{"title":"Bayesian Games with Intentions","authors":"Adam Bjorndahl, Joseph Y. Halpern, R. Pass","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.215.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.215.8","url":null,"abstract":"We show that standard Bayesian games cannot represent the full spectrum of belief-dependent preferences. However, by introducing a fundamental distinction between intended and actual strategies, we remove this limitation. We define Bayesian games with intentions, generalizing both Bayesian games and psychological games, and prove that Nash equilibria in psychological games correspond to a special class of equilibria as defined in our setting.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"129 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123249171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The optimality of coarse categories in decision-making and information storage","authors":"Michael Mandler","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.215.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.215.16","url":null,"abstract":"An agent who lacks preferences and instead makes decisions using criteria that are costly to create should select efficient sets of criteria, where the cost of making a given number of choice distinctions is minimized. Under mild conditions, efficiency requires that binary criteria with only two categories per criterion are chosen. When applied to the problem of determining the optimal number of digits in an information storage device, this result implies that binary digits (bits) are the efficient solution, even when the marginal cost of using additional digits declines rapidly to 0. This short paper pays particular attention to the symmetry conditions entailed when sets of criteria are efficient.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"370 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122069595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Dynamic Epistemic Framework for Conformant Planning","authors":"Quan Yu, Yanjun Li, Yanjing Wang","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.215.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.215.21","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we introduce a lightweight dynamic epistemic logical framework for automated planning under initial uncertainty. We reduce plan verification and conformant planning to model checking problems of our logic. We show that the model checking problem of the iteration-free fragment is PSPACE-complete. By using two non-standard (but equivalent) semantics, we give novel model checking algorithms to the full language and the iteration-free language.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126634323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Preference at First Sight","authors":"Chanjuan Liu","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.215.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.215.15","url":null,"abstract":"We consider decision-making and game scenarios in which an agent is limited by his/her computational ability to foresee all the available moves towards the future - that is, we study scenarios with short sight. We focus on how short sight affects the logical properties of decision making in multi-agent settings. We start with single-agent sequential decision making (SSDM) processes, modeling them by a new structure of \"preference-sight trees\". Using this model, we first explore the relation between a new natural solution concept of Sight-Compatible Backward Induction (SCBI) and the histories produced by classical Backward Induction (BI). In particular, we find necessary and sufficient conditions for the two analyses to be equivalent. Next, we study whether larger sight always contributes to better outcomes. Then we develop a simple logical special-purpose language to formally express some key properties of our preference-sight models. Lastly, we show how short-sight SSDM scenarios call for substantial enrichments of existing fixed-point logics that have been developed for the classical BI solution concept. We also discuss changes in earlier modal logics expressing \"surface reasoning\" about best actions in the presence of short sight. Our analysis may point the way to logical and computational analysis of more realistic game models.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114763515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Problem of Analogical Inference in Inductive Logic","authors":"Simon M. Huttegger","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.215.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.215.1","url":null,"abstract":"We consider one problem that was largely left open by Rudolf Carnap in his work on inductive logic, the problem of analogical inference. After discussing some previous attempts to solve this problem, we propose a new solution that is based on the ideas of Bruno de Finetti on probabilistic symmetries. We explain how our new inductive logic can be developed within the Carnapian paradigm of inductive logic-deriving an inductive rule from a set of simple postulates about the observational process-and discuss some of its properties.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"180 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123190934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Human-Agent Decision-making: Combining Theory and Practice","authors":"Sarit Kraus","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.215.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.215.2","url":null,"abstract":"Extensive work has been conducted both in game theory and logic to model strategic interaction. An important question is whether we can use these theories to design agents for interacting with people? On the one hand, they provide a formal design specification for agent strategies. On the other hand, people do not necessarily adhere to playing in accordance with these strategies, and their behavior is affected by a multitude of social and psychological factors. In this paper we will consider the question of whether strategies implied by theories of strategic behavior can be used by automated agents that interact proficiently with people. We will focus on automated agents that we built that need to interact with people in two negotiation settings: bargaining and deliberation. For bargaining we will study game-theory based equilibrium agents and for argumentation we will discuss logic-based argumentation theory. We will also consider security games and persuasion games and will discuss the benefits of using equilibrium based agents.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126980030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ceteris paribus logic in counterfactual reasoning","authors":"P. Girard, M. Triplett","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.215.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.215.13","url":null,"abstract":"The semantics for counterfactuals due to David Lewis has been challenged on the basis of unlikely, or impossible, events. Such events may skew a given similarity order in favour of those possible worlds which exhibit them. By updating the relational structure of a model according to a ceteris paribus clause one forces out, in a natural manner, those possible worlds which do not satisfy the requirements of the clause. We develop a ceteris paribus logic for counterfactual reasoning capable of performing such actions, and offer several alternative (relaxed) interpretations of ceteris paribus. We apply this framework in a way which allows us to reason counterfactually without having our similarity order skewed by unlikely events. This continues the investigation of formal ceteris paribus reasoning, which has previously been applied to preferences, logics of game forms, and questions in decision-making, among other areas.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132277510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Parameterized Complexity Results for a Model of Theory of Mind Based on Dynamic Epistemic Logic","authors":"Iris van de Pol, I. Rooij, Jakub Szymanik","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.215.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.215.18","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we introduce a computational-level model of theory of mind (ToM) based on dynamic epistemic logic (DEL), and we analyze its computational complexity. The model is a special case of DEL model checking. We provide a parameterized complexity analysis, considering several aspects of DEL (e.g., number of agents, size of preconditions, etc.) as parameters. We show that model checking for DEL is PSPACE-hard, also when restricted to single-pointed models and S5 relations, thereby solving an open problem in the literature. Our approach is aimed at formalizing current intractability claims in the cognitive science literature regarding computational models of ToM.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129140696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epistemic Protocols for Distributed Gossiping","authors":"K. Apt, Davide Grossi, W. Hoek","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.215.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.215.5","url":null,"abstract":"Gossip protocols aim at arriving, by means of point-to-point or group communications, at a situation in which all the agents know each other's secrets. We consider distributed gossip protocols which are expressed by means of epistemic logic. We provide an operational semantics of such protocols and set up an appropriate framework to argue about their correctness. Then we analyze specific protocols for complete graphs and for directed rings.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125495116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Coordination Games on Directed Graphs","authors":"K. Apt, Sunil Simon, D. Wojtczak","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.215.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.215.6","url":null,"abstract":"We study natural strategic games on directed graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in the absence of globally common strategies. We show that these games do not need to have a pure Nash equilibrium and that the problem of determining their existence is NP-complete. The same holds for strong equilibria. We also exhibit some classes of games for which strong equilibria exist and prove that a strong equilibrium can then be found in linear time.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116320372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}