护城河和吊桥:基于可重构硬件系统的隔离原语

Ted Huffmire, Brett Brotherton, Gang Wang, T. Sherwood, R. Kastner, T. Levin, Thuy D. Nguyen, C. Irvine
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引用次数: 122

摘要

可重构设备模糊了软件和硬件之间的界限,在定制硅的原始高速和通用处理器的制造后灵活性之间取得了平衡。虽然这种灵活性对嵌入式系统开发人员来说是一种福利,他们现在可以快速构建原型并部署性能接近定制设计的解决方案,但这导致了系统开发方法,其中功能由各种“软IP核”拼接在一起,通常由多个具有不同信任级别的供应商提供。与由操作系统管理资源的传统软件不同,软IP核必须对底层硬件进行非常精细的控制。为了解决这个问题,嵌入式系统社区需要新的安全原语来解决现代可重构硬件的现实。我们提出了一个隔离原语,护城河和吊桥,围绕四个设计属性构建:逻辑隔离,互连可追溯性,安全可重构广播和配置擦洗。其中每一个都是具有易于理解的形式属性的基本操作,并且干净有效地映射到各种可重构设备。我们仔细量化了实际fpga上所需的开销,并通过将我们的方法应用于内存保护的实际问题来演示我们的方法的实用性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Moats and Drawbridges: An Isolation Primitive for Reconfigurable Hardware Based Systems
Blurring the line between software and hardware, reconfigurable devices strike a balance between the raw high speed of custom silicon and the post-fabrication flexibility of general-purpose processors. While this flexibility is a boon for embedded system developers, who can now rapidly prototype and deploy solutions with performance approaching custom designs, this results in a system development methodology where functionality is stitched together from a variety of "soft IP cores," often provided by multiple vendors with different levels of trust. Unlike traditional software where resources are managed by an operating system, soft IP cores necessarily have very fine grain control over the underlying hardware. To address this problem, the embedded systems community requires novel security primitives which address the realities of modern reconfigurable hardware. We propose an isolation primitive, moats and drawbridges, that are built around four design properties: logical isolation, interconnect traceability, secure reconfigurable broadcast, and configuration scrubbing. Each of these is a fundamental operation with easily understood formal properties, yet maps cleanly and efficiently to a wide variety of reconfigurable devices. We carefully quantify the required overheads on real FPGAs and demonstrate the utility of our methods by applying them to the practical problem of memory protection.
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