2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07)最新文献

Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption cipher - policy基于属性的加密

2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07) Pub Date : 2007-05-20 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2007.11

J. Bethencourt, A. Sahai, Brent Waters

引用次数: 4268

Beyond Stack Inspection: A Unified Access-Control and Information-Flow Security Model 超越堆栈检查:一个统一的访问控制和信息流安全模型

2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07) Pub Date : 2007-05-20 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2007.10

Marco Pistoia, A. Banerjee, D. Naumann

{"title":"Beyond Stack Inspection: A Unified Access-Control and Information-Flow Security Model","authors":"Marco Pistoia, A. Banerjee, D. Naumann","doi":"10.1109/SP.2007.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2007.10","url":null,"abstract":"Modern component-based systems, such as Java and Microsoft .NET common language runtime (CLR), have adopted stack-based access control (SBAC). Its purpose is to use stack inspection to verify that all the code responsible for a security-sensitive action is sufficiently authorized to perform that action. Previous literature has shown that the security model enforced by SBAC is flawed in that stack inspection may allow unauthorized code no longer on the stack to influence the execution of security-sensitive code. A different approach, history-based access control (HBAC), is safe but may prevent authorized code from executing a security-sensitive operation if less trusted code was previously executed. In this paper, we formally introduce information-based access control (IBAC), a novel security model that verifies that all and only the code responsible for a security-sensitive operation is sufficiently authorized. Given an access-control policy a, we present a mechanism to extract from it an implicit integrity policy i, and we prove that IBAC enforces i. Furthermore, we discuss large-scale application code scenarios to which IBAC can be successfully applied.","PeriodicalId":131863,"journal":{"name":"2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07)","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130120093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 60

Moats and Drawbridges: An Isolation Primitive for Reconfigurable Hardware Based Systems 护城河和吊桥:基于可重构硬件系统的隔离原语

2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07) Pub Date : 2007-05-20 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2007.28

Ted Huffmire, Brett Brotherton, Gang Wang, T. Sherwood, R. Kastner, T. Levin, Thuy D. Nguyen, C. Irvine

{"title":"Moats and Drawbridges: An Isolation Primitive for Reconfigurable Hardware Based Systems","authors":"Ted Huffmire, Brett Brotherton, Gang Wang, T. Sherwood, R. Kastner, T. Levin, Thuy D. Nguyen, C. Irvine","doi":"10.1109/SP.2007.28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2007.28","url":null,"abstract":"Blurring the line between software and hardware, reconfigurable devices strike a balance between the raw high speed of custom silicon and the post-fabrication flexibility of general-purpose processors. While this flexibility is a boon for embedded system developers, who can now rapidly prototype and deploy solutions with performance approaching custom designs, this results in a system development methodology where functionality is stitched together from a variety of \"soft IP cores,\" often provided by multiple vendors with different levels of trust. Unlike traditional software where resources are managed by an operating system, soft IP cores necessarily have very fine grain control over the underlying hardware. To address this problem, the embedded systems community requires novel security primitives which address the realities of modern reconfigurable hardware. We propose an isolation primitive, moats and drawbridges, that are built around four design properties: logical isolation, interconnect traceability, secure reconfigurable broadcast, and configuration scrubbing. Each of these is a fundamental operation with easily understood formal properties, yet maps cleanly and efficiently to a wide variety of reconfigurable devices. We carefully quantify the required overheads on real FPGAs and demonstrate the utility of our methods by applying them to the practical problem of memory protection.","PeriodicalId":131863,"journal":{"name":"2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133060118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 122

Fuzzy Multi-Level Security: An Experiment on Quantified Risk-Adaptive Access Control 模糊多级安全:一种量化的风险自适应访问控制实验

2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07) Pub Date : 2007-05-20 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2007.21

P. Cheng, P. Rohatgi, C. Keser, P. Karger, Grant M. Wagner, A. S. Reninger

引用次数: 328

Trojan Detection using IC Fingerprinting 基于IC指纹的木马检测

2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07) Pub Date : 2007-05-20 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2007.36

