{"title":"From Constitutionalism to War—and Back Again","authors":"Arthur Ripstein","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0016","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter presents Arthur Ripstein’s responses to the authors of the preceding chapters. The chapter follows the order of the contributions, and are divided broadly into responses to the papers in Part I concerning the ways in which facts matter to right, and the relation between the flawed world in which we find ourselves and the ideal case that Kant contemplates, and to those in Part II dealing with more specific issues in the Kantian theory of war and peace.","PeriodicalId":129472,"journal":{"name":"The Public Uses of Coercion and Force","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129678813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Kantian Defense of Remedial Wars","authors":"Alon Harel","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter discusses how Ripstein differentiates among three types of wars: self-defense, remedial, and punitive. Harel then argues that Ripstein’s reasons for rejecting a right to remedial wars fail. The underlying Kantian principles guiding Ripstein’s own account dictate that remedial wars are permissible. There are very powerful consequentialist, intuitionist, and conventionalist arguments against recognizing a right to remedial wars. But the logic provided by Ripstein’s account of Kant cannot justify the prohibition on such wars. Precisely as the right to conduct defensive wars follows inevitably from our understanding of states as independent of each other, the right to conduct remedial wars follows from this very same principle. Harel argues that punitive and remedial wars are fundamentally different and that while Ripstein’s counterargument addresses successfully the case of punitive wars, it fails to address the case of remedial wars.","PeriodicalId":129472,"journal":{"name":"The Public Uses of Coercion and Force","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123622905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Three Models of Territory","authors":"Alice Pinheiro Walla","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter argues that regardless of whether a legal order has been established over a territory, possession of land itself already imposes obligations on persons outside the territory to respect it. She points out that possession of land also imposes duties on the holders of territory that are global in scope. It is therefore not possible to reduce territorial rights to claims of juridical independence in virtue of a state’s internal civil condition, although the existence of a legal order over a territory is an additional argument to the duty to respect a group’s occupation of land. This is because the internal legal order is only binding to its members, while occupation of land is binding to individuals and states already in the state of nature.","PeriodicalId":129472,"journal":{"name":"The Public Uses of Coercion and Force","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134349517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Right to Wage Private Wars of Subsistence","authors":"J. Olsthoorn","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"Some philosophers have recently argued for the revisionist just war doctrine that individuals can have the right to initiate war in defense of their human rights when their government fails in its duty to protect them. It was a central tenet of early modern just war theory, too, that when judicial recourse is not available, individuals are entitled to enforce their basic rights by force of war. How should we conceptualize such remedial rights to secure basic rights by armed force? And where to fit such rights within ethical theories of war? This chapter explores these questions by critically contrasting two ways to ground individual rights to wage so-called “private subsistence wars”: via “modern” duties of global justice and via “old” rights of necessity. I argue that the right-of-necessity model—for better or worse—can sidestep problems of indeterminate and underdetermined moral liability by grounding resistance rights in enforceable rights (of subsistence) rather than in enforceable duties (of global justice). My analysis thus charts normative implications of dispensing with the legitimate authority condition by analyzing what it means for rights and duties to be enforceable.","PeriodicalId":129472,"journal":{"name":"The Public Uses of Coercion and Force","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122732743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Semi-Kantian Just War Theory","authors":"Yitzhak Benbaji","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter explores the Kantian philosophy of the law of war and how it is based on two normative claims. First, states are independent of each other in virtue of their duty to provide a legal order in a territory that they rule. Second, any use of non-defensive force by a state in a territory that it does not actually rule is illegal. Benbaji shows that there is a deep tension between these claims, and he sets out to offer a contractarian theory of the crime of aggression, which he characterizes as semi-Kantian: states are fully legitimate only if their right to rule over their territory is recognized by all other states. Semi-Kantians argue that Ripstein’s Kant misconstrues the standing of states vis-à-vis the territories over which they rule.","PeriodicalId":129472,"journal":{"name":"The Public Uses of Coercion and Force","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134023696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Vulnerability, Space, Communication: