ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking最新文献_第3页

Policy Uncertainty in the Scandinavian Countries 斯堪的纳维亚国家的政策不确定性

ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Pub Date : 2019-12-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3515202

Lars Erik Kleiven, Emil Johan Verlo Ifwarsson, L. Sendstad

{"title":"Policy Uncertainty in the Scandinavian Countries","authors":"Lars Erik Kleiven, Emil Johan Verlo Ifwarsson, L. Sendstad","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3515202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3515202","url":null,"abstract":"Globalization drives the need to properly understand policy uncertainty and how it affects both the economy in general and business conditions. To systematically investigate the effect of policy uncertainty on small, open economies, we develop a policy uncertainty index based on newspaper content for each of the three Scandinavian countries; Norway, Denmark and Sweden. We show how these indices capture important historical events, both local events such as referendums and certain general elections, but also global events such as financial crises. Our narrative validation provides evidence that the three indices are good measures of policy uncertainty. Further, we compare historical policy uncertainty in the Scandinavian countries to a similar index for the US, before analysing the effect of both local and US policy uncertainty on the Scandinavian economies. Our findings indicate that increased policy uncertainty both at home and in the US leads to economic contraction, a significant decline in stock markets and a long-lasting reduction in the Scandinavian countries’ Purchasing Managers’ Index. These results can be highly relevant for anyone seeking to predict economic indicators in Scandinavia, or other small, open economies. Similarly, our findings can help to better understand how companies react to changes in policy uncertainty.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133989878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Marginal Benefits? Electoral Geography and Economic Outcomes 边际效益?选举地理与经济结果

ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Pub Date : 2019-10-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3498694

Chris Wokker

引用次数: 0

Choosing Your Pond: A Structural Model of Political Power Sharing 选择你的池塘:政治权力分享的结构模型

ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Pub Date : 2019-10-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3467761

Selcen Çakır

引用次数: 1

シャープレイ・シュービック投票力指数に基づく政党の最適規模 (The Optimal Size of a Political Party Based on the Shapley-Shubik Power Index) 夏普丽·舒比克基于投票力指数的政党最优规模(The Optimal Size of a Political Party Based on The Shapley-Shubik)power index)

ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Pub Date : 2019-10-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3466332

Yuuki Maruyama

{"title":"シャープレイ・シュービック投票力指数に基づく政党の最適規模 (The Optimal Size of a Political Party Based on the Shapley-Shubik Power Index)","authors":"Yuuki Maruyama","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3466332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3466332","url":null,"abstract":"Japanese Abstract: 議会における政党のシャープレイ・シュービック投票力指数（SSPI）を、その党へ投票した国民の人数で割った値を、一人当たりシャープレイ・シュービック投票力指数（SSPIPP）と定義する。その党に投票した人にとってSSPIPPは、自分が持つ政治への影響力の大きさとみなせる。今回の理論において、SSPIPPを最大化する政党の最適規模を算出し、可決により多くの賛成票を要求する議会ほどこの最適規模のサイズが低下することを証明する。また、この分析に基づき、可決にsupermajorityの賛成を必要とする国は小党分立状態が固定化しやすいことが示唆される。 English Abstract: I define Shapley-Shubik Power Index per Person (SSPIPP) as the ratio of a political party's Shapley-Shubik Power Index in a parliament to the number of people who voted for the party. SSPIPP can be regarded as the political power each of them has. I calculate the optimal size of a political party that maximizes SSPIPP, and it shows that the more approval votes a parliament requires to pass bills, the smaller the optimal party size becomes. It also shows that in countries that require supermajority approval vote to pass bills, party system fragmentation tends to become permanent.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126340669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Social Trust and Electoral Populism: Explaining the Quality of Government 社会信任与选举民粹主义:政府质量的解释

ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Pub Date : 2019-09-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3460914

Philip Keefer, Carlos Scartascini, Razvan Vlaicu

{"title":"Social Trust and Electoral Populism: Explaining the Quality of Government","authors":"Philip Keefer, Carlos Scartascini, Razvan Vlaicu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3460914","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3460914","url":null,"abstract":"Voters would be better off if they removed politicians offering low-quality government by pursuing populist policies and re-elected those who improved government quality with sustainable policies. In many political contexts, including those with free and fair elections, voters do the opposite. Low social trust can account for this paradox: voters must act collectively to shape political incentives, but low trust among voters is an obstacle to collective action. If every voter believes that fellow voters will accept particularistic benefits from poorly performing governments that keep them from voting against those governments, no voter has an incentive to select politicians who promise high-quality government. By the same logic, low social trust prevents voters from sanctioning politicians who renege on their promises. Frequent reneging on campaign promises, in turn, leads voters to hold low political trust. Low quality government, and in particular populism, emerge as optimal electoral strategies of political candidates in this environment. We analyze new survey data from 5,800 respondents in seven Latin American countries that provides support for a novel argument about populism and the quality of government: voters who express low trust are significantly more likely to prefer populist policies that reflect a low quality of government.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115300794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

An Experiment in Candidate Selection 候选人选择的实验

ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Pub Date : 2019-08-01 DOI: 10.3386/w26160

K. Casey, A. B. Kamara, N. Meriggi

引用次数: 15

Double Implementation without No-Veto-Power 没有否决权的双重执行

ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Pub Date : 2019-07-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3423931

Makoto Hagiwara

引用次数: 1

Economic Distress and Support for Radical Right Parties - Evidence from Sweden 经济困境和对激进右翼政党的支持——来自瑞典的证据

ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Pub Date : 2019-07-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3160480

Sirus H. Dehdari

引用次数: 30

Proxy Advisory Firms: The Economics of Selling Information to Voters

ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Pub Date : 2019-05-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2757597

A. Malenko, Nadya Malenko

引用次数: 61

The Economic Analysis of Populism. A Selective Review of the Literature 民粹主义的经济分析。文献的选择性回顾

ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Pub Date : 2019-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3421752

Emilio Ocampo

{"title":"The Economic Analysis of Populism. A Selective Review of the Literature","authors":"Emilio Ocampo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3421752","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3421752","url":null,"abstract":"Economic analysis is essential to the understanding of the rise and fall of populism. The conceptual and analytical framework of economics to the study of populism is still in its infancy, but great advances have been made in recent years. This paper reviews some key contributions behind this progress. When analyzing populism, economists face two methodological hurdles: lack of consensus and clarity about its definition and reconciling the populist vote with voter rationality. The former has plagued sociologists and political scientists for decades. As to the latter, it raises a conundrum: if populist policies are detrimental to economic growth, as most economists agree, the vote for a populist candidate suggests some irrationality or inefficiency in the political markets. But accepting that individuals are irrational when making political decisions, would imply that they are irrational when making economic decisions unless, of course, there is something fundamentally different about political markets. The works reviewed in this paper propose alternative approaches to address these issues. The most promising line of research in the economic analysis of populism incorporates and expands concepts developed by academics in other social sciences such as political theory, sociology, history and social psychology.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130789875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6