Sean W. Smith, R. Koppel, J. Blythe, Vijay H. Kothari
{"title":"Mismorphism: a semiotic model of computer security circumvention (poster abstract)","authors":"Sean W. Smith, R. Koppel, J. Blythe, Vijay H. Kothari","doi":"10.1145/2746194.2746219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2746194.2746219","url":null,"abstract":"In real world domains, from healthcare to power to finance, we deploy computer systems intended to streamline and improve the activities of human agents in the corresponding non-cyber worlds. However, talking to actual users (instead of just computer security experts) reveals endemic circumvention of the computer-embedded rules. Good-intentioned users, trying to get their jobs done, systematically work around security and other controls embedded in their IT systems. This poster reports on our work compiling a large corpus of such incidents and developing a model based on semiotic triads to examine security circumvention. This model suggests that mismorphisms---mappings that fail to preserve structure---lie at the heart of circumvention scenarios; differential perceptions and needs explain users' actions. We support this claim with empirical data from the corpus.","PeriodicalId":134331,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2015 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130029919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An empirical study of global malware encounters","authors":"Ghita Mezzour, Kathleen M. Carley, L. Carley","doi":"10.1145/2746194.2746202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2746194.2746202","url":null,"abstract":"The number of trojans, worms, and viruses that computers encounter varies greatly across countries. Empirically identifying factors behind such variation can provide a scientific empirical basis to policy actions to reduce malware encounters in the most affected countries. However, our understanding of these factors is currently mainly based on expert opinions, not empirical evidence. In this paper, we empirically test alternative hypotheses about factors behind international variation in the number of trojan, worm, and virus encounters. We use the Symantec Anti-Virus (AV) telemetry data collected from more than 10 million Symantec customer computers worldwide that we accessed through the Symantec Worldwide Intelligence Environment (WINE) platform. We use regression analysis to test for the effect of computing and monetary resources, web browsing behavior, computer piracy, cyber security expertise, and international relations on international variation in malware encounters. We find that trojans, worms, and viruses are most prevalent in Sub-Saharan African countries. Many Asian countries also encounter substantial quantities of malware. Our regression analysis reveals that the main factor that explains high malware exposure of these countries is a widespread computer piracy especially when combined with poverty. Our regression analysis also reveals that, surprisingly, web browsing behavior, cyber security expertise, and international relations have no significant effect.","PeriodicalId":134331,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2015 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security","volume":"175 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121628109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
P. Morrison, Kim Herzig, Brendan Murphy, L. Williams
{"title":"Challenges with applying vulnerability prediction models","authors":"P. Morrison, Kim Herzig, Brendan Murphy, L. Williams","doi":"10.1145/2746194.2746198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2746194.2746198","url":null,"abstract":"Vulnerability prediction models (VPM) are believed to hold promise for providing software engineers guidance on where to prioritize precious verification resources to search for vulnerabilities. However, while Microsoft product teams have adopted defect prediction models, they have not adopted vulnerability prediction models (VPMs). The goal of this research is to measure whether vulnerability prediction models built using standard recommendations perform well enough to provide actionable results for engineering resource allocation. We define 'actionable' in terms of the inspection effort required to evaluate model results. We replicated a VPM for two releases of the Windows Operating System, varying model granularity and statistical learners. We reproduced binary-level prediction precision (~0.75) and recall (~0.2). However, binaries often exceed 1 million lines of code, too large to practically inspect, and engineers expressed preference for source file level predictions. Our source file level models yield precision below 0.5 and recall below 0.2. We suggest that VPMs must be refined to achieve actionable performance, possibly through security-specific metrics.","PeriodicalId":134331,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2015 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130006968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An architecture style for Android security analysis: poster","authors":"B. Schmerl, Jeffrey Gennari, D. Garlan","doi":"10.1145/2746194.2746209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2746194.2746209","url":null,"abstract":"Modern frameworks are required to be extendable as well as secure. However, these two qualities are often at odds. In this poster we describe an approach that uses a combination of static analysis and run-time management, based on software architecture models, that can improve security while maintaining framework extendability.","PeriodicalId":134331,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2015 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124530249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Gamifying software security education and training via secure coding duels in code hunt","authors":"Tao Xie, J. Bishop, N. Tillmann, J. D. Halleux","doi":"10.1145/2746194.2746220","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2746194.2746220","url":null,"abstract":"Sophistication and flexibility of software development make it easy to leave security vulnerabilities in software applications for attackers. It is critical to educate and train software engineers to avoid introducing vulnerabilities in software applications in the first place such as adopting secure coding mechanisms and conducting security testing. A number of websites provide training grounds to train people's hacking skills, which are highly related to security testing skills, and train people's secure coding skills. However, there exists no interactive gaming platform for instilling gaming aspects into the education and training of secure coding. To address this issue, we propose to construct secure coding duels in Code Hunt, a high-impact serious gaming platform released by Microsoft Research. In Code Hunt, a coding duel consists of two code segments: a secret code segment and a player-visible code segment. To solve a coding duel, a player iteratively modifies the player-visible code segment to match the functional behaviors of the secret code segment. During the duel-solving process, the player is given clues as a set of automatically generated test cases to characterize sample functional behaviors of the secret code segment. The game aspect in Code Hunt is to recognize a pattern from the test cases, and to re-engineer the player-visible code segment to exhibit the expected behaviors. Secure coding duels proposed in this work are coding duels that are carefully designed to train players' secure coding skills, such as sufficient input validation and access control.","PeriodicalId":134331,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2015 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122761258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hemank Lamba, Thomas J. Glazier, B. Schmerl, J. Pfeffer, D. Garlan