D. Agrawal, S. Baktir, Deniz Karakoyunlu, P. Rohatgi, B. Sunar

{"title":"Trojan Detection using IC Fingerprinting","authors":"D. Agrawal, S. Baktir, Deniz Karakoyunlu, P. Rohatgi, B. Sunar","doi":"10.1109/SP.2007.36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2007.36","url":null,"abstract":"Hardware manufacturers are increasingly outsourcing their IC fabrication work overseas due to their much lower cost structure. This poses a significant security risk for ICs used for critical military and business applications. Attackers can exploit this loss of control to substitute Trojan ICs for genuine ones or insert a Trojan circuit into the design or mask used for fabrication. We show that a technique borrowed from side-channel cryptanalysis can be used to mitigate this problem. Our approach uses noise modeling to construct a set of fingerprints/or an IC family utilizing side- channel information such as power, temperature, and electromagnetic (EM) profiles. The set of fingerprints can be developed using a few ICs from a batch and only these ICs would have to be invasively tested to ensure that they were all authentic. The remaining ICs are verified using statistical tests against the fingerprints. We describe the theoretical framework and present preliminary experimental results to show that this approach is viable by presenting results obtained by using power simulations performed on representative circuits with several different Trojan circuitry. These results show that Trojans that are 3-4 orders of magnitude smaller than the main circuit can be detected by signal processing techniques. While scaling our technique to detect even smaller Trojans in complex ICs with tens or hundreds of millions of transistors would require certain modifications to the IC design process, our results provide a starting point to address this important problem.","PeriodicalId":131863,"journal":{"name":"2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07)","volume":"358 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115169121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 768

Information Flow in the Peer-Reviewing Process 同行评议过程中的信息流

2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07) Pub Date : 2007-05-20 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2007.24

M. Backes, Markus Dürmuth, Dominique Unruh

引用次数: 9

Using Rescue Points to Navigate Software Recovery 使用救援点导航软件恢复

2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07) Pub Date : 2007-05-20 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2007.38

Stelios Sidiroglou, Oren Laadan, A. Keromytis, Jason Nieh

引用次数: 34

Gradual Release: Unifying Declassification, Encryption and Key Release Policies 逐步释放:统一解密、加密和密钥释放策略

2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07) Pub Date : 2007-05-20 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2007.22

Aslan Askarov, A. Sabelfeld

{"title":"Gradual Release: Unifying Declassification, Encryption and Key Release Policies","authors":"Aslan Askarov, A. Sabelfeld","doi":"10.1109/SP.2007.22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2007.22","url":null,"abstract":"Information security has a challenge to address: enabling information-flow controls with expressive information release (or declassification) policies. Existing approaches tend to address some aspects of information release, exposing the other aspects for possible attacks. It is striking that these approaches fall into two mostly separate categories: revelation-based (as in information purchase, aggregate computation, moves in a game, etc.) and encryption-based declassification (as in sending encrypted secrets over an untrusted network, storing passwords, etc.). This paper introduces gradual release, a policy that unifies declassification, encryption, and key release policies. We model an attacker's knowledge by the sets of possible secret inputs as functions of publicly observable outputs. The essence of gradual release is that this knowledge must remain constant between releases. Gradual release turns out to be a powerful foundation for release policies, which we demonstrate by formally connecting revelation-based and encryption-based declassification. Furthermore, we show that gradual release can be provably enforced by security types and effects.","PeriodicalId":131863,"journal":{"name":"2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133845692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 164

Usable Mandatory Integrity Protection for Operating Systems 操作系统可用的强制完整性保护

2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07) Pub Date : 2007-05-20 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2007.37

Ninghui Li, Ziqing Mao, Hong Chen

引用次数: 75

Endorsed E-Cash 支持电子现金

2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07) Pub Date : 2007-05-20 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2007.15

J. Camenisch, Anna Lysyanskaya, Mira Meyerovich

引用次数: 83