发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Political Economy: Budget最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Sovereign Risk Premia and Global Macroeconomic Conditions 主权风险溢价与全球宏观经济状况
Political Economy: Budget Pub Date : 2020-08-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3162853
Sandro C. Andrade, Adelphe Ekponon, A. Jeanneret
{"title":"Sovereign Risk Premia and Global Macroeconomic Conditions","authors":"Sandro C. Andrade, Adelphe Ekponon, A. Jeanneret","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3162853","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3162853","url":null,"abstract":"We study how shifting global macroeconomic conditions affect sovereign bond prices. Bondholders earn premia for two sources of systematic risk: exposure to low-frequency changes in the state of the economy, as captured by expected macroeconomic growth and volatility, and exposure to higher-frequency macroeconomic shocks. Our model predicts that the first source, labeled “long-run macro risk”, is the primary driver of the level and the cross-sectional variation in sovereign bond premia. We find support for this prediction using sovereign bond return data for 43 countries. A long-short portfolio based on long-run macro risk earns 8.11% per year in our sample.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122739061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Who is Afraid of the Big Bad Debt? A Modern Money Theory Perspective on Federal Deficits and Debt 谁害怕巨额坏账?联邦赤字和债务的现代货币理论视角
Political Economy: Budget Pub Date : 2020-08-31 DOI: 10.1111/pbaf.12247
J. Douglas, Ringa Raudla
{"title":"Who is Afraid of the Big Bad Debt? A Modern Money Theory Perspective on Federal Deficits and Debt","authors":"J. Douglas, Ringa Raudla","doi":"10.1111/pbaf.12247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.12247","url":null,"abstract":"The U.S. federal government's deficit is expected to grow to over one trillion dollars in fiscal year (FY) 2020, and the national debt held by the public will likely grow to over $16.7 trillion. Budgeting scholars in the field of public administration have expressed concern over the increasing debt levels. The field of public administration, however, is largely unaware of Modern Money Theory (MMT) and the mechanics of money, which is its focus. MMT argues that understanding the mechanics of money in the U.S. financial system should lead scholars to different conclusions regarding the debt and deficit. This article presents the core arguments of the MMT perspective in this regard, with the goal to trigger further debates about debt and deficit among the community of budgeting scholars.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115047727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Post‐Keynesian Public Budgeting & Finance: Assessing Contributions from Modern Monetary Theory 后凯恩斯公共预算与财政:评估现代货币理论的贡献
Political Economy: Budget Pub Date : 2020-08-24 DOI: 10.1111/pbaf.12268
R. Kravchuk
{"title":"Post‐Keynesian Public Budgeting & Finance: Assessing Contributions from Modern Monetary Theory","authors":"R. Kravchuk","doi":"10.1111/pbaf.12268","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.12268","url":null,"abstract":"While Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) offers contributions that are worthy of serious consideration, some additional theory‐building and synthesis with existing theory may be in order to tie MMT into the established budgeting literature. MMT focuses primarily on monetarily sovereign governments. These are governments that face extremely “soft” budget constraints insofar as they: issue and regulate the value of their own currencies, possess central banks that function as the fiscal agents of their government treasuries, are able to issue sovereign debt denominated in their domestic currency, and operate in a system of freely‐floating currency exchange rates, with a minimum of currency and capital controls. National governments that are sovereign according to these criteria are able to make all debt service payments as they come due, virtually without regard to their level of outstanding debt; they cannot be forced to default against their will. They are also macroeconomically‐autonomous. It is the collective position of the symposium papers that these conditions describe, in precise terms, the fiscal position of the U.S. federal government. As such, the existence of an ultra‐soft U.S. government budget constraint is grounded in the extremely favorable conditions of money and credit that the federal government is subject to, and which in fact it has created and nurtured for itself since the Second World War. An important implication is that the federal level budgeting literature cannot ignore the macroeconomics and the administration of a sovereign currency regime, nor the monetary economics that ungirds it, without sustaining charges of unrealism.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128602613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Can Taxes Raise Output and Reduce Inequality? The Case of Lobbying 税收能提高产出并减少不平等吗?游说案
