19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'06)最新文献_第2页

A framework for establishing decentralized secure coalitions 建立分散安全联盟的框架

19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'06) Pub Date : 2006-07-05 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2006.5

Hongbin Zhou, S. Foley

{"title":"A framework for establishing decentralized secure coalitions","authors":"Hongbin Zhou, S. Foley","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2006.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2006.5","url":null,"abstract":"A coalition provides a virtual space across a network that allows its members to interact in a transparent manner. Coalitions may be formed for a variety of purposes. These range from simple spaces used by individuals to share resources and exchange information, to highly structured environments in which businesses and applications operate and may be governed according to regulation and contract (security policy). Coalitions may spawn further coalitions and coalitions may come-together and/or merge. This paper describes a logic-based language that provides a foundation for coalition regulation and contract in a manner that avoids authorization subterfuge and has a number of novel features that make it applicable to open systems. The language provides inter- and intra-coalition delegation, including identity, role and threshold based delegation operations. The logic is used to describe a decentralized infrastructure for establishing and regulating these coalitions. Coalitions are formed with the involvement of founders, constructors and oversight. Constructors are responsible for properly creating a coalition; this service can be provided by a third party. If the service is improperly provided then the constructor is subject to a penalty, which may be collected by another third party providing oversight","PeriodicalId":131951,"journal":{"name":"19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'06)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125397546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 14

Information-flow security for interactive programs 交互式程序的信息流安全

19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'06) Pub Date : 2006-07-05 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2006.16

K. O'Neill, Michael R. Clarkson, Stephen Chong

{"title":"Information-flow security for interactive programs","authors":"K. O'Neill, Michael R. Clarkson, Stephen Chong","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2006.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2006.16","url":null,"abstract":"Interactive programs allow users to engage in input and output throughout execution. The ubiquity of such programs motivates the development of models for reasoning about their information-flow security, yet no such models seem to exist for imperative programming languages. Further, existing language-based security conditions founded on noninteractive models permit insecure information flows in interactive imperative programs. This paper formulates new strategy-based information-flow security conditions for a simple imperative programming language that includes input and output operators. The semantics of the language enables a fine-grained approach to the resolution of nondeterministic choices. The security conditions leverage this approach to prohibit refinement attacks while still permitting observable nondeterminism. Extending the language with probabilistic choice yields a corresponding definition of probabilistic noninterference. A soundness theorem demonstrates the feasibility of statically enforcing the security conditions via a simple type system. These results constitute a step toward understanding and enforcing information-flow security in real-world programming languages, which include similar input and output operators","PeriodicalId":131951,"journal":{"name":"19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'06)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127568965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 90

On key assignment for hierarchical access control 分级访问控制的密钥分配

19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'06) Pub Date : 2006-07-05 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2006.20

J. Crampton, K. Martin, P. Wild

引用次数: 133

Secrecy by typing and file-access control 通过打字和文件访问控制保密

19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'06) Pub Date : 2006-07-05 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2006.28

A. Chaudhuri, M. Abadi

引用次数: 20

Securing interaction between threads and the scheduler 保护线程和调度器之间的交互

19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'06) Pub Date : 2006-07-05 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2006.29

Alejandro Russo, A. Sabelfeld

引用次数: 65

Independence from obfuscation: a semantic framework for diversity 独立于混淆:多样性的语义框架

19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'06) Pub Date : 2006-07-05 DOI: 10.3233/JCS-2009-0379

Riccardo Pucella, F. Schneider

引用次数: 48

Cryptographically sound theorem proving 密码学可靠定理证明

19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'06) Pub Date : 2006-07-05 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2006.10

C. Sprenger, M. Backes, D. Basin, B. Pfitzmann, M. Waidner

引用次数: 66

Privacy APIs: access control techniques to analyze and verify legal privacy policies 隐私api:访问控制技术，用于分析和验证合法的隐私策略

19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'06) Pub Date : 2006-07-05 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2006.24

Michael J. May, Carl A. Gunter, Insup Lee

引用次数: 133

Decentralized robustness 分散鲁棒性

19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'06) Pub Date : 2006-07-05 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2006.11

Stephen Chong, A. Myers

{"title":"Decentralized robustness","authors":"Stephen Chong, A. Myers","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2006.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2006.11","url":null,"abstract":"Robustness links confidentiality and integrity properties of a computing system and has been identified as a useful property for characterizing and enforcing security. Previous characterizations of robustness have been with respect to a single idealized attacker; this paper shows how to define robustness for systems with mutual distrust. Further, we demonstrate that the decentralized label model (DLM) can be extended to support fine-grained reasoning about robustness in such systems. The DLM is a natural choice for capturing robustness requirements because decentralized labels are explicitly expressed in terms of principals that can be used to characterize the power of attackers across both the confidentiality and integrity axes. New rules are proposed for statically checking robustness and qualified robustness using an extended DLM; the resulting type system is shown to soundly enforce robustness. Finally, sound approximations are developed for checking programs with bounded but unknown label parameters, which is useful for security-typed languages. In sum, the paper shows how to use robustness to gain assurance about secure information flow and information release in systems with complex security requirements","PeriodicalId":131951,"journal":{"name":"19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'06)","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121900538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 64

On the completeness of attack mutation algorithms 攻击变异算法的完备性

19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'06) Pub Date : 2006-07-05 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2006.21

Shai Rubin, S. Jha, B. Miller

{"title":"On the completeness of attack mutation algorithms","authors":"Shai Rubin, S. Jha, B. Miller","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2006.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2006.21","url":null,"abstract":"An attack mutation algorithm takes a known instance of an attack and transforms it into many distinct instances by repeatedly applying attack transformations. Such algorithms are widely used for testing intrusion detection systems. We investigate the notion of completeness of a mutation algorithm: its capability to generate all possible attack instances from a given set of attack transformations. We define the notion of a Phi-complete mutation algorithm. Given a set of transformations Phi, an algorithm is complete with respect to Phi, if it can generate every instance that the transformations in Phi derive. We show that if the rules in Phi are uniform and reversible then a Phi-complete algorithm exists. Intuitively speaking, uniform and reversible transformations mean that we can first exclusively apply transformations that simplify the attack, then exclusively apply transformations that complicate it, and still get all possible instances that are derived by the rules in Phi. Although uniformity and reversibility may appear severe restrictions, we show that common attack transformations are indeed uniform and reversible. Therefore, our Phi-complete algorithm can be incorporated into existing testing tools for intrusion detection systems. Furthermore, we show that a Phi-complete algorithm is useful, not only for testing purposes, but also for determining whether two packet traces are two different mutations of the same attack","PeriodicalId":131951,"journal":{"name":"19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'06)","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134061205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2