ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking最新文献_第10页

Political Sentiment and Predictable Returns 政治情绪和可预测的回报

ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Pub Date : 2016-02-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2169360

Jawad M. Addoum, Alok Kumar

引用次数: 95

Alliance-Building to Influence the EU: Measuring the Geography of Mutual Support 联盟建设对欧盟的影响:相互支持的地理测量

ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Pub Date : 2016-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2828116

Marco Fantini, Klaas Staal

引用次数: 0

Incumbents' Performance and Political Polarization 现任政绩与政治两极分化

ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Pub Date : 2016-01-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2721634

M. Dodlova, Galina Zudenkova

引用次数: 1

The Process of Electoral Reform in Canada: Democratic and Constitutional Constraints 加拿大选举改革进程:民主与宪法制约

ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Pub Date : 2016-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2831198

Yasmin Dawood

{"title":"The Process of Electoral Reform in Canada: Democratic and Constitutional Constraints","authors":"Yasmin Dawood","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2831198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2831198","url":null,"abstract":"This Article considers the process by which electoral reform ought to take place, focusing in particular on the democratic and constitutional constraints that bear on electoral reform. It outlines a number of possible process options — including a citizens’ assembly, a commission, a referendum, and a parliamentary committee — and it argues that although no single mechanism is mandated, the process must visibly follow the norms of political neutrality, consultation, and deliberation in order for the proposed reform to be democratically legitimate.This Article also addresses the question of whether a constitutional amendment involving provincial consent is required for electoral reform. The Supreme Court has recognized in many of its cases that the electoral system is political in nature but nonetheless subject to certain constitutional limits. The Court has also stated in its prior cases that the choice of the electoral model falls within the domain of Parliament. The remaining question, however, is whether the Senate Reference has changed the legal landscape such that Parliament would now be required to obtain provincial consent in order to usher in electoral change. This Article argues that given the salient differences between Senate reform and electoral reform, the Court could distinguish the Senate Reference and find that its earlier precedents on the electoral system remain valid. The Article concludes that electoral reform can likely proceed without a constitutional amendment involving provincial consent, provided that the reform is consistent with certain constitutional requirements.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124221161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A Spatial Theory of Ostracism 放逐的空间理论

ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Pub Date : 2015-12-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2701360

Tomohiko Kawamori, K. Yamaguchi

引用次数: 0

Globalization and its (Dis-)Content: Trade Shocks and Voting Behavior 全球化及其反内容:贸易冲击与投票行为

ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Pub Date : 2015-12-01 DOI: 10.3386/W21812

C. Dippel, Robert S. Gold, Stephan Heblich

引用次数: 138

Electoral Fraud and Voter Turnout: An Experimental Study 选举舞弊与选民投票率:一个实验研究

ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Pub Date : 2015-11-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2956385

V. Baghdasaryan, G. Iannantuoni, V. Maggian

{"title":"Electoral Fraud and Voter Turnout: An Experimental Study","authors":"V. Baghdasaryan, G. Iannantuoni, V. Maggian","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2956385","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2956385","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we experimentally investigate the consequences of electoral fraud on voter turnout. The experiment is based on a strategic binary voting model where voters decide whether to cast a costly vote in favour of their preferred candidate or to abstain. Minority candidate can illicitly influence the electoral process by applying ballot box stuffing. In the experiment we implement two different framings: we compare voter turnout in a neutral environment and with framed instructions to explicitly replicate elections. This approach enables to both test the model's predictions and to estimate framing effects of voting and fraud. Comparison of experimental results with theoretical predictions reveals over-voting, which is exac- erbated when fraud is applied. Moreover, turnout increases with moderate level of fraud. However, with more extensive electoral fraud, theoretical predictions are not matched. Voters fail to recognize that the existence of a relatively larger number of \"agents\" voting with certainty considerably decreases the benefits of voting. Importantly, framing matters, as revealed by the higher turnout of those in the majority group, against which the fraud is applied. Finally, individual level regression analysis provides evidences of strategic voting.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121567329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

Lobbying on the IASB Standards: An Analysis of the Lobbyists' Behaviour Over Period 2006-2014 基于IASB准则的游说:2006-2014年期间游说者行为分析

ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Pub Date : 2015-10-15 DOI: 10.12775/CJFA.2015.020

D. Procházka

{"title":"Lobbying on the IASB Standards: An Analysis of the Lobbyists' Behaviour Over Period 2006-2014","authors":"D. Procházka","doi":"10.12775/CJFA.2015.020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/CJFA.2015.020","url":null,"abstract":"The paper investigates whether there is any significant difference in lobbying behaviour on the IASB’s projects depending on the type of a project. In particular, we scrutinise the differences in number of comments letters received for: (a) major vs. minor projects; (b) projects successfully completed after the exposure draft phase vs. projects revised/stopped after the exposure draft phase. To test our two hypotheses about the pattern of lobbyist behaviour, we use reasoning based on a rational lobbying model developed by Sutton (1984). Our paper limits the scope to the IASB’s projects on its agenda over period 2006–2014; we thus complement previous studies of Kenny & Larson (1995) and Jorissen et al. (2012), who analysed the lobbying on IASB’s standards over periods 1989–1992, and 2002–2006 respectively. Our results show that the IASB inclines to succumb to the pressure of lobbying parties if the lobbying is quite massive (measured by number of comment letters submitted) in relation to other projects. We supplement the literature on lobbying on accounting standards with additional evidence on general ability of the lobbyist to influence the decision of standard- -setters by pushing them to revise a project substantially, or even to stop the project in question completely.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122105239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Computational Models of Social Influence and Collective Behavior 社会影响和集体行为的计算模型

ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Pub Date : 2015-10-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2673093

R. MacCoun

引用次数: 3

Democracy and Economic Growth: Do Swing Voters Make a Difference? 民主与经济增长:摇摆选民有影响吗?

ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Pub Date : 2015-08-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2700552

A. Bhardwaj, Prasanna Tantri, Nagaraju Thota

引用次数: 0