Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Matching with Minimal Quota: Case Study of a Student-Supervisor Assignment in a Japanese University","authors":"Toshiji Kawagoe, Taisuke Matsubae","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3429626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3429626","url":null,"abstract":"TThis paper describes a study of the two-sided matching problem with type-specific maximal and minimal quotas with the deferred acceptance mechanism in a student– supervisor assignment. In this problem, both students and supervisors were classified by type according to their affiliations, and the supervisors set type-specific maximal and minimal quotas. In the proposed mechanism, the maximal quotas were dynamically adjusted to fulfill the minimal quotas. We found that while the mechanism may not be strategy-proof, it eliminates justified envy among students of the same “type,” and it achieved feasibility with a certain distributional constraint. Moreover, if the sum of the ranks of students and supervisors in the final assignment is viewed as a measure of welfare, there is no domination relationship between our mechanism and the deferred acceptance mechanism. As evidence, the paper presents a case study of the proposed mechanism in use at a Japanese university.","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122507444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Civil Liberties and Social Structure","authors":"Selman Erol, Camilo García-Jimeno","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3637178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3637178","url":null,"abstract":"Governments rely on a variety of forms of coercion to aggregate distributed information relevant to governmental objectives from the prosecution of regime stability threats to terrorism or epidemics. To do so, they exploit the existing social structure, as reliable information will often come from friends and acquaintances. Civil liberties, in turn, restrict the government’s ability to exercise such coercion. We present an equilibrium theory of the joint determination of social structure and civil liberties. The depth of civil liberties shapes citizens’ decisions on how intensely and with whom to socialize. Features of the social structure such as its cohesiveness and the extent of segregation, in turn, shape the government’s willingness to enforce civil liberties protections such as search and seizure restrictions, standards of proof, and equal treatment under the law. We show that the relationship between civil liberties and social structure is mediated by a commitment problem by the government, and that this commitment problem is in turn mediated by the strength of civil society. We also show that segregation and unequal treatment sustain each other, characterize when unequal treatment against a minority or a majority can be sustained, and how equilibrium social cohesiveness and civil liberties respond to the arrival of widespread surveillance technologies, shocks to collective perceptions about the likelihood of threats or the importance of privacy, or to community norms such as codes of silence.","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126551104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Problem Shared Is a Problem Halved? Risky Tax Avoidance Decisions and Intra-Group Payoff Conflict","authors":"Eva Matthaei, Dirk Kiesewetter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3626982","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3626982","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the dynamics of group decisions regarding risky tax avoidance strategies using a laboratory experiment. To identify the causes of risk taking by groups, we compare individual to group decisions in three scenarios. The first scenario allocates payoffs from group decisions equally to all members of a group. The second and third scenario introduce intra-group payoff conflict as a new influential factor in group dynamics. Hereby, we separate intra-group payoff conflicts in the distribution of costs and profits. This manipulation allows us to disentangle group discussion effects resulting from the competing theories of polarization and diversification of opinions. Our overall findings support a predominant diversification of opinions effect. When group members share all payoffs equally, this effect overcomes polarization in 100% of the cases where outstanding individuals are risk averse, while group polarization appears to be more likely towards outstanding risk loving subjects. Intra-group payoff conflict shifts these likelihoods, supporting the importance of rational arguments in group polarization. Consequently, our experimental results support a strong increase in the level of average tax avoidance following group decisions in case of all or negative outcomes being shared equally by group members. Intra-group payoff in the distribution of costs, however, removes this difference and shifts, both individual and group preferences, towards safety.","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131493567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"More than Average Income? Preferences for Income Equality and Mobility Statistics","authors":"Bernardo Lara, Kenneth Shores","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3627896","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3627896","url":null,"abstract":"To describe preferences for income mobility/equality, we generate statistics that can be interpreted as marginal rates of substitution and converted to willingness-to- pay (WTP). All else constant, U.S. residents are willing to pay $2,736 dollars to increase income equality 10 percentiles and $1,778 dollars to increase income mobility 10 percentiles. Liberals’ WTP for income equality is two times larger than conservatives’; there are no significant differences in the WTP for mobility. Educational attainment, income, ideology, and beliefs about upward mobility negatively predict a WTP for income equality; the only predictor of the WTP for mobility is gender.","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125235612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Social Preferences Under the Shadow of the Future","authors":"Felix Kölle, Simone Quercia, E. Tripodi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3622125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3622125","url":null,"abstract":"Social interactions predominantly take place under the shadow of the future. Previous literature on infinitely repeated games has highlighted the primary role of self-interested strategic considerations in explaining outcomes. Using indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games, this paper demonstrates experimentally the importance of social preferences for achieving efficient cooperative outcomes. Sorting agents by their pro-sociality, we find that cooperation is three to four times higher among prosocial players compared to selfish players. We also show that social preferences are less important when individuals interact in mixed populations. This can explain why the influence of social preferences has not been detected in previous studies.","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125639632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dissecting Inequality-Averse Preferences","authors":"M. Bérgolo, G. Burdín, Santiago Burone, Mauricio De Rosa, Matias Giaccobasso, Martin Leites","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3729710","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3729710","url":null,"abstract":"Although different approaches and methods have been used to measure inequality aversion, there remains no consensus about its drivers at the individual level. We conducted an experiment on a sample of more than 1,576 first-year undergraduate economics and business