IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications最新文献

{"title":"Congestion Game With Agent and Resource Failures","authors":"Yupeng Li, Yongzheng Jia, Haisheng Tan, Rui Wang, Zhenhua Han, F. Lau","doi":"10.1109/JSAC.2017.2672358","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2672358","url":null,"abstract":"Motivated by practical scenarios, we study congestion games with failures. We investigate two models. The first model is congestion games with both resource and agent failures, where each agent chooses the same number of resources with the minimum expected cost. We prove that the game is potential and hence admits at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (pure-NE). We also show that the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability are bounded (equal to 1 in some cases). The second model is congestion games with only resource failures (CG-CRF), where resources are provided in packages, and their failures can be correlated with each other. Each agent can choose multiple packages for reliability’s sake and utilize the survived one having the minimum cost. CG-CRF is shown to be not potential. We prove that it admits at least one pure-NE by constructing one efficiently. Finally, we discuss various applications of these two games in the networking field. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper studying congestion games with the coexistence of resource and agent failures, and we give also the first proof of the existence of a pure-NE in congestion games with correlated package failures.","PeriodicalId":13243,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications","volume":"35 1","pages":"764-778"},"PeriodicalIF":16.4,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2672358","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47734647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Social Crowdsourcing to Friends: An Incentive Mechanism for Multi-Resource Sharing","authors":"Xiaoying Gan, Yuqing Li, Weiwei Wang, Luoyi Fu, Xinbing Wang","doi":"10.1109/JSAC.2017.2672379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2672379","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we propose a novel game-based incentive mechanism for multi-resource sharing, where users are motivated to share their idle resources in view of conditional voluntary. Through social networking service platforms, such a crowdsourcing service fully explores the significant influence and computing potential of mobile social networks. Specifically, a combination of task allocation process, profit transfer process, and reputation updating process are involved in this sharing incentive mechanism, satisfying truthfulness, individual rationality, and robustness. To maintain the social fairness-efficiency tradeoff, we further develop a resource sharing algorithm on the basis of dominant resource fairness, revealing that the sacrifice of fairness properties is necessary for the improvement of efficiency. Real-world traces from Facebook are numerically studied, validating social fairness and efficiency of our social crowdsourcing mechanism.","PeriodicalId":13243,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications","volume":"35 1","pages":"795-808"},"PeriodicalIF":16.4,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2672379","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49639190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Non-Cash Auction for Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio Networks: Contract Theoretical Model With Joint Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard","authors":"Yanru Zhang, Lingyang Song, M. Pan, Z. Dawy, Zhu Han","doi":"10.1109/JSAC.2017.2672178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2672178","url":null,"abstract":"In cognitive radio networks (CRNs), spectrum trading is an efficient way for secondary users (SUs) to achieve dynamic spectrum access and to bring economic benefits for the primary users (PUs). Existing methods require full payment from SU, which blocked many potential “buyers,” and thus limited the PU’s expected income. To better improve PUs’ revenue from spectrum trading in a CRN, we introduce a financing contract, which is similar to a sealed non-cash auction that allows SU to do financing. Unlike previous mechanism designs in CRN, the financing contract allows the SU to only pay part of the total amount when the contract is signed, known as the down payment. Then, after the spectrum is released and utilized, the SU pays the rest of payment, known as the installment payment, from the revenue generated by utilizing the spectrum. The way the financing contract carries out and the sealed non-cash auction works similarly. Thus, contract theory is employed here as the mathematical framework to solve the non-cash auction problem and form mutually beneficial relationships between PUs and SUs. As the PU may not have the full acknowledgment of the SU’s transmission status, the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard arise in the two scenarios, respectively. Therefore, a joint adverse selection and moral hazard model is considered here. In particular, we present three situations when either or both adverse selection and moral hazard are present during the trading. Furthermore, both discrete and continuous models are provided in this paper. Through simulations, we show that the adverse selection and moral hazard cases serve as the upper and lower bounds of the general case where both problems are present.","PeriodicalId":13243,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications","volume":" 688","pages":"643-653"},"PeriodicalIF":16.4,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2672178","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41251872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dynamic Scaling of Virtualized, Distributed Service Chains: A Case Study of IMS","authors":"Jingpu Duan, Chuan Wu, Franck Le, A. Liu, Yanghua Peng","doi":"10.1109/JSAC.2017.2760188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2760188","url":null,"abstract":"The emerging paradigm of network function virtualization advocates deploying virtualized network functions (VNFs) on standard virtualization platforms for significant cost reduction and management flexibility. There have been system designs for managing dynamic deployment and scaling of VNF service chains within one cloud datacenter. Many real-world network services involve geo-distributed service chains, with prominent examples of mobile core networks and IP multimedia subsystems (IMSs)). Virtualizing these service chains requires efficient coordination of dynamic VNF deployment across geo-distributed data centers, calling for a new management system. This paper designs a dynamic scaling system for geo-distributed VNF service chains, using the case of an IMS. IMSs are widely