{"title":"The Moral Basis of State Independence","authors":"A. Stilz","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter takes as its starting point the central claim in Arthur Ripstein’s defense of a Kantian approach to war, namely that each state has a right to be independent from the determining choice of other states. The state’s right to independence is the basis for its permission to use force in national defense, and also for in bello restrictions that limit the permissible means of waging war to those necessary to stop aggression. But what morally justifies the state’s right to independence? And can this right be accounted for on Kantian grounds? Specifically, Stilz focuses on whether the Kantian view, as Ripstein reconstructs it, provides a philosophically satisfying basis for attributing a right to political independence to the state. In the final section, she outlines an alternative reading of Kant that may provide a more compelling moral foundation for this right.","PeriodicalId":129472,"journal":{"name":"The Public Uses of Coercion and Force","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125800687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Exactitude and Indemonstrability in Kant’s Doctrine of Right","authors":"Katrin Flikschuh","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter states that while the Doctrine of Right is often seen as Kant’s contribution to legal theory, it is primarily a work in political philosophy. Flikschuh argues for a reading of the Doctrine of Right as a work that includes a concern with law but is not confined to that concern alone. She claims, however, that the state is a less comprehensive idea for Kant than it is for some of his immediate predecessors and successors on the one hand, and for most contemporary political philosophers on the other hand.","PeriodicalId":129472,"journal":{"name":"The Public Uses of Coercion and Force","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128225437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Kant and the Criminal Law of War","authors":"M. Thorburn","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter focuses on Ripstein’s account of a doctrine that has caused a great deal of trouble to moral philosophers of law over the years: the equal criminal immunity of combatants. Thorburn sets out the contours of the Kantian approach to the morality of law, which begins with the relationship of public authority and only later proceeds to the evaluation of how that authority has been exercised. He then considers Ripstein’s application of that approach to the legal equality of combatants in war. Although Ripstein’s account suggests a comprehensive justification of the doctrine of equal criminal immunity, Thorburn shows that Ripstein’s chapter does not spell this out fully, though he outlines a way in which Ripstein can do so.","PeriodicalId":129472,"journal":{"name":"The Public Uses of Coercion and Force","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133898656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Might and Right","authors":"Rainer Forst","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter sets out to critically discuss the methodological approach that Ripstein chooses when reconstructing Kant’s position and in particular how he defines and relates “constitutive” and “regulative” principles with respect to peace and public right. Forst focuses on what he calls a paradox of peace: peace is supposed to avoid, end, or overcome war as the practice of might making right; but the principle of peace itself at crucial points seems to require us to accept that might makes right, at least as far as the past is concerned. Specifically, Forst offers a different interpretation of the relevant constitutive principle in the realm of the practical, namely that of freedom, and he invites Ripstein to move beyond Kant in questioning rather than affirming the paradox of peace.","PeriodicalId":129472,"journal":{"name":"The Public Uses of Coercion and Force","volume":"92 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132367147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"EU Solidarity as Collective Self-Defense?","authors":"E. Herlin-Karnell","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197519103.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter sets out to explore the notion of self-defense and how it is manifested in contemporary law of war. In addition, the chapter discusses the notion of collective self-defense in the context of the European Union (EU). The chapter links this debate to Ripstein’s Kant and the Law of War by using the EU as a test case of Kantian war theory. The chapter focuses on the imminence criteria for deciding on self-defense, in the context of EU security law, and to the extent to which Kant completely ruled out any preventive use of force. The EU’s fight against terrorism and security regulation appears to have many parallels with the “war” model which will be discussed in this chapter.","PeriodicalId":129472,"journal":{"name":"The Public Uses of Coercion and Force","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125247147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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