Political Economy: Budget Pub Date : 2020-05-19 DOI: 10.1111/sjpe.12248
K. Prettner, Davud Rostam‐Afschar
{"title":"Can Taxes Raise Output and Reduce Inequality? The Case of Lobbying","authors":"K. Prettner, Davud Rostam‐Afschar","doi":"10.1111/sjpe.12248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12248","url":null,"abstract":"One of the key institutional elements for reducing inequality is the tax and transfer system. However, economists and policymakers usually view high taxes as detrimental to economic growth. We isolate one important mechanism by which higher taxes reduce inequality and raise per capita gross domestic product (GDP) at the same time. This mechanism operates in the presence of unproductive lobbying. Higher taxes induce a reallocation from lobbying toward production. This raises overall output and reduces the consumption gap between those who benefit from lobbying and those who bear its negative effects.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115372125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Where You Live Matters: Local Bank Competition, Online Marketplace Lending, and Disparity in Borrower Benefits 你住在哪里很重要:本地银行竞争、在线市场贷款和借款人利益差距
Political Economy: Budget Pub Date : 2020-05-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2985099
Mohammed Alyakoob, M. Rahman, Zaiyan Wei
{"title":"Where You Live Matters: Local Bank Competition, Online Marketplace Lending, and Disparity in Borrower Benefits","authors":"Mohammed Alyakoob, M. Rahman, Zaiyan Wei","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2985099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2985099","url":null,"abstract":"In the past decade, the proliferation of online marketplace lending has been disrupting the consumer credit market, especially for personal loans for debt consolidation. These lenders, for example, Lending Club, transcend the geographic boundaries within which local banks operate and offer homogeneous access and terms to borrowers. However, the ultimate benefits borrowers derive from marketplace lending can differ significantly because local alternatives may replace marketplace loans when available and favorable. Correspondingly, if local bank competition drives the substitution of an existing marketplace loan with a traditional bank loan, the promise of equal benefits to all borrowers from marketplace lending is unlikely to fully materialize. This competitive dynamic has implications for policy making, particularly in judging the ramifications of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Our results indicate that a borrower who resides in a more competitive market is more likely to pay off a P2P loan early by making a large, one-time payment compared with a borrower from a less competitive market, indicating a substitution with a local bank loan. Thus, borrowers from different markets do not benefit equally from online marketplace lending, disrupting the consumer credit market. In particular, consumers in smaller markets continue to be disadvantaged because of the absence of competitive intensity. This is a consequence of traditional banks competing within their local markets and incentivized to attract marketplace borrowers to traditional loans primarily by their local market conditions. Therefore, unless geographic frictions in traditional lending markets are removed, digital disruptions cannot equalize the benefits to consumers.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116524388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14
Public Debt Levels and Real Interest Rates: Causal Evidence from Parliamentary Elections 公共债务水平和实际利率:来自议会选举的因果证据
Political Economy: Budget Pub Date : 2020-05-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3603563
Gabriel Ehrlich, Aditi Thapar
{"title":"Public Debt Levels and Real Interest Rates: Causal Evidence from Parliamentary Elections","authors":"Gabriel Ehrlich, Aditi Thapar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3603563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3603563","url":null,"abstract":"We use close elections in parliamentary democracies as natural experiments to estimate public debt levels’ effects on real interest rates. We first estimate that an election in which no party achieves a parliamentary majority causes the debt-to-GDP ratio to increase by 21 percentage points over the following five years relative to an election in which one party barely secures a majority. We next estimate that real interest rates rise by a relative 119 basis points following such an election, implying that a one percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio causes a 5.6 basis point increase in real rates. That effect is larger than most previous estimates in the literature, suggesting the potential importance of simultaneity in the determination of real rates and government debt levels.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115332792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Internet Appendix for 'Trading Credit (Subsidies) for Votes: The Effect of Local Politics on Small Business Lending' 互联网附录《以信用(补贴)换选票:地方政治对小企业贷款的影响》
