{"title":"有向图上的协调博弈","authors":"K. Apt, Sunil Simon, D. Wojtczak","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.215.6","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study natural strategic games on directed graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in the absence of globally common strategies. We show that these games do not need to have a pure Nash equilibrium and that the problem of determining their existence is NP-complete. The same holds for strong equilibria. We also exhibit some classes of games for which strong equilibria exist and prove that a strong equilibrium can then be found in linear time.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"14","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Coordination Games on Directed Graphs\",\"authors\":\"K. Apt, Sunil Simon, D. Wojtczak\",\"doi\":\"10.4204/EPTCS.215.6\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study natural strategic games on directed graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in the absence of globally common strategies. We show that these games do not need to have a pure Nash equilibrium and that the problem of determining their existence is NP-complete. The same holds for strong equilibria. We also exhibit some classes of games for which strong equilibria exist and prove that a strong equilibrium can then be found in linear time.\",\"PeriodicalId\":118894,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge\",\"volume\":\"96 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-02-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"14\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.215.6\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.215.6","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We study natural strategic games on directed graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in the absence of globally common strategies. We show that these games do not need to have a pure Nash equilibrium and that the problem of determining their existence is NP-complete. The same holds for strong equilibria. We also exhibit some classes of games for which strong equilibria exist and prove that a strong equilibrium can then be found in linear time.
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