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Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy最新文献

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Policy vs. mechanism in the Secure TUNIS operating system 安全突尼斯操作系统中的策略与机制
Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1989-05-01 DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36280
Gideon Grenier, R. Holt, M. Funkenhauser
{"title":"Policy vs. mechanism in the Secure TUNIS operating system","authors":"Gideon Grenier, R. Holt, M. Funkenhauser","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36280","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36280","url":null,"abstract":"The trusted computing base (TCB) of a secure operating system can have its security policy enforced by a small, provably correct security manager. The design of the Secure TUNIS (Toronto University system) operating system divides security concerns into policy (implemented by its security manager) and mechanism (implemented by the rest of the operating system). It is shown that this separation is a key concept in allowing Secure TUNIS to be validated, due to the isolation of security critical code and data in a small module. This design provides the basis of an implementation of a POSIX (Unix) kernel that can be certified at security levels of B3 and above. The security policy, as implemented by Secure TUNIS, is given.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121059439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Security issues in policy routing 策略路由中的安全问题
Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1989-05-01 DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36293
D. Estrin, G. Tsudik
{"title":"Security issues in policy routing","authors":"D. Estrin, G. Tsudik","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36293","url":null,"abstract":"Most routing protocols, including proposed policy routing protocols, focus on environments where detection of an attack after it has taken place is sufficient. The authors explore the design of policy routing mechanisms for sensitive environments where more aggressive preventative measures are mandated. In particular, they detail the design of four secure protocol versions that prevent abuse by cryptographic checks of data integrity. They analyze and compare these schemes in terms of their prepacket processing overhead. It is concluded that preventative security is feasible, although the overhead cost is quite high. Consequently, it is critical that prevention-based schemes coexist with detection-based schemes.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"47 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130079067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 19
A model for secure information flow 安全信息流模型
Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1989-05-01 DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36299
S. Foley
{"title":"A model for secure information flow","authors":"S. Foley","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36299","url":null,"abstract":"A model that characterizes systems that restrict information flow is proposed. The model, called the confinement model, provides greater flexibility in the binding of entities to their security classes than the current static case. A consequence of the nature of security class binding in the confinement model is its ability to enforce nontransitive information-flow policies. A framework of information-flow policies is defined which forms a distributive lattice under operations for policy ordering and combination. It is shown that a state-based MAC (mandatory access) version of the confinement model is the same as a traditional Bell and LaPadula MAC model, except that the confinement model includes a special rule on dynamic class change.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"213 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117320133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 43
The hierarchical model of distributed system security 分布式系统安全的层次模型
Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1989-05-01 DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36294
G. Benson, W. Appelbe, I. Akyildiz
{"title":"The hierarchical model of distributed system security","authors":"G. Benson, W. Appelbe, I. Akyildiz","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36294","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36294","url":null,"abstract":"A description is given of the hierarchical model (HM), an access matrix-based model used to define nondisclosure in distributed multilevel secure applications such as secure file systems, secure switches, and secure upgrade downgrade facilities. The HM explicitly encodes access rights, synchronization primitives, and indirection in its state matrix. Serializability of concurrent commands is formally defined in terms of the HM syntactic model of computation. HM serializability conditions are independent of the semantic security predicate. Finally, an example that illustrates the HM is presented.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132166117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
On the derivation of secure components 关于安全组件的推导
Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1989-05-01 DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36298
J. Jacob
{"title":"On the derivation of secure components","authors":"J. Jacob","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36298","url":null,"abstract":"The author discusses the problems in deriving a system from its specification when that specification includes simple trace-based information-flow security properties as well as safety properties. He presents two fundamental theorems of information-flow security which describe the inherent difficulties of deriving secure implementations and considers the implications of these results. It is concluded that it is dangerous to extrapolate from success in the case of two to the case of many. Results proved about systems with just low- and high-access users may not extend easily to full lattices.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126416271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 92
Network security: the parts of the sum 网络安全:各部分之和
Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1989-05-01 DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36273