Three Conditions of Adequacy for Cosmopolitan Right","authors":"P. Niesen","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter argues that according to the Kantian completeness assumption, not only do we face a major unresolved systematic issue—all exercise of cosmopolitan right takes place in a state of nature between states and foreigners: a highly structured state of nature, to be sure, but a state of nature nonetheless—but we have too few options for fulfilling the conditions of explanatory adequacy. Niesen points out that in Kant and the Law of War no space is reserved for leaving normative issues undecided, to be resolved through politics and through additional, positive global institutions.","PeriodicalId":129472,"journal":{"name":"The Public Uses of Coercion and Force","volume":"41 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133072260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reading Kant’s Rechtslehre: Some Observations on Ripstein’s Kant and the Law of War","authors":"T. Mertens","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter puts forward a semantic observation which he claims reflects not only Ripstein’s Kant interpretation, but also his own perspective as a long-term reader of Kant. Mertens observes that Kantian scholarship has become to a large extent an Anglo-Saxon affair, and Kant is read and interpreted against the background of political and legal problems of that world. History has shown that several readings of Kant are possible, and Ripstein presents a new, powerful reading of Kant which is indebted to that Anglo-Saxon background. Mertens discusses several intriguing questions, inter alia, Ripstein’s interpretation of Kant’s view on the law of war is the distinction between the just war tradition and the regular war tradition and Kant’s departure from both traditions.","PeriodicalId":129472,"journal":{"name":"The Public Uses of Coercion and Force","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117353557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Between Wormholes and Blackholes","authors":"A. Ganesh","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter sets out to explore the question of how the legal claims going by the name of “human rights” in contemporary legal practice can validly be made in war, consistent with the idea that rights are possible—indeed conceivable—only in conditions of peace. Even though war is wrongful in the highest degree, a still deeper wrong obtains if a belligerent does something whose maxim aims at making a future peace impossible. On this basis, Ganesh argues that notwithstanding actual, “empirical” conditions of active conflict, a belligerent must be deemed as sharing a rightful condition with an individual if denying the same would amount to admitting the commission of a war crime. Moreover, Ganesh also demonstrates—contrary to the dominant trend in legal scholarship—that a moral reading of the most relevant caselaw finds human rights obligations to obtain even if the obligor state has little to no capacity to enforce its writ, due either to the territory being embroiled in an active civil war or under the control of another state.","PeriodicalId":129472,"journal":{"name":"The Public Uses of Coercion and Force","volume":"2016 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127502940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"National Defense and the Value of Independence","authors":"M. Renzo","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter compares Ripstein’s treatment of wars of national defense with the treatment offered by the just war theory model. Wars of national defense are surprisingly difficult to justify within the just war theory approach. Attempts by some of the most prominent philosophers working within this approach have either concluded that wars of national defense are impermissible, or that they are permissible only in an implausibly restricted number of circumstances. If they are right, and if Ripstein’s account does a better job in dealing with these cases, that would be a reason to favor his Kantian approach over the traditional just war model. Renzo argues that neither of these claims is correct. Ripstein’s view ultimately lacks the resources to justify a right to wage wars of national defense, and contemporary just war theorists are wrong in believing that their approach can at best ground a weak version of such right. This gives us some reasons to prefer the just war approach over the Kantian one championed by Ripstein.","PeriodicalId":129472,"journal":{"name":"The Public Uses of Coercion and Force","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116072953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Europe’s Cosmopolitan Union","authors":"Bertjan Wolthuis, Luigi Corrias","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0015","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter provides a Kantian reading of EU internal market law and the refugee crisis of 2015. The chapter argues that the EU should be viewed as a cosmopolitan union. The authors ask whether EU law, understood as positive cosmopolitan law, can be qualified as an extension of the legal condition, and whether it can be viewed as consistent with the other two parts of public law, especially with the freedom of EU member states which also depend on the possible connection to global, much less extensive, systems of positive cosmopolitan law such as migration law.","PeriodicalId":129472,"journal":{"name":"The Public Uses of Coercion and Force","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127093165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}