students in Uruguay to understand why people are inequality averse. We elicited inequality aversion by asking participants to make a sequence of choices between hypothetical societies characterized by varying levels of average income and income inequality. In addition, we use randomized information treatments to prime participants into competing narratives regarding the sources of inequality in society. The main findings are that (1) the prevalence of inequality aversion is high: most participants’ choices revealed inequality-averse preferences; (2) the extent of inequality aversion depends on the individual’s position in the income distribution; (3) individuals are more likely to accept inequality when it comes from effort rather than luck regardless of their income position; (4) the effect of social mobility on inequality aversion is conditional on individual’s income position: preferences for mobility reduces inequality aversion for individuals located at the bottom of the income distribution, where risk aversion cannot play any role.","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129694317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Концепты ренты и рентоискательства в экономической науке: особенности и динамика (Concepts of Rent and Rent-seeking in Economic Science: Features and Dynamics)","authors":"Andrey Latkov, N. K. Bekkalieva","doi":"10.22394/2071-2367-2019-14-4-43-55","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22394/2071-2367-2019-14-4-43-55","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Russian Abstract:</b> Цель статьи – структурировать основные проблемы, с которыми сталкивается современная теория рентоориентированного поведения. Предмет исследования – на основе обзора различных подходов к содержанию категории «рента» в зарубежной научной литературе рассмотреть генезис концепта рентоискательства. В результате обоснована правомерность разграничения понятий «рентоориентированное поведение» и «рентоискательство». Проведенный анализ современной российской научной литературы выявил наличие взаимоисключающих подходов российских исследователей к содержанию категории ренты. Показана разнонаправленность исследований российских и зарубежных авторов, посвященных рентной проблематике, которая является причиной «несводимости» доминирующей теории рентоискательства и теории рентных отношений в России. Рассмотрены попытки интеграции концептов ренты и рентоискательства в рамках единой теории. В заключении авторы предлагают собственное определение категории ренты, исходя из местоположения субъекта присвоения в социально-экономическом пространстве. Представленное определение направлено на конструктивное решение проблемы «несводимости» доминирующих концептов ренты и рентоориентированного поведения. Побочным результатом явилась постановка проблемы установления систем координат политэкономического и институционально-экономического пространства.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> The purpose of the article is to structure the main problems faced by the modern theory of rent-oriented behavior. Subject of the research is based on a review of various approaches to the content of the \"rent\" category in foreign scientific literature, to consider the genesis of the concept of rent-seeking. As a result, the legitimacy of the distinction between the concepts of \"rent-oriented behavior\" and \"rent-seeking\" is substantiated. The analysis of modern Russian scientific literature revealed the presence of mutually exclusive approaches of Russian researchers to the content of the annuity category. The multidirectionality of studies of Russian and foreign authors on rental issues, which is the reason for the “irreducibility” of the dominant theory of rent-seeking and the theory of rental relations in Russia, is shown. Attempts to integrate the concepts of rent and rent-seeking in the framework of a unified theory are considered. In conclusion, the authors propose their own definition of the category of rent based on the location of the subject of appropriation in the socio-economic space. The presented definition is aimed at a constructive solution to the problem of “irreducibility” of the dominant concepts of rent and rent-oriented behavior. A side result was the formulation of the problem of establishing the coordinate systems of the political and institutional and economic space.","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125533144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Wildfire Crime and Social Vulnerability in Italy: A Panel Investigation","authors":"A. Canepa, Federico Drogo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3597341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3597341","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we analyse the socio–economic determinants of wildfire crime in Italy through panel data at the regional level. Using fixed-effect Poisson models and fixed-effect quantile panel regression analysis, it is found that social vulnerability factors such as poverty, organised crime and inequality in income play an important role in driving wildfire crime. The quantile regression analysis highlights a significant heterogeneity of the effects of driving factors across the Italian peninsula. Finally, we also extend our analysis to investigate the effect of economic downturns on wildfire crime and we find a positive correlation between a deterioration of per capita income and wildfire crime.<br>","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123403191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Social Groups with Selfish Individuals","authors":"G. Doğan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2786986","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2786986","url":null,"abstract":"I test the effect of multiple pivotal players on unfair choices in a setup with a leader and two followers deciding on whether to expropriate the payoff of a group member. Comparing unanimity decisions to individual decisions within the group, I find that leaders are fairer in the unanimity rule compared to individual decision-making. Followers are more unfair than leaders. These findings refute multiple pivotality as a source of unfair group decisions, and are in line with image and harm responsibility concerns. Control treatments suggest that a minority might prefer not to collectively redistribute the wealth away from a victim.","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125995482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Three Myths About Federal Regulation","authors":"P. McLaughlin, C. Mulligan","doi":"10.3386/w27233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w27233","url":null,"abstract":"Despite evidence to the contrary, three common myths persist about federal regulations. The first myth is that many regulations concern the environment, but in fact only a small minority of regulations are environmental. The second myth is that most regulations contain quantitative estimates of costs or benefits. However, these quantitative estimates appear rarely in published rules, contradicting the impression given by executive orders and Office of Management and Budget guidance, which require cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and clearly articulate sound economic principles for conducting CBA. Environmental rules have relatively higher-quality CBAs, at least by the low standards of other federal rules. The third myth, which is particularly relevant to the historic regulations promulgated during the COVID-19 pandemic, is the misperception that regulatory costs are primarily clerical, rather than opportunity or resource costs. If technocrats have triumphed in the regulatory arena, their victory has not been earned by the merits of their analysis.","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121962493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}