used subsystems for delivering multimedia services among mobile users in a 3G/4G network, whose virtualization has been broadly advocated in the industry for reducing cost, improving network usage efficiency and enabling dynamic network topology reconfiguration for performance optimization. Our scaling system design caters to key control-plane and data-plane service chains in an IMS, combining proactive and reactive approaches for timely, cost-effective scaling of the service chains. The design principles are applicable to scaling of other systems with multiple related service chains. We evaluate our system using real-world experiments on both an emulation platform and a geo-distributed public cloud.","PeriodicalId":13243,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications","volume":"35 1","pages":"2501-2511"},"PeriodicalIF":16.4,"publicationDate":"2017-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2760188","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46424476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dynamic Allocation of Backhaul Resources in Converged Wireless-Optical Networks","authors":"Ioannis V. Loumiotis, Pavlos Kosmides, Evgenia F. Adamopoulou, K. Demestichas, M. Theologou","doi":"10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659023","url":null,"abstract":"The market uptake of the 4th Generation networks is expected to support the increasing demand for wireless broadband services and ensure an enhanced mobile user experience. In this direction, the convergence of a wireless access network with an optical backhauling has been proposed. However, in such a converged architecture, the traditional fixed commitment of the backhaul resources does not prove to be as efficient, and novel dynamic schemes are required that consider both the needs of the base stations and the limitations of the passive optical network. This paper is concerned with the topic of resource allocation in two competing base stations that belong to different operators and share a common optical backhaul network infrastructure. An approach based on evolutionary game theory is proposed and employed, with a view to examining the interactions among the base stations and the passive optical network. Using the model of replicator dynamics, the proposed system design is proved to be asymptotically stable. In addition, this paper studies and reveals the extent to which time delay can have an impact on the proposed system design.","PeriodicalId":13243,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications","volume":"35 1","pages":"280-287"},"PeriodicalIF":16.4,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659023","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45569114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Traffic Scheduling and Revenue Distribution Among Providers in the Internet: Tradeoffs and Impacts","authors":"Hyojung Lee, Hyeryung Jang, Jeong-woo Cho, Yung Yi","doi":"10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659378","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659378","url":null,"abstract":"The Internet consists of economically selfish players in terms of access/transit connection and content distribution. Such selfish behaviors often lead to techno-economic inefficiencies, such as unstable peering and revenue imbalance. Recent research results suggest that cooperation-based fair revenue sharing, i.e., multi-level Internet service provider (ISP) settlements, can be a candidate solution to avoid unfair revenue share. However, it has been under-explored whether selfish ISPs actually cooperate or not (often referred to as the stability of coalition), because they may partially cooperate or even do not cooperate, depending on how much revenue is distributed to each individual ISP. In this paper, we study this stability of coalition in the Internet, where our aim is to investigate the conditions under which ISPs cooperate under different regimes on the traffic demand and network bandwidth. We first consider the under-demanded regime, i.e., network bandwidth exceeds traffic demand, where revenue sharing based on Shapley value leads ISPs to entirely cooperate, i.e., stability of the grand coalition. Next, we consider the over-demanded regime, i.e., traffic demand exceeds network bandwidth, where there may exist some ISPs who deviate from the grand coalition. In particular, this deviation depends on how users’ traffic is handled inside the network, for which we consider three traffic scheduling policies having various degrees of content-value preference. We analytically compare those three scheduling policies in terms of network neutrality, and stability of cooperation that provides useful implications on when and how multi-level ISP settlements help and how the Internet should be operated for stable peering and revenue balance among ISPs.","PeriodicalId":13243,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications","volume":"35 1","pages":"421-431"},"PeriodicalIF":16.4,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659378","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47108047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"When Social Network Effect Meets Congestion Effect in Wireless Networks: Data Usage Equilibrium and Optimal Pricing","authors":"Xiaowen Gong, Lingjie Duan, Xu Chen, Junshan Zhang","doi":"10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659059","url":null,"abstract":"The rapid growth of online social networks has strengthened wireless users’ social relationships, which in turn has resulted in more data traffic due to network effect in the social domain. Nevertheless, the boosted demand for wireless services may challenge the limited wireless capacity. To build a thorough understanding, we study mobile users’ data usage behavior by jointly considering the network effect due to their social relationships in the social domain and the congestion effect in the physical wireless domain. Specifically, we develop a Stackelberg game for socially aware data usage: in Stage I, a wireless provider first decides the data pricing to all users in order to maximize its revenue, and then in Stage II, users decide their data usage, for the given price, subject to mutual interactions under both social network effect and congestion effect. We analyze the two-stage game via backward induction. In particular, for Stage II, we first provide conditions for the existence and the uniqueness of a user demand equilibrium (UDE). Then, we propose algorithms to find the UDE and for users to reach the UDE in a distributed manner. We further investigate the impact of different system parameters on the UDE. Next, for Stage I, we develop an optimal pricing algorithm to maximize the wireless provider’s revenue. We numerically evaluate the performance of our proposed algorithms using real data, and thereby draw useful engineering