Strategic Inputs into Patent Pools

Justus Baron, Henry Delcamp
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引用次数: 24

Abstract

This article explores what factors determine the decision of a patent pool to accept new inputs. We propose a dynamic analysis of 1337 U.S. patent inputs into 7 important pools. This analysis highlights a trade-off between firm and patent characteristics as the determinants of inclusion of patents into pools. For instance we prove that firms already member of the pool or holding large patent portfolios are able to include lower quality patents. These findings can be explained both by bargaining power and information asymmetry. In particular, as measured by a new indicator, insiders and firms practicing the technology file patents that are better aligned with the criteria of essentiality.
专利池的战略投入
本文探讨了决定专利池是否接受新投入的因素。本文对美国7个重要专利池的1337项专利投入进行了动态分析。这一分析强调了企业和专利特征之间的权衡,这是将专利纳入专利池的决定因素。例如,我们证明已经是专利池成员或拥有大量专利组合的公司能够包括低质量的专利。这些发现可以用议价能力和信息不对称来解释。特别是,通过一项新的指标来衡量,内部人士和实施技术的公司申请的专利更符合必要性标准。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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