Political Economy: Budget Pub Date : 2020-05-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3599539
Sahil Raina, Sheng-Jun Xu
{"title":"Internet Appendix for 'Trading Credit (Subsidies) for Votes: The Effect of Local Politics on Small Business Lending'","authors":"Sahil Raina, Sheng-Jun Xu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3599539","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3599539","url":null,"abstract":"This internet appendix complements the paper “Trading Credit (Subsidies) for Votes: The Effect of Local Politics on Small Business Lending” and is organized as follows: Appendix A provides the main results of the paper under alternative regression discontinuity specifications, Appendix B provides additional results on the performance of SBA loans, Appendix C provides the benchmark results of the paper separately for the 504 and 7(a) loan programs, Appendix D provides analysis of alternative channels of government influence on the local economy, and Appendix E provides the regression discontinuity plots not presented in the main paper.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115765328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
On Sovereign Default With Time-Varying Interest Rates 利率随时间变化的主权违约问题
Political Economy: Budget Pub Date : 2020-04-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3585667
G. Bloise, Yiannis Vailakis
{"title":"On Sovereign Default With Time-Varying Interest Rates","authors":"G. Bloise, Yiannis Vailakis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3585667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3585667","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We extend and refine Aguiar and Amador (2019) 's contraction approach to Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) 's sovereign debt model. In particular, we encompass time-varying interest rates and growth. We show that, when long-term interest rates exceed growth, equilibrium is unique and can be computed via contraction mapping. The method unifies separate branches of literature, showing that the contraction property is the reflection of previous arbitrage arguments based on replication, inspired by Bulow and Rogoff (1989) .","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120998299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The COVID-19 Bailouts COVID-19救助
Political Economy: Budget Pub Date : 2020-04-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3585515
J. Meier, Jake Smith
{"title":"The COVID-19 Bailouts","authors":"J. Meier, Jake Smith","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3585515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3585515","url":null,"abstract":"We use hand-collected data to investigate the COVID-19 bailouts for all publicly listed US firms. The median tax rate is 4% for bailout firms and 16% for no-bailout firms. The bailouts are expensive when compared to past corporate income tax payments of the bailout firms. We compute the number of years a bailout recipient has to pay corporate income tax to generate as much tax revenue as it received in bailouts: 135.0 years for the Paycheck Protection Program and 267.9 years for the airline bailouts. We also document a dark side of the bailouts. For many firms, the bailouts appear to be a windfall. Numerous bailout recipients made risky financial decisions, so bailing them out might induce moral hazard. Moreover, lobbying expenditures positively predict the bailout likelihood and amount.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133132555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Исследование бюджетных эффектов от изменения ставок страховых взносов (Research on Budgetary Effects of Changes in Insurance Premium Rates) Исследованиебюджетныхэффектовотизмененияставокстраховыхвзносов(研究预算的影响变化的保险费率)
Political Economy: Budget Pub Date : 2020-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3677856
S. Belev, Konstantin Vekerle, E. Matveev, E. Leonov, I. Sokolov, Olga Suchkova
{"title":"Исследование бюджетных эффектов от изменения ставок страховых взносов (Research on Budgetary Effects of Changes in Insurance Premium Rates)","authors":"S. Belev, Konstantin Vekerle, E. Matveev, E. Leonov, I. Sokolov, Olga Suchkova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3677856","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3677856","url":null,"abstract":"The paper provides an overview of theoretical and empirical studies of the various effects of labor taxation, as well as a review of international social security contribution practices. Three main effects of labor taxation change were identified: intensive margin (the change in working time), extensive margin (whether to participate in job market or not) and the effect of tax evasion. The paper also presents econometric estimation of budget effects. In the presence of high sensitivity to social security premium rates change it is advisable to reduce social security premium rates for low income groups.","PeriodicalId":127865,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Budget","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129658571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信