熟悉孕育成长:派系关系对中国地方干部经济绩效的影响

S. Wong, Yun Zeng
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引用次数: 7

摘要

一些人将中国经济的快速增长归因于奖励经济表现的干部晋升制度。另一些人则认为,中国的政治晋升取决于派系斗争。现有的实证研究通常假设,绩效可以独立于派性的影响来衡量。我们检验这个假设的有效性,通过考察地方干部是否由于失去了与上级当局的垂直联系,经济表现将发生变化。我们发现地方GDP和政府收入的增长速度立即提高。然而,绩效变化受继任领导类型的调节,因为只有在与当地干部有联系的地方晋升领导下才会发生这种变化。我们进一步研究了领导人的局内人身份可能影响地方经济绩效的各种渠道,发现新任命的局外领导人会减少对地方的财政转移,这可能解释了他们短期绩效下降的原因。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Familiarity Breeds Growth: The Impact of Factional Ties on Local Cadres’ Economic Performance in China
Some attribute China's rapid economic growth to a cadre promotion system that rewards economic performance. Others argue that political promotion in China hinges on factionalism. Extant empirical studies often assume that performance can be measured independently from the effect of factionalism. We test the validity of this assumption by examining whether local cadres’ economic performance would change as a result of losing vertical ties to a higher authority. We find an immediate increase in the growth rates of local GDP and government revenue. However, the performance change is mediated by the type of succeeding leaders, as it occurs only under locally promoted leaders who have existing ties with the local cadres. We further examine various channels through which a leader's insider status may affect local economic performance and find that newly appointed outsider leaders would cut fiscal transfers to the local level, which may explain the drop in their short‐term performance.
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