{"title":"Detecting insider threats in software systems using graph models of behavioral paths","authors":"Hemank Lamba, Thomas J. Glazier, B. Schmerl, J. Pfeffer, D. Garlan","doi":"10.1145/2746194.2746214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2746194.2746214","url":null,"abstract":"Insider threats are a well-known problem, and previous studies have shown that it has a huge impact over a wide range of sectors like financial services, governments, critical infrastructure services and the telecommunications sector. Users, while interacting with any software system, leave a trace of what nodes they accessed and in what sequence. We propose to translate these sequences of observed activities into paths on the graph of the underlying software architectural model. We propose a clustering algorithm to find anomalies in the data, which can be combined with contextual information to confirm as an insider threat.","PeriodicalId":134331,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2015 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130315227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Qiao Jin, Jiayi Duan, Shobha Vasudevan, Michael Bailey
{"title":"Packer classifier based on PE header information","authors":"Qiao Jin, Jiayi Duan, Shobha Vasudevan, Michael Bailey","doi":"10.1145/2746194.2746213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2746194.2746213","url":null,"abstract":"Run-time binary packers are used in malware manufacturing to obfuscate the contents of the executable files. Such packing has proved an obstacle for antivirus software that relies on signatures, as the binary contents of packed malware often bears no resemblance to the original code on which the signature was generated. A naive approach, then, is to first attempt to unpack the malware before applying a signature. Unfortunately, malware authors make use of automated tools that drastically reduce the cost of constructing new packers, and as a result, attackers routinely use previously unseen packer when releasing new malware. As a first step towards addressing this problem, we seek to build a binary program classifier that can differentiate packers and identify new packers as they emerge. We hypothesize that programs generated from the same packer share many common attributes (e.g., PE header fields) and that these may be used for packer identification. Preliminary work shows that for some packers, we may be able to build effective classifiers. This is only the first step in a line of research that seeks to identify new packers, automate their unpacking, and ultimately track new versions of malware as they emerge.","PeriodicalId":134331,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2015 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133802687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vijay H. Kothari, J. Blythe, Sean W. Smith, R. Koppel
{"title":"Measuring the security impacts of password policies using cognitive behavioral agent-based modeling","authors":"Vijay H. Kothari, J. Blythe, Sean W. Smith, R. Koppel","doi":"10.1145/2746194.2746207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2746194.2746207","url":null,"abstract":"Agent-based modeling can serve as a valuable asset to security personnel who wish to better understand the security landscape within their organization, especially as it relates to user behavior and circumvention. In this paper, we argue in favor of cognitive behavioral agent-based modeling for usable security, report on our work on developing an agent-based model for a password management scenario, perform a sensitivity analysis, which provides us with valuable insights into improving security (e.g., an organization that wishes to suppress one form of circumvention may want to endorse another), and provide directions for future work.","PeriodicalId":134331,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2015 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security","volume":"123 8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117303589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Phuong Cao, Eric C. Badger, Z. Kalbarczyk, R. Iyer, A. Withers, A. Slagell
{"title":"Towards an unified security testbed and security analytics framework","authors":"Phuong Cao, Eric C. Badger, Z. Kalbarczyk, R. Iyer, A. Withers, A. Slagell","doi":"10.1145/2746194.2746218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2746194.2746218","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents the architecture of an end-to-end security testbed and security analytics framework, which aims to: i) understand real-world exploitation of known security vulnerabilities and ii) preemptively detect multi-stage attacks, i.e., before the system misuse. With the increasing number of security vulnerabilities, it is necessary for security researchers and practitioners to understand: i) system and network behaviors under attacks and ii) potential effects of attacks to the target infrastructure. To safely emulate and instrument exploits of known vulnerabilities, we use virtualization techniques to isolate attacks in containers, e.g., Linux-based containers or Virtual Machines, and to deploy monitors, e.g., kernel probes or network packet captures, across a system and network stack. To infer the evolution of attack stages from monitoring data, we use a probabilistic graphical model, namely AttackTagger, that represents learned knowledge of simulated attacks in our security testbed and real-world attacks. Experiments are being run on a real-world deployment of the framework at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.","PeriodicalId":134331,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2015 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122183397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Integrity assurance in resource-bounded systems through stochastic message authentication","authors":"Aron Laszka, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, X. Koutsoukos","doi":"10.1145/2746194.2746195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2746194.2746195","url":null,"abstract":"Assuring communication integrity is a central problem in security. However, overhead costs associated with cryptographic primitives used towards this end introduce significant practical implementation challenges for resource-bounded systems, such as cyber-physical systems. For example, many control systems are built on legacy components which are computationally limited but have strict timing constraints. If integrity protection is a binary decision, it may simply be infeasible to introduce into such systems; without it, however, an adversary can forge malicious messages, which can cause significant physical or financial harm. We propose a formal game-theoretic framework for optimal stochastic message authentication, providing provable integrity guarantees for resource-bounded systems based on an existing MAC scheme. We use our framework to investigate attacker deterrence, as well as optimal design of stochastic message authentication schemes when deterrence is impossible. Finally, we provide experimental results on the computational performance of our framework in practice.","PeriodicalId":134331,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2015 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124273727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}