insights for the operation of wireless providers: 1) when social network effect dominates congestion effect, the marginal gain of the total usage increases with the social ties and the number of users, or decreases with the congestion coefficient; in contrast, when congestion effect dominates social network effect, the marginal gain decreases (or increases, respectively) with these parameters and 2) when social network effect is strong, a lower price should be set to increase the total revenue; in contrast, when congestion effect is strong, a higher price is preferred.","PeriodicalId":13243,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications","volume":"35 1","pages":"449-462"},"PeriodicalIF":16.4,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659059","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49604402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Exploiting Congestion Games to Achieve Distributed Service Chaining in NFV Networks","authors":"Salvatore D’oro, L. Galluccio, S. Palazzo, G. Schembra","doi":"10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659298","url":null,"abstract":"The network function virtualization (NFV) paradigm has gained increasing interest in both academia and industry as it promises scalable and flexible network management and orchestration. In NFV networks, network services are provided as chains of different virtual network functions (VNFs), which are instantiated and executed on dedicated VNF-compliant servers. The problem of composing those chains is referred to as the service chain composition problem. In contrast to centralized solutions that suffer from scalability and privacy issues, in this paper, we leverage non-cooperative game theory to achieve a low-complexity distributed solution to the above-mentioned problem. Specifically, to account for selfish and competitive behavior of users, we formulate the service chain composition problem as an atomic weighted congestion game with unsplittable flows and player-specific cost functions. We show that the game possesses a weighted potential function and admits a Nash equilibrium (NE). We prove that the price of anarchy is upper-bounded, and also propose a distributed and privacy-preserving algorithm which provably converges toward an NE of the game in polynomial time. Finally, through extensive numerical results, we assess the performance of the proposed distributed solution to the service chain composition problem.","PeriodicalId":13243,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications","volume":"35 1","pages":"407-420"},"PeriodicalIF":16.4,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659298","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44911953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Information Credibility Modeling in Cooperative Networks: Equilibrium and Mechanism Design","authors":"Chunxiao Jiang, Linling Kuang, Zhu Han, Yong Ren, L. Hanzo","doi":"10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659078","url":null,"abstract":"In a cooperative network, the user equipment (UE) shares information for cooperatively achieving a common goal. However, owing to the concerns of privacy or cost, UEs may be reluctant to share genuine information, which raises the information credibility problem addressed. Diverse techniques have been proposed for enhancing the information credibility in various scenarios. However, there is a paucity of information on modeling the UEs’ decision making behavior, namely as to whether they are willing/able to share genuine information, even though this directly affects the information credibility across the network. Hence, we propose a game theoretic framework for the associated information credibility modeling by taking into account the users’ information sharing strategies and utilities. This framework is investigated under both a homogeneous model and a heterogeneous model. The spontaneous information credibility equilibria of both models are derived and analyzed, including the closed-form analysis of the homogeneous model based on a sophisticated evolutionary game model and on the reinforcement learning-based analysis of the heterogeneous model. Moreover, a credit mechanism is designed for encouraging the UEs to share genuine information. Experimental results relying on real-world data traces support our utility function formulation, while our simulation results verify the theoretical analysis and show that all the UEs are encouraged by the proposed algorithm to share genuine information with a probability of one, when a credit mechanism is invoked. The proposed modeling techniques may be applied in diverse cooperative networks, including classic wireless networks, vehicular networks, as well as social networks.","PeriodicalId":13243,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications","volume":"35 1","pages":"432-448"},"PeriodicalIF":16.4,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659078","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44924503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Distributed Caching Algorithms for Interconnected Operator CDNs","authors":"Valentino Pacifici, G. Dán","doi":"10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659118","url":null,"abstract":"Fixed and mobile network operators increasingly deploy managed content distribution networks (CDNs) with the objective of reducing the traffic on their transit links and to improve their customers’ quality of experience. As network operator managed CDNs (nCDNs) become commonplace, operators will likely provide common interfaces to interconnect their nCDNs for mutual benefit, as they do with peering today. In this paper, we consider the problem of using distributed algorithms for computing a cache allocation for nCDNs. We show that if every network operator aims to minimize its cost and bilateral payments are not allowed, then it may be impossible to compute a cache allocation. For the case when bilateral payments are possible, we propose two distributed algorithms, the aggregate value compensation and the object value compensation algorithms, which differ in terms of the level of parallelism they allow and in terms of the amount of information exchanged between nCDNs. We prove that the algorithms converge, and we propose a scheme to ensure ex-post individual rationality. Simulations performed on a real autonomous system-level network topology and synthetic topologies show that the algorithms have geometric rate of convergence, and scale well with the graphs’ density and the nCDN capacity.","PeriodicalId":13243,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications","volume":"35 1","pages":"380-391"},"PeriodicalIF":16.4,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659118","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43671711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}