2019 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)最新文献

Ensuring the Safe and Secure Operation of Electronic Control Units in Road Vehicles 确保道路车辆电子控制单元的安全可靠运行

2019 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) Pub Date : 2019-05-23 DOI: 10.1109/SPW.2019.00032

Florian Kohnhäuser, Dominik Püllen, S. Katzenbeisser

{"title":"Ensuring the Safe and Secure Operation of Electronic Control Units in Road Vehicles","authors":"Florian Kohnhäuser, Dominik Püllen, S. Katzenbeisser","doi":"10.1109/SPW.2019.00032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2019.00032","url":null,"abstract":"With the increasing connectivity and complexity of road vehicles, security heavily impacts the safety of vehicles. In fact, researchers demonstrated that the lack of security in vehicles can lead to dangerous and even life-threatening situations. A threat that has been insufficiently addressed in existing vehicular security solutions are software attacks, in which the adversary compromises the software of Electronic Control Units (ECUs). A promising technique to defend against software attacks is remote attestation, as it enables to detect compromised devices. This paper presents a novel attestation scheme that ensures the software integrity of ECUs to warrant the vehicle's safety. In our scheme, a trusted master ECU verifies the integrity of all safety-critical ECUs and refuses to start the engine in case an untrustworthy, and hence, unsafe state is detected. As modern vehicles are highly heterogeneous system of systems, we propose two different attestation techniques that enable the attestation of simple ECUs, such as basic sensors or actuators, as well as advanced, more complex ECUs like sensor fusion systems. We implement our attestation scheme on an exemplary automotive network that incorporates CAN and Ethernet, and show that our solution imposes an imperceptible overhead for passengers.","PeriodicalId":125351,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128824578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

SwitchMan: An Easy-to-Use Approach to Secure User Input and Output 开关人:一个易于使用的方法，以确保用户输入和输出

2019 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) Pub Date : 2019-05-19 DOI: 10.1109/SPW.2019.00029

Shengbao Zheng, Zhenyu Zhou, Heyi Tang, Xiaowei Yang

{"title":"SwitchMan: An Easy-to-Use Approach to Secure User Input and Output","authors":"Shengbao Zheng, Zhenyu Zhou, Heyi Tang, Xiaowei Yang","doi":"10.1109/SPW.2019.00029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2019.00029","url":null,"abstract":"Modern operating systems for personal computers (including Linux, MAC, and Windows) provide user-level APIs for an application to access the I/O paths of another application. This design facilitates information sharing between applications, enabling applications such as screenshots. However, it also enables user-level malware to log a user's keystrokes or scrape a user's screen output. In this work, we explore a design called SwitchMan to protect a user's I/O paths against user-level malware attacks. SwitchMan assigns each user with two accounts: a regular one for normal operations and a protected one for inputting and outputting sensitive data. Each user account runs under a separate virtual terminal. Malware running under a user's regular account cannot access sensitive input/output under a user's protected account. At the heart of SwitchMan lies a secure protocol that enables automatic account switching when an application requires sensitive input/output from a user. Our performance evaluation shows that SwitchMan adds acceptable performance overhead. Our security and usability analysis suggests that SwitchMan achieves a better tradeoff between security and usability than existing solutions.","PeriodicalId":125351,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129486105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A Smörgåsbord of Typos: Exploring International Keyboard Layout Typosquatting 打字错误的Smörgåsbord:探索国际键盘布局排字

2019 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) Pub Date : 2019-05-19 DOI: 10.1109/SPW.2019.00043

V. Pochat, Tom van Goethem, W. Joosen

{"title":"A Smörgåsbord of Typos: Exploring International Keyboard Layout Typosquatting","authors":"V. Pochat, Tom van Goethem, W. Joosen","doi":"10.1109/SPW.2019.00043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2019.00043","url":null,"abstract":"Typosquatting is the malicious practice of registering domains that result from typos made when users try to visit popular domains. Previous works have only considered the US English keyboard layout, but of course other layouts are widely used around the world. In this paper, we uncover how typosquatters are also targeting communities that use these other layouts by examining typo domains on non-US English keyboards for 100 000 popular domains. We find that German users are the most targeted, with over 15 000 registered typo domains. Companies such as Equifax and Amazon have defensively registered such domains but are often incomplete; moreover, other major companies ignore them altogether and allow malicious actors to capitalize on their brand. Parking domains or advertising them for sale remains the most popular monetization strategy of squatters on at least 40% of registered domains, but we also see more harmful practices, such as a scam website that spoofs a local newspaper. This proves that domain squatters also consider typos on non-US English keyboards to be valuable, and that companies should be more alert in claiming these domains.","PeriodicalId":125351,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132104242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 8

Feasibility of a Keystroke Timing Attack on Search Engines with Autocomplete 基于自动补全的搜索引擎击键定时攻击的可行性

2019 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) Pub Date : 2019-05-19 DOI: 10.1109/SPW.2019.00047

John V. Monaco

引用次数: 6

Characterizing Vulnerability of DNS AXFR Transfers with Global-Scale Scanning 基于全局扫描的DNS AXFR传输漏洞分析

2019 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) Pub Date : 2019-05-19 DOI: 10.1109/SPW.2019.00044

Marcin Skwarek, Maciej Korczyński, W. Mazurczyk, A. Duda

引用次数: 12

Deep in the Dark - Deep Learning-Based Malware Traffic Detection Without Expert Knowledge 在黑暗深处——基于深度学习的恶意软件流量检测，无需专家知识

