ERN: Formal & Informal (Implicit) Contractual Relations Between Firms (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Investment in Outside Options as Opportunistic Behavior: An Experimental Investigation","authors":"Hodaka Morita, Maroš Servátka","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2540066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2540066","url":null,"abstract":"We contribute to the theory of the firm by experimentally investigating a bilateral trade relationship in which standard theory assuming self-regarding preferences predicts that the seller will be better off by investing in the outside option to improve his bargaining position. The seller’s investment, however, might negatively affect the buyer’s other-regarding preferences if the investment is viewed as opportunistic. We find overall support for our hypotheses that arise from the link between other-regarding behavior and opportunism. In our experiment the seller can become worse off by investing, suggesting that costly solutions to opportunistic behavior such as vertical integration may be unnecessary.","PeriodicalId":128464,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Informal (Implicit) Contractual Relations Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117312940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Export Premia and Subcontracting Discount: Passive Strategies and Performance in Domestic and Foreign Markets","authors":"Tiziano Razzolini, D. Vannoni","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9701.2011.01329.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2011.01329.x","url":null,"abstract":"This paper contributes to the literature on firms’ productivity and exporting decisions by analysing the role played by organizational choice aspects. Rather than setting up a vertically integrated structure, manufacturers may act as subcontractors in both domestic and foreign markets, and produce to satisfy the requirements of other firms. A very simple model is presented where the most productive firms self-select into exporting, while the least productive ones work as sub-contractors serving the domestic market only. These predictions are tested using a sample of Italian firms observed in the 1998-2003 period. The results of our estimates highlight a ranking of firms consistent with a priori expectations, and provide a clear indication that passive exporters (i.e. using sub-contracting in foreign markets)display lower TFP values as compared to direct exporters. Moreover, only the latter category exhibits higher pre-entry productivity levels and growth rates as well as higher post-entry TFP growth rates. Such findings are consistent with both the self-selection hypothesis and the learning by exporting explanation.","PeriodicalId":128464,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Informal (Implicit) Contractual Relations Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124804994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Theories of the Firm-Market Boundary","authors":"Todd R. Zenger, Teppo Felin, Lyda Bigelow","doi":"10.1080/19416520.2011.590301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/19416520.2011.590301","url":null,"abstract":"A central role of the entrepreneur-manager is assembling a strategic bundle of complementary assets and activities, either existing or foreseen, which when combined create value for the firm. This process of creating value however requires managers to assess which activities should be handled by the market and which should be handled within hierarchy. Indeed, for more than forty years, economists, sociologists and organizational scholars have extensively examined the theory of the firm’s central question: what determines the boundaries of the firm? Many alternative theories have emerged and are frequently positioned as competing explanations, often with no shortage of critique for one another. In this paper, we review these theories and suggest that the core theories that have emerged to explain the boundary of the firm commonly address distinctly different directional forces on the firm boundary - forces that are tightly interrelated. We specifically address these divergent, directional forces - as they relate to organizational boundaries - by focusing on four central questions. First, what are the virtues of markets in organizing assets and activities? Second, what factors drive markets to fail? Third, what are the virtues of integration in organizing assets and activities? Fourth, what factors drive organizations to fail? We argue that a complete theory of the firm must address these four questions and we review the relevant literature regarding each of these questions and discuss extant debates and the associated implications for future research.","PeriodicalId":128464,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Informal (Implicit) Contractual Relations Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123656826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Strategic Inputs into Patent Pools","authors":"Justus Baron, Henry Delcamp","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1641265","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1641265","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores what factors determine the decision of a patent pool to accept new inputs. We propose a dynamic analysis of 1337 U.S. patent inputs into 7 important pools. This analysis highlights a trade-off between firm and patent characteristics as the determinants of inclusion of patents into pools. For instance we prove that firms already member of the pool or holding large patent portfolios are able to include lower quality patents. These findings can be explained both by bargaining power and information asymmetry. In particular, as measured by a new indicator, insiders and firms practicing the technology file patents that are better aligned with the criteria of essentiality.","PeriodicalId":128464,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Informal (Implicit) Contractual Relations Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132576062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Implicit Contracts, Unemployment, and Labor Market Segmentation","authors":"Steffen Altmann, A. Falk, David Huffman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1631136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1631136","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the impact of imperfect contract enforcement on the emergence of unemployment. In an experimental labor market where trading parties can form long-term employment relationships, we compare a work environment where effort is observable, but not verifiable to a situation where explicit contracts are feasible. Our main result shows that unemployment is much higher when third-party contract enforcement is absent. Unemployment is involuntary, being caused by firms' employment and contracting policy. Moreover, we show that implicit contracting can lead to a segmentation of the labor market. Firms in both segments earn similar profits, but workers in the secondary sector face much less favorable conditions than their counterparts in primary-sector jobs.","PeriodicalId":128464,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Informal (Implicit) Contractual