Theories of the Firm-Market Boundary

Todd R. Zenger, Teppo Felin, Lyda Bigelow
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引用次数: 127

Abstract

A central role of the entrepreneur-manager is assembling a strategic bundle of complementary assets and activities, either existing or foreseen, which when combined create value for the firm. This process of creating value however requires managers to assess which activities should be handled by the market and which should be handled within hierarchy. Indeed, for more than forty years, economists, sociologists and organizational scholars have extensively examined the theory of the firm’s central question: what determines the boundaries of the firm? Many alternative theories have emerged and are frequently positioned as competing explanations, often with no shortage of critique for one another. In this paper, we review these theories and suggest that the core theories that have emerged to explain the boundary of the firm commonly address distinctly different directional forces on the firm boundary - forces that are tightly interrelated. We specifically address these divergent, directional forces - as they relate to organizational boundaries - by focusing on four central questions. First, what are the virtues of markets in organizing assets and activities? Second, what factors drive markets to fail? Third, what are the virtues of integration in organizing assets and activities? Fourth, what factors drive organizations to fail? We argue that a complete theory of the firm must address these four questions and we review the relevant literature regarding each of these questions and discuss extant debates and the associated implications for future research.
企业-市场边界理论
企业家-经理的核心角色是将现有的或可预见的互补资产和活动的战略捆绑在一起,这些资产和活动结合起来为公司创造价值。然而,这个创造价值的过程要求管理者评估哪些活动应该由市场来处理,哪些应该在层次结构中处理。事实上,四十多年来,经济学家、社会学家和组织学者广泛研究了企业核心问题的理论:是什么决定了企业的边界?许多替代理论已经出现,并且经常被定位为相互竞争的解释,通常不乏对彼此的批评。在本文中,我们回顾了这些理论,并认为已经出现的解释企业边界的核心理论通常涉及企业边界上明显不同的定向力——这些力是紧密相关的。我们通过关注四个核心问题来具体解决这些与组织边界相关的分歧性、方向性力量。首先,市场在组织资产和活动方面的优点是什么?其次,是什么因素导致市场失灵?第三,整合在组织资产和活动中的优点是什么?第四,是什么因素导致组织失败?我们认为,一个完整的企业理论必须解决这四个问题,我们回顾了有关这些问题的相关文献,并讨论了现有的争论以及对未来研究的相关含义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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