Political Economy: Budget最新文献

{"title":"Contesting Austerity: Genealogies of Human Rights Discourse","authors":"Matthias Goldmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3561660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3561660","url":null,"abstract":"The dominant understanding of the role of human rights in the context of austerity induced by sovereign debt crises has shifted markedly over time. It reflects, and may have influenced, the genealogies of human rights law in the postwar era. Four different paradigms emerge. During the 1970s, the decade preceding the debt crisis of the 1980s, the idea of austerity as a response to debt crises was contested by the basic (human) needs approach and by the proposal of a New International Economic Order. Both strands of thought showed some affinity with human rights law, although not without ambiguity, understanding self-determination as a structural requirement for ESC rights enjoyment. Counterintuitively, though, the debt crisis beginning in the 1980s silenced, rather than provoked, any form of human rights-based critique. The IMF managed to shift the focus of the debate from human needs to human capital, in line with the emerging Washington Consensus. When the Iron Curtain fell, sovereign debt restructuring became more generous, but debtor states had to pay with ever more intrusive forms of austerity, including structural conditions such as respect for civil and political rights. This “governance paradigm” of human rights was countered by a transformative paradigm of human rights in which civil society articulated its critique of austerity. The IFIs avoided the issue of human rights, but reacted by adding “social” components to austerity that aligned with their focus on efficiency and growth and further entrenched sufficiency. The impact of austerity on the European periphery led to lots of human rights litigation, but a number of structural obstacles prevented its success. Instead, the crisis aftermath saw enormous progress in the political recognition of human rights as a relevant standard for austerity. This has given rise to a new political paradigm of human rights. While this genealogy shows the contingency of human rights discourse in relation to austerity, it reveals their potential for challenging economic expertise and empowering progressive views, provided human rights are used to politicize, not to depoliticize, distributive questions. The limits of human rights discourse are the limits of our imagination.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125667899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Accrual Accounting and the Local Government Budget - A Matching Evaluation","authors":"Christian Raffer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3547302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3547302","url":null,"abstract":"The transition from cash to accrual accounting is said to change a government's perception of its budget quite fundamentally. Although an exorbitant number of governments have reformed the mode of accounting at high costs in past years, reliable empirical evidence of consequences on their financial situation and decision-making is still scarce. In this paper, budget variables are analysed which are hypothesized to react to the reform: investment expenditure and revenue from asset sales. Microdata from 1,100 local governments in the German state of Baden-Württemberg over the period 2005-2016 is exploited with different matching techniques combined with the conditional DiD estimator. Results imply a robust effect on municipal investment behaviour; evidence for sales revenue remains weak. The findings corroborate recent empirical results. For the first time a common understanding of the budgetary effects of the accrual accounting reform seems to be emerging.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132449961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Familiarity Breeds Growth: The Impact of Factional Ties on Local Cadres’ Economic Performance in China","authors":"S. Wong, Yun Zeng","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12144","url":null,"abstract":"Some attribute China's rapid economic growth to a cadre promotion system that rewards economic performance. Others argue that political promotion in China hinges on factionalism. Extant empirical studies often assume that performance can be measured independently from the effect of factionalism. We test the validity of this assumption by examining whether local cadres’ economic performance would change as a result of losing vertical ties to a higher authority. We find an immediate increase in the growth rates of local GDP and government revenue. However, the performance change is mediated by the type of succeeding leaders, as it occurs only under locally promoted leaders who have existing ties with the local cadres. We further examine various channels through which a leader's insider status may affect local economic performance and find that newly appointed outsider leaders would cut fiscal transfers to the local level, which may explain the drop in their short‐term performance.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117653064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Flexible Budget as a Development Tool: Evidence From the Personal Preparation Course","authors":"Abdullah Adilli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3539720","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3539720","url":null,"abstract":"The paper begins by explaining budget, the purposes and objetcives for budgetary planning and control system. Then, researcher describe flexible budget and cost behaviour patterns and, are explained the steps in the preparation of a flexible budget by authors. In this context, we use high-low method for identify semivariable costs in preparation of a flexible budget. After we prepared flexible budget and how apply to company.. The aim of this study is making, flexible budgets are vital for planning, control and development. In this paper, researches describe the flexible budget exercise and provide accounting instructors with a template for use in personal preparation course of Azerbaijan Republic. According to the research results, six advantages of flexible budget are described by authors.