P. Morrison, Kim Herzig, Brendan Murphy, L. Williams
{"title":"Challenges with applying vulnerability prediction models","authors":"P. Morrison, Kim Herzig, Brendan Murphy, L. Williams","doi":"10.1145/2746194.2746198","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Vulnerability prediction models (VPM) are believed to hold promise for providing software engineers guidance on where to prioritize precious verification resources to search for vulnerabilities. However, while Microsoft product teams have adopted defect prediction models, they have not adopted vulnerability prediction models (VPMs). The goal of this research is to measure whether vulnerability prediction models built using standard recommendations perform well enough to provide actionable results for engineering resource allocation. We define 'actionable' in terms of the inspection effort required to evaluate model results. We replicated a VPM for two releases of the Windows Operating System, varying model granularity and statistical learners. We reproduced binary-level prediction precision (~0.75) and recall (~0.2). However, binaries often exceed 1 million lines of code, too large to practically inspect, and engineers expressed preference for source file level predictions. Our source file level models yield precision below 0.5 and recall below 0.2. We suggest that VPMs must be refined to achieve actionable performance, possibly through security-specific metrics.","PeriodicalId":134331,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2015 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"99","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2015 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2746194.2746198","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 99
Abstract
Vulnerability prediction models (VPM) are believed to hold promise for providing software engineers guidance on where to prioritize precious verification resources to search for vulnerabilities. However, while Microsoft product teams have adopted defect prediction models, they have not adopted vulnerability prediction models (VPMs). The goal of this research is to measure whether vulnerability prediction models built using standard recommendations perform well enough to provide actionable results for engineering resource allocation. We define 'actionable' in terms of the inspection effort required to evaluate model results. We replicated a VPM for two releases of the Windows Operating System, varying model granularity and statistical learners. We reproduced binary-level prediction precision (~0.75) and recall (~0.2). However, binaries often exceed 1 million lines of code, too large to practically inspect, and engineers expressed preference for source file level predictions. Our source file level models yield precision below 0.5 and recall below 0.2. We suggest that VPMs must be refined to achieve actionable performance, possibly through security-specific metrics.