{"title":"A security policy for an A1 DBMS (a trusted subject)","authors":"J. Wilson","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36286","url":null,"abstract":"A security policy for a multilevel secure relational database management system (DBMS) is stated. The DBMS is implemented as a trusted subject that can be hosted on any of a variety of secure operating systems. Accordingly, the policy is stated in two parts: (1) a generic policy for the operating-system TCB (trusted computing base) layer that states requirements that any operating system must meet so that the DBMS can be hosted on it; and (2) the policy of the DBMS TCB layer. It is argued that the DBMS can be evaluated for each operating system on which it is hosted without reevaluating the underlying operating system. Rationale is given for implementing the DBMS as a trusted subject rather than using a Hinke-Schaefer architecture. The policy addresses secrecy and integrity.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116667345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A framework for expressing models of security policy","authors":"J. Dobson, J. Mcdermid","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36297","url":null,"abstract":"The authors first describe some issues that arise from the interplay between the security requirements for an integrated project support environment (IPSE) for the development of a trusted system, and the security requirements of the trusted system itself. All of these issues derive from security policy and the modeling of security policy. A framework is then presented which allows security policies to be expressed in the context of the enterprise whose needs the trusted system is intended to serve. Finally some possible applications of the framework are used to indicate how security policies affect design decision-making, security policy conflict detection, and security risk evaluation.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"223 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116165575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Statistical models of trust: TCBs vs. people","authors":"Theodore M. P. Lee","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36274","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36274","url":null,"abstract":"The processes of granting security clearances to people and accrediting trusted computer systems are compared, both informally and using preliminary mathematical models of risk probabilities. The risk models support the validity of two hypotheses that were previously merely conjectures: (1) in determining an acceptable accreditation range for a computer one need only consider the highest classification of data on it and the least-cleared person using it, (2) that under suitable conditions a cascade (combination) of two trusted systems can be trusted more than either individually. In particular, it is shown that a cascade of two (independently built) B2 systems is as good as one B3 system.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126955387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Detection of anomalous computer session activity","authors":"H. S. Vaccaro, G. Liepins","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36302","url":null,"abstract":"The authors discusses Wisdom and Sense (W&S), a computer security anomaly detection system. W&S is statistically based. It automatically generates rules from historical data and, in terms of those rules, identifies computer transactions that are at variance with historically established usage patterns. Issues addressed include how W&S generates rules from a necessarily small sample of all possible transactions, how W&S deals with inherently categorical data, and how W&S assists system security officers in their review of audit logs. Preliminary results with W&S show that the software does periodically detect anomalies of high interest even in data though to be free of such events.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126032279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Transformation of access rights","authors":"R. Sandhu","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36300","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36300","url":null,"abstract":"The author introduces the concept of transformation of access rights to unify a variety of access-control mechanisms. These mechanisms have mostly been proposed independently of each other to deal with various integrity issues. Their common foundation is abstracted in a model called transform. The formalization makes it possible to investigate the minimal features required to support transform. The relation of transform to existing access-control models is then considered. It is shown that the access-matrix model transform is outside the class of systems for which safety is known to be decidable. On the other hand it is shown that transform is an instance of the decidable cases of the schematic protection model.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126706077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Layering central authentication on existing distributed system terminal services","authors":"D. Nessett","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36303","url":null,"abstract":"An approach to the secure logon problem in distributed systems managed by a single authority is considered in which central authentication is layered onto existing terminal services. This approach suggests itself when a large installed base of computer systems that do not support central authentication already exists. Work to assess the feasibility of this approach was carried out. The results demonstrate that layering can be used in certain circumstances to provide central authentication services, although, as a result, the concomitant maintenance costs may increase. It was also determined that terminal service features are necessary so that central authentication is easily layered over existing terminal services. Recommendations are made concerning how to structure terminal services in a distributed system to support an integrated central authentication service.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131456265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A 'new' security policy model","authors":"P. Terry, S. Wiseman","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36296","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36296","url":null,"abstract":"A model of security is presented which integrates notions of confidentiality and integrity. This model has been developed to fulfil the needs of the RSRE SMITE project because existing modeling approaches proved to be inadequate. The authors introduce the model and subsequently compare and contrast it with existing approaches. Both an inductive confidentiality property and a noninductive integrity property have been modeled. To successfully utilize the second property, the authors have used an approach whereby the noninductiveness is absent in the model, but appears in proof obligations on refinement.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121990756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the cell suppression by merging technique in the lattice model of summary tables","authors":"T. Su, JiYoung Chung, G. Özsoyoglu","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36287","url":null,"abstract":"The authors investigate the suitability of the cell suppression by merging (CSM) technique as an SDB (statistical database) protection mechanism, and give various heuristic algorithms for the minimum information loss. They first revise the definition for the information loss when query probabilities are taken into account. This definition reflects the actual utilization of cells in the lattice. The authors then propose a heuristic approach to be used with the CSM technique. This approach tries to minimize the information loss by properly choosing the merging pairs. Experimental results show that, in most cases, the information loss is lower than that of the case in which the query probabilities are not considered. This indicates that the actual information loss under query probabilities is low when the CSM technique is combined with the heuristic approach. It is concluded that the CSM technique is therefore an effective protection mechanism for summary tables. It is also shown that the CSM technique is also applicable in the generalized lattice model as an effective security enforcement mechanism. The authors propose several heuristic approaches to minimize the information loss when this technique is applied.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129564777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A software engineering approach to designing trustworthy software","authors":"M. Cornwell","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36289","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36289","url":null,"abstract":"Some specific formal techniques that have proven useful in the SMMS design are examined. Attention is given to a simplified example derived from experience with the actual design. The formal techniques examined incorporate the use of a formal security model, formal specifications of module interfaces, and proofs of correspondence between the two. The use of a proof-driven design approach ensured that: (1) security design proceeded in an orderly fashion; (2) the system has high security assurance; (3) security flaws were exposed early in the design; (4) the system is more amenable to change; and (5) specific security responsibilities are traceable to individual components of the system.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124350920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tea and I: an allergy (computer security)","authors":"M. Schaefer, W. Barker, C. Pfleeger","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36292","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36292","url":null,"abstract":"Problems associated with the application of the connectivity approach to computer system security are addressed. The failure of trusted connectivity to protect computer systems is indicated. The work is presented in the form of an allergy.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131087409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}