{"title":"The incorporation of multi-level IPC into Unix","authors":"Thomas J. Parenty","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36281","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36281","url":null,"abstract":"The author discusses the design, interface, and implementation issues that need to be addressed for Unix to support multilevel synchronized file access, pipes (FIFOs), messages, and semaphores. It is shown that, by changing some of Unix's underlying mechanisms and by making additions to system calls and the run-time library, it is possible architecturally to support more flexible sharing and communication. This increased sharing simplifies the building of multilevel applications, both trusted and untrusted, to run on top of Unix.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128260789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A secure identity-based capability system","authors":"L. Gong","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36277","url":null,"abstract":"The author presents the design of an identity-based capability protection system called ICAP, which is aimed at a distributed system in a network environment. The semantics of traditional capabilities are modified to incorporate subject identities. This enables the monitoring, mediating, and recording of capability propagations to enforce security policies. It also supports administrative activities such as traceability. The author has developed an exception-list approach to achieve rapid revocation and the idea of capability propagation trees for complete revocation. Compared with existing capability system designs, ICAP requires much less storage and has the potential of lower cost and better real-time performance. The author proposes to expand R.Y. Kain and C.E. Landwehr's (1987) design taxonomy of capability-based systems to cover a wider range of designs.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"6 11","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113946437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"New methods for immediate revocation","authors":"Paul A. Karger","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36276","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36276","url":null,"abstract":"The author introduces two techniques for immediate revocation of access rights: revocation with event counts and revocation by chaining. The two algorithms are appropriate for shared and unshared page tables, respectively, and can be used for both access control list and capability-based systems. The proposed techniques are much simpler to implement and more efficient in operation than previous revocation techniques and are therefore more appropriate for implementation in a security kernel, where simplicity of design is crucial. Furthermore, both techniques are particularly appropriate for RISC (reduced-instruction-set computer) implementations where translation buffer misses are handled in software. However, the techniques are very dependent on the particular style of memory management available on the underlying hardware. It is concluded that, with these techniques, user requirements for immediate revocation can be easily met in any operating system on security kernel design.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":126792,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121711027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}