojun Liu, Chaoyi Lu, Zhou Li, Haixin Duan, Jiachen Li, Zaifeng Zhang

{"title":"Rusted Anchors: A National Client-Side View of Hidden Root CAs in the Web PKI Ecosystem","authors":"Yiming Zhang, Baojun Liu, Chaoyi Lu, Zhou Li, Haixin Duan, Jiachen Li, Zaifeng Zhang","doi":"10.1145/3460120.3484768","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3484768","url":null,"abstract":"HTTPS secures communications in the web and heavily relies on the Web PKI for authentication. In the Web PKI, Certificate Authorities (CAs) are organizations that provide trust and issue digital certificates. Web clients rely on public root stores maintained by operating systems or browsers, with hundreds of audited CAs as trust anchors. However, as reported by security incidents, hidden root CAs beyond the public root programs have been imported into local root stores, which allows adversaries to gain trust from web clients. In this paper, we provide the first client-side, nation-wide view of hidden root CAs in the Web PKI ecosystem. Through cooperation with a leading browser vendor, we analyze certificate chains in web visits, together with their verification statuses, from volunteer users in 5 months. In total, over 1.17 million hidden root certificates are captured and they cause a profound impact from the angle of web clients and traffic. Further, we identify around 5 thousand organizations that hold hidden root certificates, including fake root CAs that impersonate large trusted ones. Finally, we highlight that the implementation of hidden root CAs and certificates is highly flawed, and issues such as weak keys and signature algorithms are prevalent. Our findings uncover that the ecosystem of hidden root CAs is massive and dynamic, and shed light on the landscape of Web PKI security. Finally, we call for immediate efforts from the community to review the integrity of local root stores.","PeriodicalId":135883,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131799752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

Towards Automated Computational Auditing of mHealth Security and Privacy Regulations 迈向移动健康安全和隐私法规的自动计算审计

Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2021-11-12 DOI: 10.1145/3460120.3485342

B. Tung, Zhiyuan Yu, Ning Zhang

引用次数: 1