Stephen T. Walker
{"title":"Network security: the parts of the sum","authors":"Stephen T. Walker","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36273","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36273","url":null,"abstract":"Attention is given to the three basic elements of network security, i.e. encryption, network protocols, and trusted computer system protocols. It is noted that each of these measures is needed to achieve overall network security and yet frequently the advocates of individual measures ignore the others for a variety of technical and/or doctrinal reasons. The author attempts to convey the importance of applying these measures in proper perspective to achieve true network security. Examples of problems in network security are discussed, including personal-computer encryption services, secure data network issues, and COMSEC procurements.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125013052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16
A formal model for Unix setuid Unix setuid的正式模型
Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1989-05-01 DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36279
T. Levin, S. J. Padilla, C. Irvine
{"title":"A formal model for Unix setuid","authors":"T. Levin, S. J. Padilla, C. Irvine","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36279","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36279","url":null,"abstract":"The Unix setuid (set user identification) mechanism is described in the context of the GEMSOS architecture. Motivation for modeling setuid is given, and modeling and policy requirements for the control of the setuid mechanism are presented. The GEMSOS formal security policy model is compared with the Bell and LaPadula model. The Bell and LaPadula model is shown not to admit the actions of a setuid mechanism. Features of the GEMSOS DAC (discretionary access control) model are described that represent the actions of the Unix setuid mechanism while limiting their negative effect on the DAC policy.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123068051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Access meditation in a message passing kernel 在消息传递内核中访问冥想
Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1989-05-01 DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36278
M. Branstad, H. Tajalli, F. Mayer, D. Dalva
{"title":"Access meditation in a message passing kernel","authors":"M. Branstad, H. Tajalli, F. Mayer, D. Dalva","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36278","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36278","url":null,"abstract":"The authors describe how mandatory and discretionary access mediation are performed in the trusted mach (TMach) kernel, a system that uses message passing as its primary means of communication both between tasks and with the kernel. As a consequence, control of interprocess communication in the TMach kernel is a central concern whereas controlled sharing of segments is the central focus in trusted systems with more traditional architectures. The TMach kernel is not a complete trusted system. It is a reference monitor of basic system abstractions, providing a small, well-controlled base on which the rest of a trusted computing base and operating system can be constructed. The TMach kernel provides simple and elegant mandatory access control for port access rights. The TMach kernel's MAC (mandatory access control) mechanisms clearly control the flow of information according to a mandatory security policy based on a Bell and La Padula model. DAC (discretionary access control) mechanisms are provided in the TMach kernel to implement TCSEC (trusted computer system evaluation criteria) requirements and to support DAC in servers to be built on the kernel.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129829903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 38
Using narrowing in the analysis of key management protocols 在密钥管理协议的分析中使用窄化
Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1989-05-01 DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36288
C. Meadows
{"title":"Using narrowing in the analysis of key management protocols","authors":"C. Meadows","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36288","url":null,"abstract":"The author develops methods for analyzing cryptographic protocols using techniques developed for the solutions of equations in a term rewriting system. In particular, she describes a model of a class of cryptographic protocols and possible attacks on those protocols as term rewriting systems. She also describes a software tool based on the narrowing algorithm that can be used in the analysis of such protocols. Finally, she uses the tool in the analysis of a simple protocol and outlines ways in which the tool might be improved to provide greater assistance in the analysis of more complex protocols.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130991709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 68
The Chinese Wall security policy 中国长城安全政策
Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Pub Date : 1989-05-01 DOI: 10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36295
David F.C. Brewer, Michael J. Nash
{"title":"The Chinese Wall security policy","authors":"David F.C. Brewer, Michael J. Nash","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36295","url":null,"abstract":"The authors explore a commercial security policy (the Chinese Wall) which represents the behavior required of those persons who perform corporate analysis for financial institutions. It can be distinguished from Bell-LaPadula-like policies by the way that a user's permitted accesses are constrained by the history of his previous accesses. It is shown that the formal representation of the policy correctly permits a market analyst to talk to any corporation which does not create a conflict of interest with previous assignments. The Chinese Wall policy combines commercial discretion with legally enforceable mandatory controls. It is required in the operation of many financial services organizations; the authors conclude that it is, therefore, perhaps as significant to the financial world as Bell-LaPadula's policies are to the military.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129140840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1045
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