Relations Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123695364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Cultural Differences and Homogeneity in Strategic Alliances: The Case of Trimo Trebnje (Slovenia) and Trimo Vsk (Russia)","authors":"Metka Tekavcic, Vlado Dimovski, Darja Peljhan, Miha Škerlavaj","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1582355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1582355","url":null,"abstract":"Strategic alliances are a necessity for organizations to be successful: to survive in the dynamic surroundings of today, organizations need to give integrated and fl exible solutions to consumers that can better be realized by cooperating with partners (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002). The label ‘strategic alliance’ has been used to denote a variety of interfirm relationships: from loose cooperation of independent partners, across joint ventures, acquisitions, towards mergers as the tightest form (Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997). Despite abundance of their forms, strategic alliances often fail (Duysters et al, 1999; Kauser and Shaw, 2004). Cultural misfit has been recognized as one of the main reasons for such results (Duysters and Heimericks, 2004). Culture can be studied at various levels: national, professional and organizational (Hofstede, 1980, 1990; Ulijn and Weggeman, 2001). This chapter addresses the importance of cultural fit at the organizational level in the case of a Slovenian company from the construction industry and its Russian greenfi eld investment Trimo VSK (Russia), which has been established as a joint venture with Russian partners. Trimo Trebnje d.d. (Slovenia, hereafter Trimo) holds a 51 per cent stake in Trimo VSK and its Russian partners hold 49 per cent. Trimo was aware that in order to operate well within the Russian market, it was necessary to have a local, reputable partner, with particular knowledge of local conditions and market customs. Both companies are presented in more detail in the next section. Just as each individual has its own personal characteristics, so each company has its characteristics that are encompassed in its organizational culture. If a company wants to be successful in the long run, its organizational culture should not be dependent only on its current management but has to develop a strong culture that is based on values that become implicit and are accepted by all of the company’s members (Tekavcic and Peljhan, 2004). On the other hand, employees in the company have to retain flexibility to be able to respond and adapt quickly to sudden changes in the environment as well as in the organization itself. While cultural misfi t is one of the main obstacles for success of a strategic alliance, culture that fits the company’s strategy can be an important source of its competitive advantage (Skerlavaj et al., 2007). Trimo (Slovenia) builds its strategy on internationalization. For this sort of strategy to be successful, it is important that the company knows the culture of the foreign (in our case Russian) market it is entering. A case study by Bartlett et al. (2004) shows that the national culture of whichever country a company does business in has an effect on that company’s organizational culture. It is the culture that is often blamed for marketing blunders, merger failures and unsuccessful transfers of best practices (Johansson, 2004). In Russia, Trimo would like to develop an organizational culture t","PeriodicalId":128464,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Informal (Implicit) Contractual Relations Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125524027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Anatomy of Relationship Significance: A Critical Realist Exploration","authors":"Filipe J. Sousa, Luis M. de Castro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1594105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1594105","url":null,"abstract":"Markets-as-networks (MAN) theorists contend, at least tacitly, the significance of business relationships to the firm – that is, business relationships contribute somewhat to corporate survival or growth. One does not deny the existence of significant business relationships but sustain, in contrast to the consensus within the MAN theory, that relationship significance should not be a self-evident assumption. For significance cannot be a taken-for-granted property of each and every one of the firm's business relationships. The authors adopt explicitly a critical realist meta-theoretical position in this conceptual paper and claim that relationship significance is an event of the business world, whose causes remain yet largely unidentified. Where the powers and liabilities of business relationships (i.e., relationship functions and dysfunctions) are put to work, inevitably under certain contingencies (namely the surrounding networks and markets), relationship effects ensue for the firm (often benefits in excess of sacrifices, i.e., relationship value) and as a consequence relationship significance is likely to be brought about. In addition, relationship significance can result from the dual impact that business relationships may have on the structure and powers and liabilities of the firm, that is, on corporate nature and scope, respectively.","PeriodicalId":128464,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Informal (Implicit) Contractual Relations Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128191806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Explicit and Implicit Contracts with Non-Financial Stakeholders and Corporate Capital Structure: The Case of Product Warranties","authors":"Jayant R. Kale, Costanza Meneghetti, Husayn K. Shahrur","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1539217","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1539217","url":null,"abstract":"We use a unique dataset of product warranty offerings by firms to investigate the effect of a firm’s warranty reserve levels on its capital structure decisions. Our sample consists of firms that (i) offer explicit warranties, (ii) likely offer implicit product warranties, and (iii) are in non-warranty-offering industries. For the whole sample, we find that leverage relates negatively to the firm’s warranty level. Further, we find that firms that offer implicit warranties have lower debt levels than firms in non-warranty industries and that, conditional on operating in a warranty-offering industry, firms that issue explicit warranties tend to have even lower debt levels. We also investigate the determinants of the product warranty decision, and find that firms offer explicit warranties when products are more differentiated, when uncertainty about product quality is high, and when sellers have private information on product quality. We then show that the negative relation between firm’s debt and warranty levels continues to hold even after we control for self-selection by firms into offering explicit warranties. Our research contributes to the literature that examines how contracting with non-financial stakeholders such as customers affects the firm’s financing decision.","PeriodicalId":128464,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Informal (Implicit) Contractual Relations Between Firms (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128983674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}