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134196389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Impacts of Fiscal Policy on the Economic Growth in Rwanda","authors":"Vladimir Benimana","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3666901","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3666901","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the impact of fiscal policy measured by (Government expenditure, Government revenues, public debt) factors on GDP growth for the period 1999-2017 in Rwanda. The study used multiple linear regression and least squares method (OLS) to test the study hypotheses. The study found that government expenditure, public debt and government revenues have a positive and significant impact on the Rwandan GDP growth.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126734410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Does Job Design Make Workers Happy?","authors":"P. Böckerman, A. Bryson, A. Kauhanen, M. Kangasniemi","doi":"10.1111/sjpe.12211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12211","url":null,"abstract":"Using linked employer‐employee data for Finland we examine associations between job design, employee well‐being and job‐related stress. Three key findings stand out. First, in accordance with the theory of Karasek and Karasek and Theorell, job control and supervisory support are positively correlated with employee well‐being and negatively correlated with job‐related stress. Second, as predicted by theory, job demands are positively correlated with job‐related stress. Third, there is no association between job demands and employee well‐being and, contrary to expectations, neither job control nor supervisory support alleviate the negative relationship between job demands and job‐related stress. Our results confirm the importance of job design for employee well‐being.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115122484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Optimal Regulation Under Imperfect Enforcement: Permits, Tickets, or Both?","authors":"A. Samuel, A. Farmer, Fabio Méndez","doi":"10.1111/sjpe.12242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12242","url":null,"abstract":"Economic activity is often regulated through both permits and tickets (subsequent inspections). We study the effectiveness of such policies where corruption and an underground economy make enforcement imperfect. In the theoretical model, asymmetric information justifies regulatory action which is enforced by corruptible bureaucrats. We find that regulation through permits alone is useless when corruption exists, while tickets still offer some benefit. Surprisingly, we also find that a system with both permits and tickets achieves welfare that is higher than that which can be achieved with only tickets—that combining the two mechanisms has an effect that is greater than the “sum of the parts.”","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126430073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Fiscal Commitment and Sovereign Default Risk","authors":"Siming Liu, Hewei Shen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3165726","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3165726","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the effects of fiscal policy commitment in countries that suffer sovereign default risk. Since a government does not incorporate the effect of their taxation decisions on past bond prices, a time-inconsistency problem arises, resulting in too many defaults and too few fiscal adjustments. We show that a fiscal commitment device can mitigate the government’s default incentives and improve their borrowing opportunities. Moreover, instead of committing to a single tax rate, introducing a commitment device that depends on economic conditions can further reduce default risk while preserving the contingency of a pro-cyclical fiscal policy.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122796687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"20 Weak Points in the State Budget of Azerbaijan for 2020","authors":"G. Ibadoghlu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3514311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3514311","url":null,"abstract":"As a result of the analysis of budget risks and macro-fiscal forecasting, the evaluation of the sustainability of budget revenues, as well as the transparency and efficiency of expenditures, it is clear that the 2020 budget contains at least 20 weak points. The presence of weak points reduces the quality of budget management, in other words, the efficiency of expenditures and its contribution to economic growth for the next year. These weak points can be classified as follows.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132571574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Sovereign Debt Crises and Low Interest Rates","authors":"G. Bloise, Yiannis Vailakis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3499620","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3499620","url":null,"abstract":"We study the traditional Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)'s model of sovereign debt default under timevarying interest rates and growth. We show that, when long-term interest rates exceed growth, equilibrium is unique and liquidity crises do not occur. High interest rates impose discipline on market sentiments, as creditors necessarily become more optimistic about solvency when the sovereign reduces debt exposure. Creditors’ beliefs respond instead ambiguously under low interest rates. As long as interest rates exceed growth, debt reduction alleviates the fiscal burden. However, the sovereign also benefits from the prospect of rolling over outstanding debt while interest rates remain below growth. Thus, creditors’ sentiments might adjust adversely to fiscal consolidation. This mechanism sustains belief-driven debt crises even when fundamentals would otherwise ensure solvency.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130483826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}