基于智能设备配套应用的智能设备漏洞分析研究

Davino Mauro Junior, L. Melo, Hao Lu, Marcelo d’Amorim, A. Prakash
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引用次数: 8

摘要

物联网(IoT)设备的安全性是一个众所周知的问题,因为这些设备在家庭和商业环境中的使用越来越多。为了更好地了解公司对物联网设备安全的重视程度以及他们使用的保护方法,本文介绍了对亚马逊上96个最畅销的WiFi物联网设备的安全分析结果。我们发现,我们可以通过首先分析负责控制设备的Android配套应用的代码来进行很大一部分分析。一个有趣的发现是,这些设备只使用32个独特的配套应用;我们发现来自同一品牌和不同品牌的设备共享同一款应用,这大大减少了我们的工作量。我们分析了这些配套应用程序的代码,以了解它们如何与设备通信以及通信的安全性。我们发现安全问题很普遍:38%的设备对应的50%的应用程序没有使用适当的加密技术;有些人甚至使用了众所周知的弱密码,如凯撒密码。我们还购买了5台设备,并确认了发现的漏洞。在某些情况下,我们能够绕过配对过程,仍然控制设备。最后,我们对从具有安全含义的研究中获得的技术和非技术经验教训进行了评论。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Study of Vulnerability Analysis of Popular Smart Devices Through Their Companion Apps
Security of Internet of Things (IoT) devices is a well-known concern as these devices come in increasing use in homes and commercial environments. To better understand the extent to which companies take security of the IoT devices seriously and the methods they use to secure them, this paper presents findings from a security analysis of 96 top-selling WiFi IoT devices on Amazon. We found that we could carry out a significant portion of the analysis by first analyzing the code of Android companion apps responsible for controlling the devices. An interesting finding was that these devices used only 32 unique companion apps; we found instances of devices from same as well as different brands sharing the same app, significantly reducing our work. We analyzed the code of these companion apps to understand how they communicated with the devices and the security of that communication. We found security problems to be widespread: 50% of the apps corresponding to 38% of the devices did not use proper encryption techniques; some even used well-known weak ciphers such as Caesar cipher. We also purchased 5 devices and confirmed the vulnerabilities found with exploits. In some cases, we were able to bypass the pairing process and still control the device. Finally, we comment on technical and non-technical lessons learned from the study that have security implications.
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