2019 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) Pub Date : 2019-05-19 DOI: 10.1109/SPW.2019.00019

Gonzalo Marín, P. Casas, G. Capdehourat

{"title":"Deep in the Dark - Deep Learning-Based Malware Traffic Detection Without Expert Knowledge","authors":"Gonzalo Marín, P. Casas, G. Capdehourat","doi":"10.1109/SPW.2019.00019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2019.00019","url":null,"abstract":"With the ever-growing occurrence of networking attacks, robust network security systems are essential to prevent and mitigate their harming effects. In recent years, machine learning-based systems have gain popularity for network security applications, usually considering the application of shallow models, where a set of expert handcrafted features are needed to pre-process the data before training. The main problem with this approach is that handcrafted features can fail to perform well given different kinds of scenarios and problems. Deep Learning models can solve this kind of issues using their ability to learn feature representations from input raw or basic, non-processed data. In this paper we explore the power of deep learning models on the specific problem of detection and classification of malware network traffic, using different representations for the input data. As a major advantage as compared to the state of the art, we consider raw measurements coming directly from the stream of monitored bytes as the input to the proposed models, and evaluate different raw-traffic feature representations, including packet and flow-level ones. Our results suggest that deep learning models can better capture the underlying statistics of malicious traffic as compared to classical, shallow-like models, even while operating in the dark, i.e., without any sort of expert handcrafted inputs.","PeriodicalId":125351,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132226279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 22

A Study of Vulnerability Analysis of Popular Smart Devices Through Their Companion Apps 基于智能设备配套应用的智能设备漏洞分析研究

2019 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) Pub Date : 2019-05-19 DOI: 10.1109/SPW.2019.00042

Davino Mauro Junior, L. Melo, Hao Lu, Marcelo d’Amorim, A. Prakash

{"title":"A Study of Vulnerability Analysis of Popular Smart Devices Through Their Companion Apps","authors":"Davino Mauro Junior, L. Melo, Hao Lu, Marcelo d’Amorim, A. Prakash","doi":"10.1109/SPW.2019.00042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2019.00042","url":null,"abstract":"Security of Internet of Things (IoT) devices is a well-known concern as these devices come in increasing use in homes and commercial environments. To better understand the extent to which companies take security of the IoT devices seriously and the methods they use to secure them, this paper presents findings from a security analysis of 96 top-selling WiFi IoT devices on Amazon. We found that we could carry out a significant portion of the analysis by first analyzing the code of Android companion apps responsible for controlling the devices. An interesting finding was that these devices used only 32 unique companion apps; we found instances of devices from same as well as different brands sharing the same app, significantly reducing our work. We analyzed the code of these companion apps to understand how they communicated with the devices and the security of that communication. We found security problems to be widespread: 50% of the apps corresponding to 38% of the devices did not use proper encryption techniques; some even used well-known weak ciphers such as Caesar cipher. We also purchased 5 devices and confirmed the vulnerabilities found with exploits. In some cases, we were able to bypass the pairing process and still control the device. Finally, we comment on technical and non-technical lessons learned from the study that have security implications.","PeriodicalId":125351,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125624245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 8

Defending Against Neural Network Model Stealing Attacks Using Deceptive Perturbations 利用欺骗性摄动防御神经网络模型窃取攻击

2019 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) Pub Date : 2019-05-19 DOI: 10.1109/SPW.2019.00020

Taesung Lee, Ben Edwards, Ian Molloy, D. Su

{"title":"Defending Against Neural Network Model Stealing Attacks Using Deceptive Perturbations","authors":"Taesung Lee, Ben Edwards, Ian Molloy, D. Su","doi":"10.1109/SPW.2019.00020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2019.00020","url":null,"abstract":"Machine learning architectures are readily available, but obtaining the high quality labeled data for training is costly. Pre-trained models available as cloud services can be used to generate this costly labeled data, and would allow an attacker to replicate trained models, effectively stealing them. Limiting the information provided by cloud based models by omitting class probabilities has been proposed as a means of protection but significantly impacts the utility of the models. In this work, we illustrate how cloud based models can still provide useful class probability information for users, while significantly limiting the ability of an adversary to steal the model. Our defense perturbs the model's final activation layer, slightly altering the output probabilities. This forces the adversary to discard the class probabilities, requiring significantly more queries before they can train a model with comparable performance. We evaluate our defense under diverse scenarios and defense aware attacks. Our evaluation shows our defense can degrade the accuracy of the stolen model at least 20%, or increase the number of queries required by an adversary 64 fold, all with a negligible decrease in the protected model accuracy.","PeriodicalId":125351,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)","volume":"128 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123315902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 64

Demo: An Emulator-Based Active Protection System Against IoT Malware 演示:基于模拟器的物联网恶意软件主动防护系统

2019 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) Pub Date : 2019-05-19 DOI: 10.1109/SPW.2019.00038

Shin-Ming Cheng, Shengfu Ma

引用次数: 1

SpyCon: Adaptation Based Spyware in Human-in-the-Loop IoT SpyCon:人在环物联网中基于适应的间谍软件

2019 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) Pub Date : 2019-05-19 DOI: 10.1109/SPW.2019.00039

Salma Elmalaki, Bo-Jhang Ho, M. Alzantot, Yasser Shoukry, M. Srivastava

引用次数: 9